![[dr. bob]](/dr-bob-sm.gif)
Dr. Bob is Robert Hsiung, MD,
bob@dr-bob.orgShown: posts 10 to 34 of 39. Go back in thread:
Posted by alexandra_k on October 2, 2005, at 21:46:45
In reply to Re: intolerance, posted by alexandra_k on October 2, 2005, at 21:01:51
and ethics is something that i've always stayed away from
because i see enough contradictions
enough conflict between my current convictions
and my current actions
and i'm not interested in ever increasingly sophisticated arguments to justify my actions
and i'm a little afraid of developing my moral sensibilities further still...
how much conflict between my convictions and my action can i face without becoming lost in despair?
and i dare say...
that this is not a quandry that most analytic philosophers consider themselves to be faced with...but i do have some fundamental assumptions about the way the world works...
i do not have reasons for them.
they are brute.
they are indefensible ultimately
but no matter what you are looking at
no matter how rigerous and methodical you aim to be
something will always be brute
like in physics you get mass and charge
and maybe... one day... consciousness
and for me i have some fundamental assumptions too...that we can handle the truth.
that the consequences of knowing the truth are positive rather than destructive.and so when you get that feeling of despair...
then something has gone wrong.
because the truth isn't supposed to be opressive
it is supposed to be liberating
and i believe that all truths can be handled
though it can be bloody hard to recast them in a way that remains true
that we can handle.and about morality...
and about the ability of people with emotional disorders to be moral...morality
perfect morality
is an ideal.
obtainable as a matter of principle i suppose
but not obtainable as a matter of contingent fact
and here i am just worried about people achieving their own standards of what they believe is right
(just in case anyone has issues about whether there are mind-independent or inter-subjective ethical facts or whether morality really is relative to each individual)
people do not do what they believe to be right
and that is a fact...
about our psychology i suppose.i would have thought morality would have more to do with doing the best you can with what you have got.
but courage... seems to mean doing what you believe is right DESPITE feeling afraid. Thus one cannot exhibit the virtue of courage if one does not experience fear in the appropriate contexts.
So maybe... There is something to the view after all...
Maybe people who do not feel the appropriate emotions cannot be moral when their emotion is inappropriate to the context.
But it is not just people with emotional disorders who do not expereince the appropriate emotion relative to the context.
It is not.
And so when it comes down to the actual practice...
The majority of us come up short
Irregardless of ones mental healthSo in practice...
It makes little difference.I just think that to emphasise that people with mental illness are unable to be moral (IN SOME CONTEXTS - a qualification that they seem to leave off) is more likely to encourage fear and discrimination toward people with mental illness than anything else.
Just like encouraging 'cognitive deficit' and 'irrationality' talk is more likely to encourage judgement and condemnation rather than empathy and attempts to understand.
Those things don't have to follow...
They do not follow as a matter of logical necessity...But they do follow.
They follow contingently.
As facts about our psychology.
And not just the 'ignorant masses' (to coin a phrase)
Philosophers are slaves to their psychology too
Slaves to their associations
And while they might be better placed to see that that is not logically implied...
There isn't enough time in the day to rationally investigate all logical implications...
So they are more likely to rely on their associations to find what is intuitively plausible to them.
Then begin devising intricate arguments to justify those intuitions.
Without investigating why it is that their intuitions are so very important to them...
Posted by Damos on October 3, 2005, at 21:05:00
In reply to The albatross, posted by alexandra_k on October 2, 2005, at 4:25:30
Hey :-)
Would've downloaded Fleetwood Mac's Albatross for you but can't do that from work - sorry. It's a beautiful instrumental piece.
You probably don't realise it but it the very things that you have posted in this thread that are the true beauty of you, and why you are so incredibly pecious to us.
Your struggles with yourself and those things you are passionate about matter. Your intolerance matters. The internal contradictions and conflicts matter. You have much to say that needs to be said and a way will be found.
The growth of shared meaning and understanding matters. What you think and feel and write matters.
Posted by alexandra_k on October 5, 2005, at 22:05:19
In reply to Re: The albatross » alexandra_k, posted by Damos on October 3, 2005, at 21:05:00
and i guess the issue with saying things
saying things with content
saying things that address fundamental concerns
is the problem of
just how wrong is one willing to be?
because the more you say
the more likely you are to say something objectionable.like me
like i have done
already...because the truth is neutral
the truth doesn't care
and of course i can now think of a variety of counter-examples
where one might well be better off
not knowing
not knowing the truthbut what is truth?
truth is a property of propositions
(truth is a property of thought and language - mental contents and meanings).
more than that...
it is hard to say...
there are a variety of theories i guess.and language and thought
carve the world up
it a way that does not accurately mirror
mind-independent divisions in reality
and if truth is a correspondance relation between meanings and mind-independent reality
then one is never in a position to know whether any claim is true or false
because one does not have access to mind-independent reality
all one has access to
is the meeting point of mind and world.and language and thought...
muddy the waters.
