![[dr. bob]](/dr-bob-sm.gif)
Dr. Bob is Robert Hsiung, MD,
bob@dr-bob.orgShown: posts 15 to 39 of 39. Go back in thread:
Posted by Damos on October 6, 2005, at 1:52:57
In reply to Re: jeepers, posted by alexandra_k on October 6, 2005, at 1:14:02
> i CAN talk a load of sh*t sometimes...
>
> ;-)Smoking a load of good sh*t would probably do more for your mood though ;-)
Lots to read on the train YIPPEE!!!!!!
Posted by zeugma on October 9, 2005, at 14:46:33
In reply to Re: The albatross, posted by alexandra_k on October 5, 2005, at 22:40:16
Meaning is an artifact of mind / language
There is no meaning apart from mind / language>>
what do you think of Russell's distinction between acquiantance and description? That our descriptive powers enable us to talk about things that aren't real (however you want to parse that), but that acquiantance is something along the lines of an 'encounter', in which there must be a second party present (i.e. an aspect of reality, however you want to parse that)?
Reality is mind- and language- independent, in Russell's formulation. Thus it is a 'realist' formulation.
What is mind-dependent is the amount of reality we can acquiant ourselves with. What is language-dependent is fuzzy, because we have vague predicates, terms whose referents we don't know, etc. Acquiantance itself? well, as someone who has shut himself in for a good part of a decade with Evans' works, I would say that we are acquianted with something if we can subject its usage to the Generality Constraint. Thus, if I am acquianted with (and i really am!) this cup of coffee, this one from the coffee shop down the street, then I can understand such statements as that this cup of coffee has a reasonable milk-to-coffee ratio, that it could be poured into a mug from this styrofoam cup, and that putting it in the microwave would make it too hot for me to tolerate, what with my tender mouth (of course, I would put the coffee in a microwave-safe mug first). This is because I am acquianted with the putative 'universals' that go into each statements (e.g. I know what a reasonable milk-to coffee ratio is, at least relativized to me and further specificied as applying to matters of taste rather than chemical composition- presumably the universal needs to be specified in such a way as to make it immune to twin Earth type objections, or I could not have acquiantance with the universal in question).
As an albatross-related digression, there is an excellent biography of Russell, "Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude", whose title comes from the subtitle of Shelley's poem "Alastor; or, the Spirit of Solitude." Russell was a great admirer of Shelley's work. Shelley's poem contains references that appear to be to Wordsworth and Coleridge:
It is a woe too "deep for tears," when all
Is reft at once, when some surpassing Spirit,
Whose light adorned the world around it, leaves
Those who remain behind, not sobs or groans,
The passionate tumult of a clinging hope;
But pale despair and cold tranquillity...Shelley regarded Wordsworth as an example of a poet who sank into "cold tranquillity," becoming a servile friend of a corrupt government, while Coleridge had given way to "pale despair;" reading Coleridge's biography, "Coleridge: Darker Visions" (again, an excellent work) shows how accurate Shelley's characterization was.
End of albatross-related digression.
-z
Posted by zeugma on October 9, 2005, at 15:05:09
In reply to Russell, realism, and the albatross » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on October 9, 2005, at 14:46:33
Thus, if I am acquianted with (and i really am!) this cup of coffee, this one from the coffee shop down the street, then I can understand such statements as that this cup of coffee has a reasonable milk-to-coffee ratio, >>
I meant that I could not be said to be acquianted with the cup of coffee (the particular cup of coffee) if I could say it was too hot, but I couldn't say or understand anything else about it. If I said the coffee was too hot, but didn't know the coffee was liquid (choosing an arbitrary predicate or 'universal') then I really didn't have a grip on the coffee itself. Of course I might not know what 'liquid' meant; substitute any other predicate known to me that could apply to a cup of coffee (e.g. the coffee is bitter): I have to be capable of understanding statements along the lines of the parenthesized one in order to claim acquiantance. I must be able to understand generalizations about the coffee. I don't think this means verbal generalizations: for example a dog could be acquianted with the coffee if it could identify the coffee that is now placidly in my styrofoam cup as the same substance flung across the room in a childish outburst at how the coffee shop overcharged me for coffee with spoiled milk.
Thus, the dog understands that the coffee that at time T1 was in the cup was the same stuff as the coffee splotching the refrigerator at time T2. It would involve a tracking ability on the part of the dog to follow its progress from T1 to T2. Thus, Evans emphasizes the ability to re-identify an object as a criterion for knowing which object it is- and I take 'knowing which object it is' as another way of saying that you are acquianted with the object.
what do you think of Evans?
-z
Posted by Damos on October 10, 2005, at 18:11:44
In reply to acquiantance, posted by zeugma on October 9, 2005, at 15:05:09
Hope you feel more than an acquaintance to us. I sadly know nothing of Evans and precious little of Russell, but will never look at my simple cup of coffee in the same way again :-)
I've actually been sporadically re-reading the dialogues between Dr David Bohm and Krishnamurti, can't seem to hold any of it my head for any length of time though (sigh).
The occassionaly coffee with spoiled milk aside, how are you doing?
Posted by alexandra_k on October 10, 2005, at 22:26:20
In reply to Russell, realism, and the albatross » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on October 9, 2005, at 14:46:33
hello :-)
> what do you think of Russell's distinction between acquiantance and description? That our descriptive powers enable us to talk about things that aren't real (however you want to parse that), but that acquiantance is something along the lines of an 'encounter', in which there must be a second party present (i.e. an aspect of reality, however you want to parse that)?
i guess acquaintance... is with the referent. so here is where it gets tricky... i want to say there is no meaning apart from mind / language. but then we typically want to be good content extenalists about mental content... and if reference is part of meaning... we also want to be externalists about reference too. but... i don't think there would be any reference or any meaning aside from mind / language. because even reference... to get that the referent of water is H2O you have to apply the sortal 'natural kind term' to water in order to create a distinction... and mind / language creates distinctions (that are not inherent in reality). so the distinction (sortal) tells us that what is relevant (as opposed to irrelevant) for the reference is chemical composition.
to be honest... i haven't done a lot on Russell. Just a little... just a little. so... from memory... the kinds of things we can have acquaintance knowledge of...
