Posted by alexandra_k on October 11, 2005, at 19:22:13
In reply to Re: Russell, realism, and the albatross » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on October 11, 2005, at 18:39:34
> > i want to say there is no meaning apart from mind / language.
and i've just thought of something to support this notion... have you read any grice? do you remember how grice distinguishes between natural and non-natural meaning?
by 'meaning' i mean non-natural meaning. and non-natural meaning REQUIRES a speaker intending something by what they think / say. and thinkings / sayings are the only candidates for non-natural meanings (though I should also include sign language and writing of course).
> hmmm. 'sortal' denotes that we sort items by neans of such terms... natural kind terms are surely a special kind of 'sortal'?
yes indeed. in order to grasp the referent (and make determinations on 'same' or 'different' referent across possible worlds) we need to grasp something of the referents accidental as opposed to essential properties.
'water'. you can gesture as much as you like, that doesn't distinguish between the accidental and essential properties of the referent. the world (in itself) does not contain a distinction between its accidental and essential properties. this is a distinction that we make, that we draw, for our various purposes. and of course you need to draw the distinction between which properties count as essential and which properties count as accidental in order to grasp the notion of 'same stuff'. in order to make judgements of similarity and difference you need to preface that with 'same or different in what respects?' and so this is where people come into it. what interests us. what distinctions we care to draw. what distinctions are important to us.
so in the case of 'water'. we decide that what we are really interested in is its essential properties as are to be determined by science. it is because these scientific properties are considered to be the relevant essential properties with respect to the reference of the term 'water' that 'water' is being treated as a natural kind term here. natural kind terms just do have essential properties that are to be determined by science.
if you grant that 'water' is a natural kind term then you are saying something about which properties are to be considered accidental and which are to be considered essential to the identity of the referent.
if you do not grant that 'water' is a natural kind term then you might think the superficial, observable properties are actually what interests us. if you do this instead then you mean a different thing by 'water' you are drawing a different distinction. the observable properties would be essential and the chemical composition properties would be accidental.
and thus you are going to get a different result when you ask 'same or different stuff / thing' across different possible worlds.
but the stuff in the world...
in the world the observable properties (if you cash that out PROPERLY), the observable properties JUST ARE correlated with the scientific 'real nature' properties.there isn't a distinction in reality...
but we make distinctions according to what interests us...more on universals...
i think our grasp of universals is innate...
don't get me wrong... i don't believe that there would be any redness if there weren't any red things... but there are red things, and so if we see two red things then our minds are such that we judge them to be similar in respect to this notion we call 'redness'. so... i guess our grasp of universals is in abstracting away from our experiences. but this abstracting away... is something that our mind does... the abstraction is general whereas reality... is always particular... though this is senseless really because reality isn't even particular because to say that it is particular is to say that it contains its own conditions of identity (that there is an objective distinction as to essential and inessential properties). but there is no 'identity' in the mind independent world. the world doesn't ask itself 'is that the same (insert identity conditions here) x or not?' that is something that we do...> > with respect to sense data... they don't seem to me to be mind independent.
> agreed. Russell's epsitemology was crap. Sense data are mind dependent and not the place to look for acquiantance (a word whose spelling still eludes me).:-)
the spelling eludes me too...
i liked his epistemology (we know because we have direct access)
its just that it relied on a metaphysical system...
and that metaphysical system is untenable (as you note)
:-(> i guess i would say that those... are the meeting point of mind and world.
> if all goes well with our senses, yes.and even if our senses are in error... that just means that our minds are contributing other than how they should be...
> all the problems that we have trying to get face recognition etc up off the ground in AI would seem to crop up quite significantly if objects are to be viewed as merely conjunctions of sense data...> ah. now this is the point i am interested in. Objects as conjunctions of sense data is untenable metaphysics.
yeah. and i think... that realisation was the end of logical positivism... :-( it was beautiful (acquaintance gives us certain knowledge) but unfortunately acquaintance cannot be of mind independent reality...
> i don't think sense data gets us far at all.
no, just a whole heap of trouble...
> my self is rapidly slipping away as i write (damn these stimulants with their wretched half-lives). the place to look for a self is not through introspection. damn these stimulants....where do you think we should look for a self?
bodily criterion?
memory criterion?
narrative?
behaviour???
ooh. on reality 1 reality 2 this is a distinction i made in my honours year. apparantly it is similar to a distinction that kant drew but unfortunately i haven't read my kant so i'll just say something briefly about my version...reality 1 is mind-independent reality.
reality 2 is inter-subjective reality (mind-dependent but also the point that we need different people to converge on their observations)reality 1 is outside the grasp of our minds by definition. by the very meaning of reality 1. because it is outside the grasp of our minds it follows that we cannot have acquaintance with it. we cannot know anything about it. if reality 1 is what is of interest to us then radical scepticism follows and we are left with a very sorry state of affairs indeed. science cannot be about reality 1 because reality 1 is beyond our grasp as a matter of principle.
(i think this is noumena? reality in itself or how things are in themselves)
reality 2 just has to be what interests us...
the meeting point of mind and world.
what is crucial is the point that different observers report the same observation.
but observations just have to play a crucial part on the world that we experience.
and isn't that what really interests us anyways?
the world that we experience?
isn't that really what science is about?
explaining the essential properties (to be determined by science) of the world that we experience?(phenomena...)
so of course mind is going to play a pivotal role in just what we mean by reality...
the distinction between mind and reality is ultimately untenable.
though... we do talk about a distinction between 'mind' and 'reality'. in fact, we set them up as being contrasting terms *by definition*. and we need these terms to even describe 'reality' as being the meeting point of mind and world.
sigh.
i think i'm heading back towards the inexpressible...
(ps i've never read evans...)
poster:alexandra_k
thread:561840
URL: http://www.dr-bob.org/babble/write/20050910/msgs/565803.html