Joseph Black wrote that 'caloric fluid flowed from one object to another'
is such a claim true or false?
there is no such thing as caloric fluid...
and thus if his utterance logically entails 'there is such a thing as caloric fluid'
it would be false.
so what is the meaning of his utterance?
what does it mean?
how do we map truth conditions?
one could radically translate the utterance
(to make the meaning clear)
1) there is such a thing as caloric fluid
2) that caloric fluid flowed from one object to another
and both claims would have to be true in order for his utterance to be true...
in which case his utterance is false because 1) is false...but that seems an inadequate translation of what Black was trying to say...
perhaps...perhaps this is better
'it is observed that one object that is hot makes the object next to it hot as well'
in which case that seems to be true enough...and maybe laws of nature
instead of ruling out certain mind-independent events from occurring...
maybe laws of nature
just say that
'the phenomena that runs contrary to the law will never be observed'and psychology is thought to be reducible to physiology
and physiology is thought to be reducible to biology
and biology is thought to be reducible to chemistry
and chemistry is thought to be reducible to physics
and physics requires an observer...
which brings us back to mindand thus in the search for fundamental entities
the fundamental bits of matter
the brute objects and properties that comprise this world
cannot be given a reductive explanation
because you are either left having to conclude that certain things are brute
or if you refuse to accept that
if you refuse to accept that you have hit bedrock
that your spade is turned
that explanation has to stop somewhere
then you see that explanation is holisticand atomism and holism are two sides to the same coin
and you cannot properly understand one without the other
because there are two ways to become wise
one way is to study one thing in as much detail as possible
(because then one understands the nature of the thing and how it will unfold and impact upon other things in various ways)
and the other way is to study as many different things as possible
(because then one understands the relationship between things)and so from one pov
from the atomistic pov
you have these essential properties
which are instinsic (internal) to the thing and guide the way in which it will interact with other things (with their intrinsic properties)
and from the other pov
from the holistic pov
you treat the thing as a 'black box' where the essential properties are unknown and you just study the relationships between the black box and the next black box
you study the lawsbut really...
both are two sides to the same coin
and really...
there is no such distinction in realityas my old teacher was so very fond of saying
it is not like on day x god made the objects with their essential properites
and on day x+1 god superimposed the laws of nature on top of them to govern their interrelationshipsno
rather he made the objects
and then he rested
because there was no more work to doand from the pov of atomism
intrinsic properties are brute
and from the pov of holism
laws of nature are brute
and if one wants to explain intrinsic properties
one can treat them as a black box and appeal to the laws
and if one wants to explain the laws
one can treat them as a black box and appeal to
essential propertiesand the truth is transcendental once again
because both are true
but not completely
(because language / thought carves the world up in artificial ways)
and the greater truth...
is that you can put both sides
atomism
holism
together
and once you understand how they are two sides to the coin (the artificial distinctions in language)
then you can see the greater truth
and the greater truth transcends the limited truth of the parts
and thus there are degrees of truth
even though 'degrees of truth' doesn't make any sense at all to an analytic philosopher
(to the best of my knowledge)hmm.
and mind and matter
two sides of an articificial distinction
a problem that arises from our language and our thought making an arbitrary distinction
for convenience
that does not accurately reflect a genuine distinction in realiy.
and thus the irreducability of consciousness
is an artifact of what we mean by consciousness
because of the very way we define the term
consciousness cannot be reductively explained by appeals to matter
cannot be reductively explained unless you alter the meaning of the term 'consciousness' as every materialist account of consciousness just has to do to solve the problem. because that simply is the only way to solve the intractible problem, by definition.and there it is.
and the point...
the point is in danger of getting lost...
but the point was something of consequence...
to me at least.because it seems to me
it seems to me
that in doing metaphysics
(which concerns itself with the fundamental nature of reality)
what you are really doing is going
one
or two
or one
or two
over and over again.
laws of nature and essential properties
one
or two
or one
or two?
mind and matter
one
or two?
objects (things) and universals (properties)
one
or two?two different ways of viewing the same thing
because there is no distinction in realityand even us
even our nature
we are made from the meeting of sperm and egg
so is our essential nature
one
or two?
and many phenomena...
many phenomena that we observe
(mental conflict, repression etc)
require that we are two
and many phenomena...
many phenomena that we observe
(a single body, moral responsibility)
require that we are oneand in reality there is no distinction...
and so i guess that is why it does make some kind of sense to speak of 'degrees of truth'
but what is meant by truth?
the trouble is that our very language carves things up in a way that is (strictly speaking) false
and yet the world can conform to what is said
more
or less
and that is the best we can do...except that to appreciate that that is the case...
is one better again.
and it is apparant that meanings slide...
and the limits of my language is the limits of my world
w.
and all we have access to is the meeting point of mind and world
but the trouble with that is that the distinction between mind and world is itself an artifact of languageand so the question remains:
how is communication possible?
well...
because people are so very similar
similar mind
similar world
(though to say this seems senseless in a way)
and we cannot comprehend of how a very alien species
with a radically different psychology
would see the world...
we simply cannot comprehend
just like how we cannot comprehend beings whose thought conforms to different laws of logicand w. was right again...
some things cannot be said
they can only be shown
and anyone who truely understands me must see
that my words are senseless
anyone who truely understands me must see
that i am trying to express the inexpressable
and he must use my words as a ladder
to ascend
and once one has ascended one must throw away the ladder
as nonsensehmm.