1) universals
2) sense data
3) perhaps... 'I'.with respect to the first...
i'm not so sure about universals being 'in the world'. i think... the judgement of similarity / difference is something that we do via mind / language. i'm not sure how we can be acquainted with universals... no matter how many instances of 'tobacco' i encounter i seem to be going beyond the samples i have encountered when i grasp the concept 'tobacco' and grasp that it not only applies to all the samples that i have encountered, but also to past present and future samples that i have not encountered. i'm not so sure that knowledge of universals can be grasped by acquaintance with something external to us...with respect to sense data... they don't seem to me to be mind independent. i guess i would say that those... are the meeting point of mind and world.
and with respect to knowledge of objects... well... the same object can be multiply realised with respect to sense data. the sense data alter as we view it from a slightly different perspective etc. all the problems that we have trying to get face recognition etc up off the ground in AI would seem to crop up quite significantly if objects are to be viewed as merely conjunctions of sense data...
there is also the point that i cannot access your sense data. and you cannot access mine. sense data are thus subjective... i don't see how we can get from sense data to mind independent reality...
i thought that was a major problem for Russell...
and with respect to having an acquaintance with 'I'. well... that is notorious. i have to say that i have sympathies with hume when he said that no matter how much he introspected and tried to find this thing 'the self' he could only be aware of particular thoughts, memories, mental pictures, or impressions. he could not find this thing that was supposed to contain all that.
i don't think...
i experience a self either...
Posted by zeugma on October 11, 2005, at 18:39:34
In reply to Re: Russell, realism, and the albatross » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on October 10, 2005, at 22:26:20
> hello :-)
hi there :-)> >
>
> i guess acquaintance... is with the referent. so here is where it gets tricky... i want to say there is no meaning apart from mind / language. but then we typically want to be good content extenalists about mental content... and if reference is part of meaning... we also want to be externalists about reference too. but... i don't think there would be any reference or any meaning aside from mind / language. because even reference... to get that the referent of water is H2O you have to apply the sortal 'natural kind term' to water in order to create a distinction... and mind / language creates distinctions (that are not inherent in reality). so the distinction (sortal) tells us that what is relevant (as opposed to irrelevant) for the reference is chemical composition.
>
hmmm. 'sortal' denotes that we sort items by neans of such terms, i.e make distinctions for whatever reason (I should look up my Strawson on this, but it's too late at night); but natural kind terms are surely a special kind of 'sortal'? Water has to be H2O, or Twin Earth experiments lose their force. The distinction is inherent in relaity, because where else are we to look? Not in subjective experience... ex hypothesi (I love sounding like I know what I'm talking about) retaw (McGinn's felicitious name for Twin earth's liquid of sustenance)is indistinguishable from water except for its aberrant chemical composition. Take on the other hand 'pencil.' On Twin Earth pencils might be made of something other than graphite, but it doesn't matter, because pencils aren't a natural kind. But what is special about natural kind terms that causes our semantics to break down as we move from one world to another? Is it mind- or language-dependent? Alternatively, what is special about pencils that we can keep our semantic grip on them even in places as remote as twin earth?
> to be honest... i haven't done a lot on Russell. Just a little... just a little. so... from memory... the kinds of things we can have acquaintance knowledge of...
>
> 1) universals
> 2) sense data
> 3) perhaps... 'I'.
>
> with respect to the first...
> i'm not so sure about universals being 'in the world'. i think... the judgement of similarity / difference is something that we do via mind / language. i'm not sure how we can be acquainted with universals... no matter how many instances of 'tobacco' i encounter i seem to be going beyond the samples i have encountered when i grasp the concept 'tobacco' and grasp that it not only applies to all the samples that i have encountered, but also to past present and future samples that i have not encountered. i'm not so sure that knowledge of universals can be grasped by acquaintance with something external to us...
>
> with respect to sense data... they don't seem to me to be mind independent.
agreed. Russell's epsitemology was crap. Sense data are mind dependent and not the place to look for acquiantance (a word whose spelling still eludes me).
i guess i would say that those... are the meeting point of mind and world.
>
if all goes well with our senses, yes.> and with respect to knowledge of objects... well... the same object can be multiply realised with respect to sense data. the sense data alter as we view it from a slightly different perspective etc. all the problems that we have trying to get face recognition etc up off the ground in AI would seem to crop up quite significantly if objects are to be viewed as merely conjunctions of sense data...
ah. now this is the point i am interested in. Objects as conjunctions of sense data is untenable metaphysics.
>
> there is also the point that i cannot access your sense data. and you cannot access mine. sense data are thus subjective... i don't see how we can get from sense data to mind independent reality...
agreed. i don't think sense data gets us far at all.
>
> i thought that was a major problem for Russell...
>
> and with respect to having an acquaintance with 'I'. well... that is notorious. i have to say that i have sympathies with hume when he said that no matter how much he introspected and tried to find this thing 'the self' he could only be aware of particular thoughts, memories, mental pictures, or impressions. he could not find this thing that was supposed to contain all that.
>
> i don't think...
>
> i experience a self either...
>
my self is rapidly slipping away as i write (damn these stimulants with their wretched half-lives). the place to look for a self is not through introspection. damn these stimulants....
-z
Posted by zeugma on October 11, 2005, at 18:50:36
In reply to Good to see you » zeugma, posted by Damos on October 10, 2005, at 18:11:44
> Hope you feel more than an acquaintance to us. I sadly know nothing of Evans and precious little of Russell, but will never look at my simple cup of coffee in the same way again :-)
>I feel more than an acquaintance with you (and thanks btw for showing me how to spell that word). More important to look at the coffee in a multiplex way (sorry, free associating, word from adolescence, Samuel delany's "Empire Star", interesting little book) than acquiant yourself with the tomes of Evans, which are fascinating; anything Russell wrote after 1912 is verbiage IMO.
> I've actually been sporadically re-reading the dialogues between Dr David Bohm and Krishnamurti, can't seem to hold any of it my head for any length of time though (sigh).
>quantum physics? I have no grasp of it either, and I am devoid at the moment of spiritual outlook.
> The occassionaly coffee with spoiled milk aside, how are you doing?
Quite well, early bedtimes, but greatly enjoying the cooler weather. And yourself?
-z
Posted by alexandra_k on October 11, 2005, at 19:22:13
In reply to Re: Russell, realism, and the albatross » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on October 11, 2005, at 18:39:34
> > i want to say there is no meaning apart from mind / language.
and i've just thought of something to support this notion... have you read any grice? do you remember how grice distinguishes between natural and non-natural meaning?
by 'meaning' i mean non-natural meaning. and non-natural meaning REQUIRES a speaker intending something by what they think / say. and thinkings / sayings are the only candidates for non-natural meanings (though I should also include sign language and writing of course).
> hmmm. 'sortal' denotes that we sort items by neans of such terms... natural kind terms are surely a special kind of 'sortal'?
yes indeed. in order to grasp the referent (and make determinations on 'same' or 'different' referent across possible worlds) we need to grasp something of the referents accidental as opposed to essential properties.
'water'. you can gesture as much as you like, that doesn't distinguish between the accidental and essential properties of the referent. the world (in itself) does not contain a distinction between its accidental and essential properties. this is a distinction that we make, that we draw, for our various purposes. and of course you need to draw the distinction between which properties count as essential and which properties count as accidental in order to grasp the notion of 'same stuff'. in order to make judgements of similarity and difference you need to preface that with 'same or different in what respects?' and so this is where people come into it. what interests us. what distinctions we care to draw. what distinctions are important to us.
so in the case of 'water'. we decide that what we are really interested in is its essential properties as are to be determined by science. it is because these scientific properties are considered to be the relevant essential properties with respect to the reference of the term 'water' that 'water' is being treated as a natural kind term here. natural kind terms just do have essential properties that are to be determined by science.
if you grant that 'water' is a natural kind term then you are saying something about which properties are to be considered accidental and which are to be considered essential to the identity of the referent.
if you do not grant that 'water' is a natural kind term then you might think the superficial, observable properties are actually what interests us. if you do this instead then you mean a different thing by 'water' you are drawing a different distinction. the observable properties would be essential and the chemical composition properties would be accidental.
and thus you are going to get a different result when you ask 'same or different stuff / thing' across different possible worlds.
but the stuff in the world...
in the world the observable properties (if you cash that out PROPERLY), the observable properties JUST ARE correlated with the scientific 'real nature' properties.there isn't a distinction in reality...
but we make distinctions according to what interests us...more on universals...
i think our grasp of universals is innate...
don't get me wrong... i don't believe that there would be any redness if there weren't any red things... but there are red things, and so if we see two red things then our minds are such that we judge them to be similar in respect to this notion we call 'redness'. so... i guess our grasp of universals is in abstracting away from our experiences. but this abstracting away... is something that our mind does... the abstraction is general whereas reality... is always particular... though this is senseless really because reality isn't even particular because to say that it is particular is to say that it contains its own conditions of identity (that there is an objective distinction as to essential and inessential properties). but there is no 'identity' in the mind independent world. the world doesn't ask itself 'is that the same (insert identity conditions here) x or not?' that is something that we do...> > with respect to sense data... they don't seem to me to be mind independent.
> agreed. Russell's epsitemology was crap. Sense data are mind dependent and not the place to look for acquiantance (a word whose spelling still eludes me).:-)
the spelling eludes me too...
i liked his epistemology (we know because we have direct access)
its just that it relied on a metaphysical system...
and that metaphysical system is untenable (as you note)
:-(> i guess i would say that those... are the meeting point of mind and world.
> if all goes well with our senses, yes.and even if our senses are in error... that just means that our minds are contributing other than how they should be...
> all the problems that we have trying to get face recognition etc up off the ground in AI would seem to crop up quite significantly if objects are to be viewed as merely conjunctions of sense data...> ah. now this is the point i am interested in. Objects as conjunctions of sense data is untenable metaphysics.
yeah. and i think... that realisation was the end of logical positivism... :-( it was beautiful (acquaintance gives us certain knowledge) but unfortunately acquaintance cannot be of mind independent reality...
> i don't think sense data gets us far at all.
no, just a whole heap of trouble...
> my self is rapidly slipping away as i write (damn these stimulants with their wretched half-lives). the place to look for a self is not through introspection. damn these stimulants....where do you think we should look for a self?
bodily criterion?
memory criterion?
narrative?
behaviour???
ooh. on reality 1 reality 2 this is a distinction i made in my honours year. apparantly it is similar to a distinction that kant drew but unfortunately i haven't read my kant so i'll just say something briefly about my version...reality 1 is mind-independent reality.
reality 2 is inter-subjective reality (mind-dependent but also the point that we need different people to converge on their observations)reality 1 is outside the grasp of our minds by definition. by the very meaning of reality 1. because it is outside the grasp of our minds it follows that we cannot have acquaintance with it. we cannot know anything about it. if reality 1 is what is of interest to us then radical scepticism follows and we are left with a very sorry state of affairs indeed. science cannot be about reality 1 because reality 1 is beyond our grasp as a matter of principle.
(i think this is noumena? reality in itself or how things are in themselves)
reality 2 just has to be what interests us...
the meeting point of mind and world.
what is crucial is the point that different observers report the same observation.
but observations just have to play a crucial part on the world that we experience.
and isn't that what really interests us anyways?
the world that we experience?
isn't that really what science is about?
explaining the essential properties (to be determined by science) of the world that we experience?(phenomena...)
so of course mind is going to play a pivotal role in just what we mean by reality...
the distinction between mind and reality is ultimately untenable.
though... we do talk about a distinction between 'mind' and 'reality'. in fact, we set them up as being contrasting terms *by definition*. and we need these terms to even describe 'reality' as being the meeting point of mind and world.
sigh.
i think i'm heading back towards the inexpressible...
(ps i've never read evans...)
Posted by Damos on October 11, 2005, at 19:45:22
In reply to Re: Good to see you » Damos, posted by zeugma on October 11, 2005, at 18:50:36
> I feel more than an acquaintance with you (and thanks btw for showing me how to spell that word).
I'm glad, and I hadn't noticed any spelling issues.
Thanks for the recommendations, I'm struggling to enjoy reading at the moment - never a good sign, but I do enjoy a good google and bookshop browse.
> quantum physics? I have no grasp of it either, and I am devoid at the moment of spiritual outlook.
Ah no. What interests me about Bohm is his thinking about thinking; his interest in 'meaning'. I exchanged emails a while back with Donald Factor, one of the co-authors of "Dialogue - a Proposal". I guess basically 'truth' and who's right or wrong don't interest me as much as the unfolding of shared meaning.
Want to talk more about the 'spiritual outlook' stuff?
Glad to hear you are doing well. Me, I'm getting a bit more exercise which is good, and doing a bit of Reiki and meditation each night which really helps the quality of my sleep and general mood.
Damos
Posted by alexandra_k on October 11, 2005, at 20:41:26
In reply to Re: Reality 1 and Reality 2 » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on October 11, 2005, at 19:22:13
sorry.
that was a confusing muddle.> reality 1 is mind-independent reality.