Posted by alexandra_k on October 5, 2005, at 22:40:16
In reply to Re: The albatross, posted by alexandra_k on October 5, 2005, at 22:05:19
and so this is where the analytic philosophers come into the picture
because our problems are artifacts of language / thought
we make distinctions that are an arbitrary artifact of a language...
and the sad truth is that our language is deficient
it is inadequate to express the way things areand thus w. was led to write that the solution to the problem lies in the dissolution of the problem
and the philosophers turned to an analysis of language
because it is our language and our thinking that gets us into trouble
and thus the philosophers create artificial languages to better capture legitimate (tenable) distinctions. logic, as one example, and many terminological distinctions as another. and the trouble is that no matter what we do... logic and the new terminological distinctions seem to lead to new problems, new problems being created.
and thus to see the truth...
is to appreciate something of this process
as soon as we think about things
as soon as we speak about things
then a shaddow is cast
and the shaddow is an artifact of the inquirer
and without the inquirer there wouldn't be a problemthe problem is that we are compelled to ask
senseless questions.there aren't any distinctions in reality
it is homogenous
but we see difference
we talk about difference
it is language and thought that discriminate
and thus reality must be two
it cannot be homogenous
one
or two?the distinction between what can be shown
and what can be saidO
Can be seen as an empty hole
Can be seen as the presence of a line
But what is it really?
Is senseless...
It is neither
And both
It just isReality is like that
It just is
And the shadow cast by the inquirer...
Is the fact that we insist on asking questions and thinking about things
What does it mean?
For one.Meaning is an artifact of mind / language
There is no meaning apart from mind / language
And so 'what is the meaning of life'
Is about how you interpret the significance of things...
How you judge similarity and difference
And this is a pseudo question
A pseudo problem
Because there isn't any such thing as *the* meaning of life.
Rather...
People find a variety of things meaningful
And life...
Just is about finding those meanings
Which is just to say finding things that are meaningful'I am an active information processor'
I am compelled to create sense
I am compelled to create meaning
I am compelled to engage in things that I find meaningfulAnd...
Just maybe...
That is the truth.But of course none of this can be said...
And there are too many contradictions to count
And i don't know that it can be expressed any clearerAnd reality is oblivious...
But reality is not what interests us anyways
It is our experience of the world that interests us
And one cannot tease apart experience from the world
And all there really is are degrees of inter-subjectivity
And everything slides
Which is of course senseless
Because everything is fixedAnd I do believe...
That one really can go crazy worrying about this stuff...
Posted by alexandra_k on October 6, 2005, at 1:14:02
In reply to Re: The albatross, posted by alexandra_k on October 5, 2005, at 22:40:16
i CAN talk a load of sh*t sometimes...
;-)
Posted by Damos on October 6, 2005, at 1:52:57
In reply to Re: jeepers, posted by alexandra_k on October 6, 2005, at 1:14:02
> i CAN talk a load of sh*t sometimes...
>
> ;-)Smoking a load of good sh*t would probably do more for your mood though ;-)
Lots to read on the train YIPPEE!!!!!!
Posted by zeugma on October 9, 2005, at 14:46:33
In reply to Re: The albatross, posted by alexandra_k on October 5, 2005, at 22:40:16
Meaning is an artifact of mind / language
There is no meaning apart from mind / language>>
what do you think of Russell's distinction between acquiantance and description? That our descriptive powers enable us to talk about things that aren't real (however you want to parse that), but that acquiantance is something along the lines of an 'encounter', in which there must be a second party present (i.e. an aspect of reality, however you want to parse that)?
Reality is mind- and language- independent, in Russell's formulation. Thus it is a 'realist' formulation.
What is mind-dependent is the amount of reality we can acquiant ourselves with. What is language-dependent is fuzzy, because we have vague predicates, terms whose referents we don't know, etc. Acquiantance itself? well, as someone who has shut himself in for a good part of a decade with Evans' works, I would say that we are acquianted with something if we can subject its usage to the Generality Constraint. Thus, if I am acquianted with (and i really am!) this cup of coffee, this one from the coffee shop down the street, then I can understand such statements as that this cup of coffee has a reasonable milk-to-coffee ratio, that it could be poured into a mug from this styrofoam cup, and that putting it in the microwave would make it too hot for me to tolerate, what with my tender mouth (of course, I would put the coffee in a microwave-safe mug first). This is because I am acquianted with the putative 'universals' that go into each statements (e.g. I know what a reasonable milk-to coffee ratio is, at least relativized to me and further specificied as applying to matters of taste rather than chemical composition- presumably the universal needs to be specified in such a way as to make it immune to twin Earth type objections, or I could not have acquiantance with the universal in question).
As an albatross-related digression, there is an excellent biography of Russell, "Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude", whose title comes from the subtitle of Shelley's poem "Alastor; or, the Spirit of Solitude." Russell was a great admirer of Shelley's work. Shelley's poem contains references that appear to be to Wordsworth and Coleridge:
It is a woe too "deep for tears," when all
Is reft at once, when some surpassing Spirit,
Whose light adorned the world around it, leaves
Those who remain behind, not sobs or groans,
The passionate tumult of a clinging hope;
But pale despair and cold tranquillity...Shelley regarded Wordsworth as an example of a poet who sank into "cold tranquillity," becoming a servile friend of a corrupt government, while Coleridge had given way to "pale despair;" reading Coleridge's biography, "Coleridge: Darker Visions" (again, an excellent work) shows how accurate Shelley's characterization was.
End of albatross-related digression.
-z
Posted by zeugma on October 9, 2005, at 15:05:09
In reply to Russell, realism, and the albatross » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on October 9, 2005, at 14:46:33
Thus, if I am acquianted with (and i really am!) this cup of coffee, this one from the coffee shop down the street, then I can understand such statements as that this cup of coffee has a reasonable milk-to-coffee ratio, >>
I meant that I could not be said to be acquianted with the cup of coffee (the particular cup of coffee) if I could say it was too hot, but I couldn't say or understand anything else about it. If I said the coffee was too hot, but didn't know the coffee was liquid (choosing an arbitrary predicate or 'universal') then I really didn't have a grip on the coffee itself. Of course I might not know what 'liquid' meant; substitute any other predicate known to me that could apply to a cup of coffee (e.g. the coffee is bitter): I have to be capable of understanding statements along the lines of the parenthesized one in order to claim acquiantance. I must be able to understand generalizations about the coffee. I don't think this means verbal generalizations: for example a dog could be acquianted with the coffee if it could identify the coffee that is now placidly in my styrofoam cup as the same substance flung across the room in a childish outburst at how the coffee shop overcharged me for coffee with spoiled milk.
Thus, the dog understands that the coffee that at time T1 was in the cup was the same stuff as the coffee splotching the refrigerator at time T2. It would involve a tracking ability on the part of the dog to follow its progress from T1 to T2. Thus, Evans emphasizes the ability to re-identify an object as a criterion for knowing which object it is- and I take 'knowing which object it is' as another way of saying that you are acquianted with the object.
what do you think of Evans?
-z
Posted by Damos on October 10, 2005, at 18:11:44
In reply to acquiantance, posted by zeugma on October 9, 2005, at 15:05:09
Hope you feel more than an acquaintance to us. I sadly know nothing of Evans and precious little of Russell, but will never look at my simple cup of coffee in the same way again :-)
I've actually been sporadically re-reading the dialogues between Dr David Bohm and Krishnamurti, can't seem to hold any of it my head for any length of time though (sigh).
The occassionaly coffee with spoiled milk aside, how are you doing?
Posted by alexandra_k on October 10, 2005, at 22:26:20
In reply to Russell, realism, and the albatross » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on October 9, 2005, at 14:46:33
hello :-)
> what do you think of Russell's distinction between acquiantance and description? That our descriptive powers enable us to talk about things that aren't real (however you want to parse that), but that acquiantance is something along the lines of an 'encounter', in which there must be a second party present (i.e. an aspect of reality, however you want to parse that)?
i guess acquaintance... is with the referent. so here is where it gets tricky... i want to say there is no meaning apart from mind / language. but then we typically want to be good content extenalists about mental content... and if reference is part of meaning... we also want to be externalists about reference too. but... i don't think there would be any reference or any meaning aside from mind / language. because even reference... to get that the referent of water is H2O you have to apply the sortal 'natural kind term' to water in order to create a distinction... and mind / language creates distinctions (that are not inherent in reality). so the distinction (sortal) tells us that what is relevant (as opposed to irrelevant) for the reference is chemical composition.
to be honest... i haven't done a lot on Russell. Just a little... just a little. so... from memory... the kinds of things we can have acquaintance knowledge of...
1) universals
2) sense data
3) perhaps... 'I'.with respect to the first...
i'm not so sure about universals being 'in the world'. i think... the judgement of similarity / difference is something that we do via mind / language. i'm not sure how we can be acquainted with universals... no matter how many instances of 'tobacco' i encounter i seem to be going beyond the samples i have encountered when i grasp the concept 'tobacco' and grasp that it not only applies to all the samples that i have encountered, but also to past present and future samples that i have not encountered. i'm not so sure that knowledge of universals can be grasped by acquaintance with something external to us...with respect to sense data... they don't seem to me to be mind independent. i guess i would say that those... are the meeting point of mind and world.
and with respect to knowledge of objects... well... the same object can be multiply realised with respect to sense data. the sense data alter as we view it from a slightly different perspective etc. all the problems that we have trying to get face recognition etc up off the ground in AI would seem to crop up quite significantly if objects are to be viewed as merely conjunctions of sense data...
there is also the point that i cannot access your sense data. and you cannot access mine. sense data are thus subjective... i don't see how we can get from sense data to mind independent reality...
i thought that was a major problem for Russell...
and with respect to having an acquaintance with 'I'. well... that is notorious. i have to say that i have sympathies with hume when he said that no matter how much he introspected and tried to find this thing 'the self' he could only be aware of particular thoughts, memories, mental pictures, or impressions. he could not find this thing that was supposed to contain all that.
i don't think...
i experience a self either...