> reality 2 is inter-subjective reality (mind-dependent but also the point that we need different people to converge on their observations)and so i maintain that the real nature of reality (the real nature of the reality that interests us)
is that the real nature of that reality is...
the meeting point of mind and world.
i know that analytically (what we mean by reality) is that it is mind-independent.
but it turns out that the reality that is of interest to us... well its real nature is such that it does have mind as an essential componant.and so...
i'm getting myself into a muddle...
the similar muddle that there is in philosophy of mind...between the analytic enterprise of the clarification of meanings
(by reality we just mean mind independent reality)
and the empirical enterprise of the discovery of the real nature of the thing AS IT INTERESTS US
(where the real nature of the reality that interests us has mind as a componant)
and thus...
there isn't really a confusion.
its a little like behaviourists...
how they said that the real nature of mental states was that they were behaviours.
they didn't mean to imply that the meaning of any mental state term just is a list of behaviours or dispositions to behave (analytically that is false)but they were less interested in the analytic enterprise of the clarification of meaning of mental state terms...
and more interested in the real nature of the phenomena that interests us...
and those things can come apart...
and the problem for philosophy is that they quite often do...and what their coming apart shows us...
is that our language, our concepts, what we mean by our concepts
comes apart from the real nature of things that interest us.
and thus...
our language is defective.:-(
but then...
just try and come up with a better one...
Posted by alexandra_k on October 11, 2005, at 20:55:42
In reply to Re: Reality 1 and Reality 2, posted by alexandra_k on October 11, 2005, at 20:41:26
and thus...
in studying the reality that interests us...
what is the contribution of world?
(can we say anything about its intrinsic nature)
and what is the contribution of mind?
(can we say anything about its intrinsic nature)
is there any principled way of deciding?
it shouldn't just be an analytic enterprise - should it?
(or maybe... mind/world is just one phenomena. and in reality... there isn't any such thing as mind apart from world and there isn't any such thing as world apart from mind. comperably to how there isn't any such thing as an uninstantiated universal and how there isn't any such thing as a particular without any universals inhering in it)
maybe these distinctions...
are artifacts of mind / language
though if this is the case...
we end up with them being artifacts of world / mind / language
and thus...
we are back to the inexpressible...
we can't talk ABOUT anything...
in order to talk ABOUT things
(in order to even get to things)
one needs to apply (via mind / language)
an identity criterion to the world in order to distinguish accidental from essential properties.and now...
i've completely lost myself...
i think...
i'm back to the inexpressible
and i think...
i need to take a little babble break...and i think the problem is that if you imagine what things are like aside from mind / language...
well then you can't even comprehend them (think of them or talk about them)
BY DEFINITION
AAAAAAAAAAAARGH
and with respect to 'it shouldn't just be an analytic enterprise - should it?'i think the answer is 'yes'
because these are metaphysical questions...
and i can't see how science can help...
because these things transcend science
they lie beyond its limitsand thus what we are left with is an analytic enterprise
and thus the rules of the game are the rules of analytic philosophy
(not the sciences)
and thus we are looking at who has the best theory?????simplicity
coherance
etc etcand it is surely possible that there could be multiple metaphysical systems that measure up the same with respect to relevant criteria...
and yet they are incompatable...
and the truth is in seeing the scope of 'best explanation'
and now i really am going away
:-(
Posted by alexandra_k on October 12, 2005, at 2:49:41
In reply to Re: Reality 1 and Reality 2, posted by alexandra_k on October 11, 2005, at 20:55:42
okay... just one more...
and zeugma...
i hope i'm not too overwhelming with my gigantic raves... just disregard whatever and chat about whatever you want. there are always points of contact and i love to read whatever you have to say :-)
the limits of thought just are the limits of the thinkable.
to think of something outside thought is to think of the unthinkable.
which is something that we just cannot do
(though i have a slightly disturbed feeling about this... and i think i'm making an error here?)
the limits of language just are the limits of the expressable.
to attempt to talk about something outside language is to attempt to express the inexpressable.but we seem to want to talk about
we seem to want to think about
things outside language
things outside thoughtbut things are objects of language and thought
and outside language and thought
there aren't any things
there aren't any objectsbut things and objects are surely composed of states of affairs...
but states of affairs are connected like links in a chain
when we express or think about the world
we think of facts.
facts are carved up states of affairs
states of affairs are the truth makers for facts
we only have access to a very limited portion of the states of affairsour sensory apperatus is one limitation
our tiny finite minds are anotherbut i'm just talking...
Posted by alexandra_k on October 12, 2005, at 2:51:11
In reply to Re: just one more..., posted by alexandra_k on October 12, 2005, at 2:49:41
one cannot get outside language or thought to see the boundary or limit from both sides.
one can only hit ones head up against the limits of sense
w.
we do this when we attempt to think the unthinkable
or when we attempt to express the inexpressable
Posted by alexandra_k on October 12, 2005, at 3:09:04
In reply to Re: just one more..., posted by alexandra_k on October 12, 2005, at 2:51:11
and the limits of my language...
the limits of my thought...just are the limits of my world
(zeugma.. just in case you worry about my wittgenstein i have some confusion there about referencing and distinguishing what is in the "Tractatus" and the "Philosophical Investigations" from stuff I've made up. when i go 'w.' that is a half-hearted attempt at a reference. i don't want to plagarise... but i don't want to reference falsely either. i think i pervert a lot of what wittgenstein said in my own ravings and i don't purport to be a wittgenstein scholar)
Posted by alexandra_k on October 12, 2005, at 6:36:40
In reply to Re: Good to see you » zeugma, posted by Damos on October 11, 2005, at 19:45:22
> I guess basically 'truth' and who's right or wrong don't interest me as much as the unfolding of shared meaning.
:-)
That sounds interesting to me.I am not sure...
But I think I was in danger of getting lost...I would be interested to hear about that :-)
Posted by Damos on October 12, 2005, at 17:57:42
In reply to Re: Good to see you » Damos, posted by alexandra_k on October 12, 2005, at 6:36:40
> I am not sure...
> But I think I was in danger of getting lost...Oh yes indeedy, and it was worrying me (lots). It's okay though, I slipped and EPIRB (Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon) in your backpack when you weren't looking ;-)
Not sure that I can adequately explain but I'll try when I get a chance (busy, busy day)
Posted by Damos on October 13, 2005, at 22:41:41
In reply to Re: Good to see you » Damos, posted by alexandra_k on October 12, 2005, at 6:36:40
You guys have no idea how daunting the idea of trying to explain something to you is.
I actually saw a really interesting example on tv the other night. A guy held up a solid cone and asked the others what it was. From where they, and the viewer were it was a cone. He then rotated it and asked them again. Purely, objectively what you saw was the base of the cone - a circle. He rotated it again and it appeared to be a triangle. So what was 'true'? It depends entirely on your perspective, assumptions, judgements, prejudices, beliefs, experience, etc.