Posted by zeugma on October 11, 2005, at 18:39:34
In reply to Re: Russell, realism, and the albatross » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on October 10, 2005, at 22:26:20
> hello :-)
hi there :-)> >
>
> i guess acquaintance... is with the referent. so here is where it gets tricky... i want to say there is no meaning apart from mind / language. but then we typically want to be good content extenalists about mental content... and if reference is part of meaning... we also want to be externalists about reference too. but... i don't think there would be any reference or any meaning aside from mind / language. because even reference... to get that the referent of water is H2O you have to apply the sortal 'natural kind term' to water in order to create a distinction... and mind / language creates distinctions (that are not inherent in reality). so the distinction (sortal) tells us that what is relevant (as opposed to irrelevant) for the reference is chemical composition.
>
hmmm. 'sortal' denotes that we sort items by neans of such terms, i.e make distinctions for whatever reason (I should look up my Strawson on this, but it's too late at night); but natural kind terms are surely a special kind of 'sortal'? Water has to be H2O, or Twin Earth experiments lose their force. The distinction is inherent in relaity, because where else are we to look? Not in subjective experience... ex hypothesi (I love sounding like I know what I'm talking about) retaw (McGinn's felicitious name for Twin earth's liquid of sustenance)is indistinguishable from water except for its aberrant chemical composition. Take on the other hand 'pencil.' On Twin Earth pencils might be made of something other than graphite, but it doesn't matter, because pencils aren't a natural kind. But what is special about natural kind terms that causes our semantics to break down as we move from one world to another? Is it mind- or language-dependent? Alternatively, what is special about pencils that we can keep our semantic grip on them even in places as remote as twin earth?
> to be honest... i haven't done a lot on Russell. Just a little... just a little. so... from memory... the kinds of things we can have acquaintance knowledge of...
>
> 1) universals
> 2) sense data
> 3) perhaps... 'I'.
>
> with respect to the first...
> i'm not so sure about universals being 'in the world'. i think... the judgement of similarity / difference is something that we do via mind / language. i'm not sure how we can be acquainted with universals... no matter how many instances of 'tobacco' i encounter i seem to be going beyond the samples i have encountered when i grasp the concept 'tobacco' and grasp that it not only applies to all the samples that i have encountered, but also to past present and future samples that i have not encountered. i'm not so sure that knowledge of universals can be grasped by acquaintance with something external to us...
>
> with respect to sense data... they don't seem to me to be mind independent.
agreed. Russell's epsitemology was crap. Sense data are mind dependent and not the place to look for acquiantance (a word whose spelling still eludes me).
i guess i would say that those... are the meeting point of mind and world.
>
if all goes well with our senses, yes.> and with respect to knowledge of objects... well... the same object can be multiply realised with respect to sense data. the sense data alter as we view it from a slightly different perspective etc. all the problems that we have trying to get face recognition etc up off the ground in AI would seem to crop up quite significantly if objects are to be viewed as merely conjunctions of sense data...
ah. now this is the point i am interested in. Objects as conjunctions of sense data is untenable metaphysics.
>
> there is also the point that i cannot access your sense data. and you cannot access mine. sense data are thus subjective... i don't see how we can get from sense data to mind independent reality...
agreed. i don't think sense data gets us far at all.
>
> i thought that was a major problem for Russell...
>
> and with respect to having an acquaintance with 'I'. well... that is notorious. i have to say that i have sympathies with hume when he said that no matter how much he introspected and tried to find this thing 'the self' he could only be aware of particular thoughts, memories, mental pictures, or impressions. he could not find this thing that was supposed to contain all that.
>
> i don't think...
>
> i experience a self either...
>
my self is rapidly slipping away as i write (damn these stimulants with their wretched half-lives). the place to look for a self is not through introspection. damn these stimulants....
-z
Posted by zeugma on October 11, 2005, at 18:50:36
In reply to Good to see you » zeugma, posted by Damos on October 10, 2005, at 18:11:44
> Hope you feel more than an acquaintance to us. I sadly know nothing of Evans and precious little of Russell, but will never look at my simple cup of coffee in the same way again :-)
>I feel more than an acquaintance with you (and thanks btw for showing me how to spell that word). More important to look at the coffee in a multiplex way (sorry, free associating, word from adolescence, Samuel delany's "Empire Star", interesting little book) than acquiant yourself with the tomes of Evans, which are fascinating; anything Russell wrote after 1912 is verbiage IMO.
> I've actually been sporadically re-reading the dialogues between Dr David Bohm and Krishnamurti, can't seem to hold any of it my head for any length of time though (sigh).
>quantum physics? I have no grasp of it either, and I am devoid at the moment of spiritual outlook.
> The occassionaly coffee with spoiled milk aside, how are you doing?
Quite well, early bedtimes, but greatly enjoying the cooler weather. And yourself?
-z
Posted by alexandra_k on October 11, 2005, at 19:22:13
In reply to Re: Russell, realism, and the albatross » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on October 11, 2005, at 18:39:34
> > i want to say there is no meaning apart from mind / language.
and i've just thought of something to support this notion... have you read any grice? do you remember how grice distinguishes between natural and non-natural meaning?
by 'meaning' i mean non-natural meaning. and non-natural meaning REQUIRES a speaker intending something by what they think / say. and thinkings / sayings are the only candidates for non-natural meanings (though I should also include sign language and writing of course).
> hmmm. 'sortal' denotes that we sort items by neans of such terms... natural kind terms are surely a special kind of 'sortal'?
yes indeed. in order to grasp the referent (and make determinations on 'same' or 'different' referent across possible worlds) we need to grasp something of the referents accidental as opposed to essential properties.
'water'. you can gesture as much as you like, that doesn't distinguish between the accidental and essential properties of the referent. the world (in itself) does not contain a distinction between its accidental and essential properties. this is a distinction that we make, that we draw, for our various purposes. and of course you need to draw the distinction between which properties count as essential and which properties count as accidental in order to grasp the notion of 'same stuff'. in order to make judgements of similarity and difference you need to preface that with 'same or different in what respects?' and so this is where people come into it. what interests us. what distinctions we care to draw. what distinctions are important to us.
so in the case of 'water'. we decide that what we are really interested in is its essential properties as are to be determined by science. it is because these scientific properties are considered to be the relevant essential properties with respect to the reference of the term 'water' that 'water' is being treated as a natural kind term here. natural kind terms just do have essential properties that are to be determined by science.
if you grant that 'water' is a natural kind term then you are saying something about which properties are to be considered accidental and which are to be considered essential to the identity of the referent.
if you do not grant that 'water' is a natural kind term then you might think the superficial, observable properties are actually what interests us. if you do this instead then you mean a different thing by 'water' you are drawing a different distinction. the observable properties would be essential and the chemical composition properties would be accidental.
and thus you are going to get a different result when you ask 'same or different stuff / thing' across different possible worlds.
but the stuff in the world...
in the world the observable properties (if you cash that out PROPERLY), the observable properties JUST ARE correlated with the scientific 'real nature' properties.there isn't a distinction in reality...
but we make distinctions according to what interests us...more on universals...
i think our grasp of universals is innate...
don't get me wrong... i don't believe that there would be any redness if there weren't any red things... but there are red things, and so if we see two red things then our minds are such that we judge them to be similar in respect to this notion we call 'redness'. so... i guess our grasp of universals is in abstracting away from our experiences. but this abstracting away... is something that our mind does... the abstraction is general whereas reality... is always particular... though this is senseless really because reality isn't even particular because to say that it is particular is to say that it contains its own conditions of identity (that there is an objective distinction as to essential and inessential properties). but there is no 'identity' in the mind independent world. the world doesn't ask itself 'is that the same (insert identity conditions here) x or not?' that is something that we do...> > with respect to sense data... they don't seem to me to be mind independent.
> agreed. Russell's epsitemology was crap. Sense data are mind dependent and not the place to look for acquiantance (a word whose spelling still eludes me).:-)
the spelling eludes me too...
i liked his epistemology (we know because we have direct access)
its just that it relied on a metaphysical system...
and that metaphysical system is untenable (as you note)
:-(> i guess i would say that those... are the meeting point of mind and world.
> if all goes well with our senses, yes.and even if our senses are in error... that just means that our minds are contributing other than how they should be...
> all the problems that we have trying to get face recognition etc up off the ground in AI would seem to crop up quite significantly if objects are to be viewed as merely conjunctions of sense data...> ah. now this is the point i am interested in. Objects as conjunctions of sense data is untenable metaphysics.
yeah. and i think... that realisation was the end of logical positivism... :-( it was beautiful (acquaintance gives us certain knowledge) but unfortunately acquaintance cannot be of mind independent reality...
> i don't think sense data gets us far at all.
no, just a whole heap of trouble...
> my self is rapidly slipping away as i write (damn these stimulants with their wretched half-lives). the place to look for a self is not through introspection. damn these stimulants....where do you think we should look for a self?
bodily criterion?
memory criterion?
narrative?
behaviour???
ooh. on reality 1 reality 2 this is a distinction i made in my honours year. apparantly it is similar to a distinction that kant drew but unfortunately i haven't read my kant so i'll just say something briefly about my version...reality 1 is mind-independent reality.
reality 2 is inter-subjective reality (mind-dependent but also the point that we need different people to converge on their observations)reality 1 is outside the grasp of our minds by definition. by the very meaning of reality 1. because it is outside the grasp of our minds it follows that we cannot have acquaintance with it. we cannot know anything about it. if reality 1 is what is of interest to us then radical scepticism follows and we are left with a very sorry state of affairs indeed. science cannot be about reality 1 because reality 1 is beyond our grasp as a matter of principle.
(i think this is noumena? reality in itself or how things are in themselves)
reality 2 just has to be what interests us...
the meeting point of mind and world.
what is crucial is the point that different observers report the same observation.
but observations just have to play a crucial part on the world that we experience.
and isn't that what really interests us anyways?
the world that we experience?
isn't that really what science is about?
explaining the essential properties (to be determined by science) of the world that we experience?(phenomena...)
so of course mind is going to play a pivotal role in just what we mean by reality...
the distinction between mind and reality is ultimately untenable.
though... we do talk about a distinction between 'mind' and 'reality'. in fact, we set them up as being contrasting terms *by definition*. and we need these terms to even describe 'reality' as being the meeting point of mind and world.
sigh.
i think i'm heading back towards the inexpressible...
(ps i've never read evans...)
Posted by Damos on October 11, 2005, at 19:45:22
In reply to Re: Good to see you » Damos, posted by zeugma on October 11, 2005, at 18:50:36
> I feel more than an acquaintance with you (and thanks btw for showing me how to spell that word).