Okay, so that got me precisely nowhere. Hmm, this is one of those times when being a relatively ignorant, inarticulate moron is a damn nuisance.
Alex, you were on the same track in your essay about the Cotard Delusion. The experience is true for individual and that's all there is to it. Trying to prove it to be untrue and making them wrong is almost always futile and in some cases damaging in the long run. But if you accept that the experience is true and work with the meaning and impact of it and try to discover those things that allow it to be true for them, then you get to shared meaning. Then you can work together with coherent meaning, and when you work with coherent meaning this allows deeper truth to emerge. Breaking it down into one thousand carefully labelled and defined pieces and trying to prove or disprove the validity doesn't change the truth of the experience for the person one iota. Dammit!!!!! Do you know why that essay was so good? Because there was a flow of meaning from you to me. I didn't understand all of the terminology and stuff, didn't know about whether the references you were citing were right or wrong, but I picked up and sensed the flow of meaning.
AAARRRRGGGGHHHHH!!!!!!!!! I'm still not getting at it. I guess basically what I am saying is that I don't need to be right, and that who's right and who's wrong matters less to me that why you think, believe and feel the things you do. And because I care and respect you I would never dare believe that I had a better idea of what was true for you than you do. If you say 'x' is true for you then that's good enough for me. What I do care about is how and why those things are true for you and how understanding those things helps me understand you, and how that allows the relationship to grow and other possibilities to emerge. The definitions of the words you use to describe the experience don't matter nearly as much to me as the meaning you ascribe to them and to the experience you are trying to describe. I don't want to argue, debate, persuade or discuss. I want to understand. And to do that I have to give up my certainty about my position and all kinds of things.
Something that has always royally p*ssed me off is the way different groups (individuals) always believe that they alone are arriving at a unique truth. Science, religion, politics, whatever, even groups within these fields. They believe that they are right and therefore everyone else must be wrong. I hate that. Worse than that there are groups who believe that we are never going to get to absolute truth. Can't all of them see that their rigidly sticking to the same damn road is limiting by its very nature. I guess my problem with thinking about thinking is that thinking seems to just limit and define. It's an abstraction, and because it limits and defines it can't grasp the whole - surely. Surely it just grabs a bit of the whole, thinks it to death and then finds another bit to think about. Isn't it the case that all this limiting and defining is only moving further and further away from the whole to a place where the sense of completeness is lost, a place where all you have is all these pieces that no longer seem to bear any real relationship to one another. I don't care about how you divide it, categorise it and analyse it. I care about what it means.
Meaning is so important to me because it's like........like glue I guess, a kind of binding agent if you will. And I don't see meaning as being fixed either, it flows. It needs to flow. Without meaning I am lost and that's why I'm so hopelessly floundering around right now. I can't find a way to see how who I am and what I do (workwise and whole of life wise) has any meaning, purpose or value.
Sorry, I've rambled, distorted, misrepresented and very probably plagiarised and only ended up with a thousand kinds of cr*p. I'm sorry.
Posted by zeugma on October 15, 2005, at 14:13:26
In reply to I tried......and failed miserably - as usual :-( » alexandra_k, posted by Damos on October 13, 2005, at 22:41:41
Damos,
meaning is a binding agent. In my case it is very precarious holding together a few shreds of consciousness.
about spirituality: last night i had terrible hypnagogic hallucinations, when they occur i always think of how in medieval times they were considered nocturnal attacks by demons, and more recently so-called UFO abductions have been attributed to them.
they are extremely unpleasant. i haven't said anything about spirituality. i suppose these hypnagogic hallucinations would have made a me a most spiritual person had i grown up (and i use the phrase loosely) in a different environment.
i break down over the course of a week. i become less responsive, coordinated, and focused. i actually feel ok, simply inert, like mere brain substrate with minimal consciousness.the meaning generator sputters and one sees that it is a machine that makes extraordinary demands on our selves, one can perceive its substrates when the glaze of sensation wears away and what remains is dull enough to stare at, as one can stare at Venus but not the sun.
and if you've ever stared at Venus after sunrise, there are moments when you can see it, then it flickers away, then there, and then... it melts away from the center of the sky.
there is meaning as i perceive it.
-z
Posted by zeugma on October 15, 2005, at 15:30:54
In reply to Re: Reality 1 and Reality 2 » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on October 11, 2005, at 19:22:13
> > > i want to say there is no meaning apart from mind / language.
>
> and i've just thought of something to support this notion... have you read any grice? do you remember how grice distinguishes between natural and non-natural meaning?
grice and NM vs. NNM... a cloud means it's going to rain, natural meaning. 'red' means red, NNM. doesn't science become a series of searches into natural meaning then?
>
> by 'meaning' i mean non-natural meaning. and non-natural meaning REQUIRES a speaker intending something by what they think / say. and thinkings / sayings are the only candidates for non-natural meanings (though I should also include sign language and writing of course).
>
yes, but NNM becomes convoluted. I interrupt a speaker with 'it's a fine day.' Conventional meaning: the sun is shining. my intention: get this annoying character to shut up. NNM of utterance of 'it's a fine day': shut up, annoying character. because that's my intention. Grice is right to zero in on sudden changes of subject as instances where conventional meaning and intention diverge. Grice is good, but intention has to do an awful lot of work.> > hmmm. 'sortal' denotes that we sort items by neans of such terms... natural kind terms are surely a special kind of 'sortal'?
>
> yes indeed. in order to grasp the referent (and make determinations on 'same' or 'different' referent across possible worlds) we need to grasp something of the referents accidental as opposed to essential properties.
>
> 'water'. you can gesture as much as you like, that doesn't distinguish between the accidental and essential properties of the referent. the world (in itself) does not contain a distinction between its accidental and essential properties. this is a distinction that we make, that we draw, for our various purposes. and of course you need to draw the distinction between which properties count as essential and which properties count as accidental in order to grasp the notion of 'same stuff'. in order to make judgements of similarity and difference you need to preface that with 'same or different in what respects?' and so this is where people come into it. what interests us. what distinctions we care to draw. what distinctions are important to us.
ok. we are interested in the molecular structure of water, and make it the basis for putting substances on the lists of things that are water. now suppose it was observable properties that caught our eye instead (so to speak). nothing wrong with that. but i have certain sympathies with quine's holism, and can't let this go by too blithely. suppose it turned out that chemists were wrong about water. it's like jade (i think that jade is the substance that has several chemical instantiations while looking alike to the naked eye). or, let's say gold and pyrite. now gold is on the periodic table near silver. but we're wrong about gold, it turns out to be like pyrite, a composite of some kind. no big deal, EXCEPT an awful lot of work is now invalidated regarding the nature of gold, and which ripples through the whole web of our beliefs. now i don't take gold's elemental status on faith, so to speak. i take our understanding of gold as interwoven with our understanding of everything else on the periodic table.so if gold is not silver's neighbor on the chart, then what about hydrogen? or carbon? is it merely a set of observations that produced the conclusion that gold was distinct from pyrite, or is it those observations PLUS the fact that the observations cleared a path to putting gold in its slot in the vicinity of silver? And isn't that path the one we follow? and what other paths are there?