I'm glad, and I hadn't noticed any spelling issues.
Thanks for the recommendations, I'm struggling to enjoy reading at the moment - never a good sign, but I do enjoy a good google and bookshop browse.
> quantum physics? I have no grasp of it either, and I am devoid at the moment of spiritual outlook.
Ah no. What interests me about Bohm is his thinking about thinking; his interest in 'meaning'. I exchanged emails a while back with Donald Factor, one of the co-authors of "Dialogue - a Proposal". I guess basically 'truth' and who's right or wrong don't interest me as much as the unfolding of shared meaning.
Want to talk more about the 'spiritual outlook' stuff?
Glad to hear you are doing well. Me, I'm getting a bit more exercise which is good, and doing a bit of Reiki and meditation each night which really helps the quality of my sleep and general mood.
Damos
Posted by alexandra_k on October 11, 2005, at 20:41:26
In reply to Re: Reality 1 and Reality 2 » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on October 11, 2005, at 19:22:13
sorry.
that was a confusing muddle.> reality 1 is mind-independent reality.
> reality 2 is inter-subjective reality (mind-dependent but also the point that we need different people to converge on their observations)and so i maintain that the real nature of reality (the real nature of the reality that interests us)
is that the real nature of that reality is...
the meeting point of mind and world.
i know that analytically (what we mean by reality) is that it is mind-independent.
but it turns out that the reality that is of interest to us... well its real nature is such that it does have mind as an essential componant.and so...
i'm getting myself into a muddle...
the similar muddle that there is in philosophy of mind...between the analytic enterprise of the clarification of meanings
(by reality we just mean mind independent reality)
and the empirical enterprise of the discovery of the real nature of the thing AS IT INTERESTS US
(where the real nature of the reality that interests us has mind as a componant)
and thus...
there isn't really a confusion.
its a little like behaviourists...
how they said that the real nature of mental states was that they were behaviours.
they didn't mean to imply that the meaning of any mental state term just is a list of behaviours or dispositions to behave (analytically that is false)but they were less interested in the analytic enterprise of the clarification of meaning of mental state terms...
and more interested in the real nature of the phenomena that interests us...
and those things can come apart...
and the problem for philosophy is that they quite often do...and what their coming apart shows us...
is that our language, our concepts, what we mean by our concepts
comes apart from the real nature of things that interest us.
and thus...
our language is defective.:-(
but then...
just try and come up with a better one...
Posted by alexandra_k on October 11, 2005, at 20:55:42
In reply to Re: Reality 1 and Reality 2, posted by alexandra_k on October 11, 2005, at 20:41:26
and thus...
in studying the reality that interests us...
what is the contribution of world?
(can we say anything about its intrinsic nature)
and what is the contribution of mind?
(can we say anything about its intrinsic nature)
is there any principled way of deciding?
it shouldn't just be an analytic enterprise - should it?
(or maybe... mind/world is just one phenomena. and in reality... there isn't any such thing as mind apart from world and there isn't any such thing as world apart from mind. comperably to how there isn't any such thing as an uninstantiated universal and how there isn't any such thing as a particular without any universals inhering in it)
maybe these distinctions...
are artifacts of mind / language
though if this is the case...
we end up with them being artifacts of world / mind / language
and thus...
we are back to the inexpressible...
we can't talk ABOUT anything...
in order to talk ABOUT things
(in order to even get to things)
one needs to apply (via mind / language)
an identity criterion to the world in order to distinguish accidental from essential properties.and now...
i've completely lost myself...
i think...
i'm back to the inexpressible
and i think...
i need to take a little babble break...and i think the problem is that if you imagine what things are like aside from mind / language...
well then you can't even comprehend them (think of them or talk about them)
BY DEFINITION
AAAAAAAAAAAARGH
and with respect to 'it shouldn't just be an analytic enterprise - should it?'i think the answer is 'yes'
because these are metaphysical questions...
and i can't see how science can help...
because these things transcend science
they lie beyond its limitsand thus what we are left with is an analytic enterprise
and thus the rules of the game are the rules of analytic philosophy
(not the sciences)
and thus we are looking at who has the best theory?????simplicity
coherance
etc etcand it is surely possible that there could be multiple metaphysical systems that measure up the same with respect to relevant criteria...
and yet they are incompatable...
and the truth is in seeing the scope of 'best explanation'
and now i really am going away
:-(
Posted by alexandra_k on October 12, 2005, at 2:49:41
In reply to Re: Reality 1 and Reality 2, posted by alexandra_k on October 11, 2005, at 20:55:42
okay... just one more...
and zeugma...
i hope i'm not too overwhelming with my gigantic raves... just disregard whatever and chat about whatever you want. there are always points of contact and i love to read whatever you have to say :-)
the limits of thought just are the limits of the thinkable.
to think of something outside thought is to think of the unthinkable.
which is something that we just cannot do
(though i have a slightly disturbed feeling about this... and i think i'm making an error here?)
the limits of language just are the limits of the expressable.
to attempt to talk about something outside language is to attempt to express the inexpressable.but we seem to want to talk about
we seem to want to think about
things outside language
things outside thoughtbut things are objects of language and thought
and outside language and thought
there aren't any things
there aren't any objectsbut things and objects are surely composed of states of affairs...
but states of affairs are connected like links in a chain
when we express or think about the world
we think of facts.
facts are carved up states of affairs
states of affairs are the truth makers for facts
we only have access to a very limited portion of the states of affairsour sensory apperatus is one limitation
our tiny finite minds are anotherbut i'm just talking...