>
> so in the case of 'water'. we decide that what we are really interested in is its essential properties as are to be determined by science. it is because these scientific properties are considered to be the relevant essential properties with respect to the reference of the term 'water' that 'water' is being treated as a natural kind term here. natural kind terms just do have essential properties that are to be determined by science.
>this portrayal (sorry to be so critical, this is an important matter) makes science a freestanding instituition rather than part of the path we as cognitive creatures follow. Or am i misreading you?
> if you grant that 'water' is a natural kind term then you are saying something about which properties are to be considered accidental and which are to be considered essential to the identity of the referent.
>
> if you do not grant that 'water' is a natural kind term then you might think the superficial, observable properties are actually what interests us. if you do this instead then you mean a different thing by 'water' you are drawing a different distinction. the observable properties would be essential and the chemical composition properties would be accidental.
>
> and thus you are going to get a different result when you ask 'same or different stuff / thing' across different possible worlds.
>
> but the stuff in the world...
> in the world the observable properties (if you cash that out PROPERLY), the observable properties JUST ARE correlated with the scientific 'real nature' properties.
>this partitions observation and 'reality' too strictly. it can be that they JUST ARE, the results of observation have to be sent to the right destination (i.e. woven into the right place in the web of belief).
> there isn't a distinction in reality...
> but we make distinctions according to what interests us...>i disagree. science is driven by what interests us, but it must go down a path that makes sense. but then there is the question of why certain paths make more sense than others. and if we say that some make more sense because they interest us, then it seems like a vicious circle. or if we say they make sense because of mind-dependence, then we have a very strong version of anti-realism that seems to me to go too far).
>
> more on universals...
>
> i think our grasp of universals is innate...
> don't get me wrong... i don't believe that there would be any redness if there weren't any red things... but there are red things, and so if we see two red things then our minds are such that we judge them to be similar in respect to this notion we call 'redness'. so... i guess our grasp of universals is in abstracting away from our experiences. but this abstracting away... is something that our mind does... the abstraction is general whereas reality... is always particular... though this is senseless really because reality isn't even particular because to say that it is particular is to say that it contains its own conditions of identity (that there is an objective distinction as to essential and inessential properties). but there is no 'identity' in the mind independent world. the world doesn't ask itself 'is that the same (insert identity conditions here) x or not?' that is something that we do...>>surely there is a difference between essential and inessential properties. but i have no argument s available at the moment beyond what i've already said. maybe essential properties are those that are necessary for coherence with the bulk of our beliefs.
>
> > > with respect to sense data... they don't seem to me to be mind independent.
>
> > agreed. Russell's epsitemology was crap. Sense data are mind dependent and not the place to look for acquiantance (a word whose spelling still eludes me).
>
> :-)
> the spelling eludes me too...
> i liked his epistemology (we know because we have direct access)
> its just that it relied on a metaphysical system...
> and that metaphysical system is untenable (as you note)
> :-(
>
> > i guess i would say that those... are the meeting point of mind and world.
>
> > if all goes well with our senses, yes.
>
> and even if our senses are in error... that just means that our minds are contributing other than how they should be...
> > all the problems that we have trying to get face recognition etc up off the ground in AI would seem to crop up quite significantly if objects are to be viewed as merely conjunctions of sense data...
>
> > ah. now this is the point i am interested in. Objects as conjunctions of sense data is untenable metaphysics.
>
> yeah. and i think... that realisation was the end of logical positivism... :-( it was beautiful (acquaintance gives us certain knowledge) but unfortunately acquaintance cannot be of mind independent reality...
>
> > i don't think sense data gets us far at all.
>
> no, just a whole heap of trouble...
>
> > my self is rapidly slipping away as i write (damn these stimulants with their wretched half-lives). the place to look for a self is not through introspection. damn these stimulants....
>
> where do you think we should look for a self?
>
> bodily criterion?
> memory criterion?
> narrative?
> behaviour?
>
> ??
>
>
> ooh. on reality 1 reality 2 this is a distinction i made in my honours year. apparantly it is similar to a distinction that kant drew but unfortunately i haven't read my kant so i'll just say something briefly about my version...
>
> reality 1 is mind-independent reality.
> reality 2 is inter-subjective reality (mind-dependent but also the point that we need different people to converge on their observations)
>
> reality 1 is outside the grasp of our minds by definition. by the very meaning of reality 1. because it is outside the grasp of our minds it follows that we cannot have acquaintance with it. we cannot know anything about it. if reality 1 is what is of interest to us then radical scepticism follows and we are left with a very sorry state of affairs indeed. science cannot be about reality 1 because reality 1 is beyond our grasp as a matter of principle.
>
> (i think this is noumena? reality in itself or how things are in themselves)
>
> reality 2 just has to be what interests us...
> the meeting point of mind and world.
> what is crucial is the point that different observers report the same observation.
> but observations just have to play a crucial part on the world that we experience.
> and isn't that what really interests us anyways?
> the world that we experience?
> isn't that really what science is about?
> explaining the essential properties (to be determined by science) of the world that we experience?
>
> (phenomena...)
>
> so of course mind is going to play a pivotal role in just what we mean by reality...
>
> the distinction between mind and reality is ultimately untenable.
>
> though... we do talk about a distinction between 'mind' and 'reality'. in fact, we set them up as being contrasting terms *by definition*. and we need these terms to even describe 'reality' as being the meeting point of mind and world.
>i don't think 'mind' and 'reality' are contrastive. if they are contrastive that presupposes skepticism. the difficulty with 'reality' is that it is not amenable to adjectival modification. is mind as 'real' as 'reality' or is it less? how about paths converging on reality, but not quite there? in this regard contrast with 'truth.' we don't have unlimited access to truth, and there may be many truths that are in principle unknowable to us. but truths (and forgive my convoluted path) can be called part of the 'alpha' content of minds. 'beta' content is content that is not truth-conditional, for instance knowing how to follow a gricean maxim of informativeness is the product of perceptions that need not be put into propositional form, and indeed one may not know how to put the knowledge into propositional form. or take my knowledge that the matterhorn is a jagged mountain on the swiss-italian border. now that is 'alpha' content. i believe the proposition true because i have seen pictures and i know what it means to be a jagged mountain. someone who has seen the mountain, and only knows it as 'that mountain over there,' has 'beta' knowledge. that mountain is the matterhorn, but this lucky person doesn't know that- he just observes the spectacular peak. now suppose i am that lucky person, and i study a map, figure out that 'that mountain' is the matterhorn- now i have done something that is neither given in the map nor delivered by sensory process. I have brought two pictures of the world into systematic correlation. but saying that propositional content and experiential content are anything other than differemces in sense- i.e. differences in cognitive significance- makes no sense because the fact that one can locate one's position is to say that both the map and the sensory qualities are alike in reference.
sorry, can't do any better now....
-z
> sigh.
>
> i think i'm heading back towards the inexpressible...
>
> (ps i've never read evans...)
>
>
Posted by Damos on October 16, 2005, at 19:33:40
In reply to Re: I tried......and failed miserably - as usual :-( » Damos, posted by zeugma on October 15, 2005, at 14:13:26
Hi -Z,
I hope you know it means a lot to me that you come here to be with us. Yeah, I know what you mean about it being precarious. I also know that it's the fact that there are those precious few that mean so much to me that actually keeps me going.
Dreams, something else Efexor seems to have stolen from me. I think I know what you mean though, I've had a couple of sleep paralysis incidents where there was something else there and some other terrible hallucinations with snakes and spiders and other 'things' that have left me spooked for days (nights). They are no fun, no fun at all. When you come to and you're actually standing in the middle of the bed and the bed clothes, pillows etc are strewn around the room and you're completely terrified, or lying on the floor having physically thrown yourself out of bed trying to get away, you get the feeling things are more than a little odd. But fortunately or sadly depending on your point of view since coming off Efexor I don't seem to dream anymore. Seem to have had an almost complete creativity by-pass.
I was actually reading somewhere recently how in ancient times they used to try and put terrible dreams into the minds of their enemies to make them lose their heart for battle. Had you grown up in ancient times or simply a different culture I'm sure you would have made a fine seer indeed. Guess you'll just have to settle for being the sage you are in this one :-)
Usually with the Dysthymia it's just a long slow slide into the abyss for me with varying levels of disconnectedness. But sometimes, sometimes it's like someone sneaks in while I'm asleep and sucks all that is me out of my body and just leaves an empty shell. A thing that can't think, can't feel, but continues to apparently function in the world. It's those times that I grasp the threads of what others mean to me and hold on to them with all I'm worth. Hoping that just holding on will somehow pull me back to life.
I kind of get what you mean about Venus, and yeah I feel meaning and the sense of meaning slipping away at times but I try so hard to remember that just like Venus, just because I can't see it doesn't mean it isn't there. Even more sadly sometimes I don't see the meaning of things and people until it's too late and that makes me sad. People need to know they have meaning to others. Like the time and care you take in your responses to Alex has meaning to me. The fact that you come down to my level to talk with me means more than you know. And my friend, just like Venus, even when we can't see you, just knowing you are there means something to us, and we long for those moments when you appear above the horizon and choose to grace our skies on your journey.
Sometimes I worry that we are looking so hard for specific meaning, that we actually miss so much other meaning that is flowing around us. I worry about that.
Thank you for sharing with me -z, I really appreciate it.
Posted by zeugma on October 26, 2005, at 17:26:34
In reply to Re: I tried......and failed miserably - as usual :-( » zeugma, posted by Damos on October 16, 2005, at 19:33:40
Hi damos,I hope you don't take my dilatory responses as anything other than a reflection of my sloth.
I take your words most seriously.
>
> Dreams, something else Efexor seems to have stolen from me. I think I know what you mean though, I've had a couple of sleep paralysis incidents where there was something else there and some other terrible hallucinations with snakes and spiders and other 'things' that have left me spooked for days (nights). They are no fun, no fun at all. When you come to and you're actually standing in the middle of the bed and the bed clothes, pillows etc are strewn around the room and you're completely terrified, or lying on the floor having physically thrown yourself out of bed trying to get away, you get the feeling things are more than a little odd. But fortunately or sadly depending on your point of view since coming off Efexor I don't seem to dream anymore. Seem to have had an almost complete creativity by-pass.>Everything has a plus and a minus, it seems. I am ill with the drugs I take to function (I mean that literally... right now there is a bit of a doctors' squabble over my situation, and i naturally side with the more conservative view, i.e. i am not willing to f*ck with my basic health for the sake of functioning. but then again, i am. hopefully this will clarify itself soon.) I think like all things that are the product of our wonderful/vile culture, they are more powerful than those who control them (here I am thinking of psychiatrists) think. Those of us who take them learn that, usually the hard way :-(
>
>
> Usually with the Dysthymia it's just a long slow slide into the abyss for me with varying levels of disconnectedness. But sometimes, sometimes it's like someone sneaks in while I'm asleep and sucks all that is me out of my body and just leaves an empty shell. A thing that can't think, can't feel, but continues to apparently function in the world. It's those times that I grasp the threads of what others mean to me and hold on to them with all I'm worth. Hoping that just holding on will somehow pull me back to life.
>i was in that state prior to taking medication. i am in a somewhat different, but dangerous, spot having taken the actions that were necessary to survive (i.e. i do not regret taking meds... but... whatever the source of my current health problems, it is quite likely the meds are implicated somehow. i see the dr. this week, so hopefully i will get some answers.)
> I kind of get what you mean about Venus, and yeah I feel meaning and the sense of meaning slipping away at times but I try so hard to remember that just like Venus, just because I can't see it doesn't mean it isn't there. Even more sadly sometimes I don't see the meaning of things and people until it's too late and that makes me sad. People need to know they have meaning to others. Like the time and care you take in your responses to Alex has meaning to me. The fact that you come down to my level to talk with me means more than you know.
>
the thought about Venus is actually one that has a lot of personal significance for me. shelley writes about it in "to a Skylark." i am not coming down to your level. i am struggling to keep up with you.> Sometimes I worry that we are looking so hard for specific meaning, that we actually miss so much other meaning that is flowing around us. I worry about that.
>
my own, personal concern. but i do not think alexandra misses much meaning. i don't think you do either.-z
Posted by damos on October 26, 2005, at 22:53:47
In reply to no failure apparent » Damos, posted by zeugma on October 26, 2005, at 17:26:34
Hi Z my friend,
> I hope you don't take my dilatory responses as anything other than a reflection of my sloth.
Not at all, and it's been nice to see your tag appearing on other boards too.
Hmm, I always wanted a sloth as a pet when I was a kid. They just seemed so floppy, furry and cuddly. Little did I know I'd grow up to be the Common Australia Suburban 5-toed variety ;-)
> I take your words most seriously.Thanks Z, that means a lot. Though I tend to think I'm more of a sad(bad) joke that nobody gets.
> Everything has a plus and a minus, it seems. I am ill with the drugs I take to function (I mean that literally... right now there is a bit of a doctors' squabble over my situation, and i naturally side with the more conservative view, i.e. i am not willing to f*ck with my basic health for the sake of functioning. but then again, i am. hopefully this will clarify itself soon.) I think like all things that are the product of our wonderful/vile culture, they are more powerful than those who control them (here I am thinking of psychiatrists) think. Those of us who take them learn that, usually the hard way :-(
> i was in that state prior to taking medication. i am in a somewhat different, but dangerous, spot having taken the actions that were necessary to survive (i.e. i do not regret taking meds... but... whatever the source of my current health problems, it is quite likely the meds are implicated somehow. i see the dr. this week, so hopefully i will get some answers.)Ah yes, medicine brought to you by Microsoft. Put the product out into the market, rake in the profits, and let the consumers find all the bugs for you. Or is that being too cynical? Nup, sounds about right. All that's missing are the regular releases of service packs.
Sorry Z, my brain is not working the best so I can't decide whether your situation is a catch-22 or a double-edged sword or just a b*tch of a thing to happen. Take what you need to be 'functional' and sacrifice your physical health; or do what you need to do to be physically healthy and risk not being 'functional'. Not much of a choice my friend, not much of a choice at all.
Really sorry to hear you're not well. What's up if it's not to rude to ask? Hope they get it sorted for you soon. It's a drain you sure don't need.
> the thought about Venus is actually one that has a lot of personal significance for me. shelley writes about it in "to a Skylark." i am not coming down to your level. i am struggling to keep up with you.Googled "To a Skylark" this morning - beautiful. I envy your ability to recall things like that. And I don't for a minute believe that you're stuggling to keep up with me. Nice of you to say though.
> my own, personal concern. but i do not think alexandra misses much meaning. i don't think you do either.
No, I think you're right about Alex, not much gets by her. A very perceptive and precious young lady. Plenty gets by me, trust me.
Z, the timing of this post couldn't have been better, so "Thanks" okay.
Your friend,
Damos
Posted by zeugma on October 29, 2005, at 6:46:10
In reply to Re: no failure apparent » zeugma, posted by damos on October 26, 2005, at 22:53:47
hi Damos,
I was very glad for your kind words. I don't know what's up healthwise, actually. But i will find out soon (pending test results). the stimulant i take (Provigil) is less cardiotoxic than traditional stimulants such as Ritalin, but also can cause pancreatic problems resulting in diabetes. And I was warned for years when younger when i self medicated with chocolate (for its caffeine mostly) that i was consuming such large amounts that I was putting myself at risk for diabetes (haven't investigated this claim so don;t know if it's on the same level as the other things psychiatrists/psychotherapists have said to me- I have had TERRIBLE responses to psychotherapy). I do know that I self medicate with caffeine and it is not a happy thing, but I have to function.
About meds and creativity, which you touched on earlier and which preserves the relevance of this to PB Writing: meds have not affected my creativity for the worse, though this is more a reflection of limited functioning when untreated. My functioning is still limited: if you were to look at my apt. you would say it was close to nil. Optimal for me was working 20 hrs. a week, that way the functional time I have in me could be divided between work and home. As it is it all goes to work. But I do have to support myself.
The block on dreaming from AD's does not bother me, as I experience waking as dreamlike anyway. I have since read that this is common to depersonalization and to narcolepsy.
Have you tried psychotherapy? If so has it helped you?
-z
Posted by zeugma on October 29, 2005, at 7:19:33
In reply to Re: no failure apparent » damos, posted by zeugma on October 29, 2005, at 6:46:10
apologies if i repeat myself. I have a few thoughts that mean a lot to me, and i repeat them cause i am very, very slowed down (I speak slowly, write slowly, in fact caffeinate/stimulate myself so the slowness does not become perfect stillness, a state celebrated by mystics but not one that looks good on timesheets).
The thoughts on natural kinds that i posted to alexandra were a couple of weeks' worth of steady rumination, such as it is. This [this, these words]is a spontaneous comment on my extreme slowness, something i used to be very despondent about, but which is something i am acclimating to after decades.
A few thoughts, a few metaphors, have meaning to me. There is a timesheet waiting right now, so i cannot expand on this inherently limited topic.
I hate timesheets.
-z
Posted by damos on October 30, 2005, at 20:33:33
In reply to Re: no failure apparent » damos, posted by zeugma on October 29, 2005, at 6:46:10
Hi Z,
It's bad enough that the drugs robbed me of whatever miniscule amount of creativity I may have possessed, but on top of that the depression when it hits makes me second guess and quadruple analyse and critique every word to the point where I just end up deleting posts, emails, text messages, work over and over again.
You really need to be careful of the pancreas, as it's not an organ that takes messing with well at all, ans I can't imagine that the idea of adding diabetes to the list of things to be managed on a daily basis exactly fills you with joy. I'm sure I read somewhere recently that dark chocolate actually has something in it that protects the pancreas. But then again, these days I'm sure of anything. Well I hope the tests provide and answer for which the remedy doesn't add to the problems.
20 years ago I had a caffeine problem, up to a 9-10 cans of Coke a day. Which I replaced 12 or more cups of black coffee (that you could stand the spoon up in). Not good. Down to only 2-3 very strong large black coffees a day now; more habit that need.
At this point no, no therapy for me. I've worked with a couple of alternate therapists though and they seem to suit my personality. I've never been good at being processed, or really talking to people in general. If you'd like to talk further, just about stuff, whatever matters and is important to you, I'll babblemail you my email.
It's always a pleasure Z,
Damos
This is the end of the thread.
Psycho-Babble Writing | Extras | FAQ
Dr. Bob is Robert Hsiung, MD,
bob@dr-bob.org
Script revised: February 4, 2008
URL: http://www.dr-bob.org/cgi-bin/pb/mget.pl
Copyright 2006-17 Robert Hsiung.
Owned and operated by Dr. Bob LLC and not the University of Chicago.