Posted by alexandra_k on October 12, 2005, at 2:51:11
In reply to Re: just one more..., posted by alexandra_k on October 12, 2005, at 2:49:41
one cannot get outside language or thought to see the boundary or limit from both sides.
one can only hit ones head up against the limits of sense
w.
we do this when we attempt to think the unthinkable
or when we attempt to express the inexpressable
Posted by alexandra_k on October 12, 2005, at 3:09:04
In reply to Re: just one more..., posted by alexandra_k on October 12, 2005, at 2:51:11
and the limits of my language...
the limits of my thought...just are the limits of my world
(zeugma.. just in case you worry about my wittgenstein i have some confusion there about referencing and distinguishing what is in the "Tractatus" and the "Philosophical Investigations" from stuff I've made up. when i go 'w.' that is a half-hearted attempt at a reference. i don't want to plagarise... but i don't want to reference falsely either. i think i pervert a lot of what wittgenstein said in my own ravings and i don't purport to be a wittgenstein scholar)
Posted by alexandra_k on October 12, 2005, at 6:36:40
In reply to Re: Good to see you » zeugma, posted by Damos on October 11, 2005, at 19:45:22
> I guess basically 'truth' and who's right or wrong don't interest me as much as the unfolding of shared meaning.
:-)
That sounds interesting to me.I am not sure...
But I think I was in danger of getting lost...I would be interested to hear about that :-)
Posted by Damos on October 12, 2005, at 17:57:42
In reply to Re: Good to see you » Damos, posted by alexandra_k on October 12, 2005, at 6:36:40
> I am not sure...
> But I think I was in danger of getting lost...Oh yes indeedy, and it was worrying me (lots). It's okay though, I slipped and EPIRB (Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon) in your backpack when you weren't looking ;-)
Not sure that I can adequately explain but I'll try when I get a chance (busy, busy day)
Posted by Damos on October 13, 2005, at 22:41:41
In reply to Re: Good to see you » Damos, posted by alexandra_k on October 12, 2005, at 6:36:40
You guys have no idea how daunting the idea of trying to explain something to you is.
I actually saw a really interesting example on tv the other night. A guy held up a solid cone and asked the others what it was. From where they, and the viewer were it was a cone. He then rotated it and asked them again. Purely, objectively what you saw was the base of the cone - a circle. He rotated it again and it appeared to be a triangle. So what was 'true'? It depends entirely on your perspective, assumptions, judgements, prejudices, beliefs, experience, etc.
Okay, so that got me precisely nowhere. Hmm, this is one of those times when being a relatively ignorant, inarticulate moron is a damn nuisance.
Alex, you were on the same track in your essay about the Cotard Delusion. The experience is true for individual and that's all there is to it. Trying to prove it to be untrue and making them wrong is almost always futile and in some cases damaging in the long run. But if you accept that the experience is true and work with the meaning and impact of it and try to discover those things that allow it to be true for them, then you get to shared meaning. Then you can work together with coherent meaning, and when you work with coherent meaning this allows deeper truth to emerge. Breaking it down into one thousand carefully labelled and defined pieces and trying to prove or disprove the validity doesn't change the truth of the experience for the person one iota. Dammit!!!!! Do you know why that essay was so good? Because there was a flow of meaning from you to me. I didn't understand all of the terminology and stuff, didn't know about whether the references you were citing were right or wrong, but I picked up and sensed the flow of meaning.
AAARRRRGGGGHHHHH!!!!!!!!! I'm still not getting at it. I guess basically what I am saying is that I don't need to be right, and that who's right and who's wrong matters less to me that why you think, believe and feel the things you do. And because I care and respect you I would never dare believe that I had a better idea of what was true for you than you do. If you say 'x' is true for you then that's good enough for me. What I do care about is how and why those things are true for you and how understanding those things helps me understand you, and how that allows the relationship to grow and other possibilities to emerge. The definitions of the words you use to describe the experience don't matter nearly as much to me as the meaning you ascribe to them and to the experience you are trying to describe. I don't want to argue, debate, persuade or discuss. I want to understand. And to do that I have to give up my certainty about my position and all kinds of things.
Something that has always royally p*ssed me off is the way different groups (individuals) always believe that they alone are arriving at a unique truth. Science, religion, politics, whatever, even groups within these fields. They believe that they are right and therefore everyone else must be wrong. I hate that. Worse than that there are groups who believe that we are never going to get to absolute truth. Can't all of them see that their rigidly sticking to the same damn road is limiting by its very nature. I guess my problem with thinking about thinking is that thinking seems to just limit and define. It's an abstraction, and because it limits and defines it can't grasp the whole - surely. Surely it just grabs a bit of the whole, thinks it to death and then finds another bit to think about. Isn't it the case that all this limiting and defining is only moving further and further away from the whole to a place where the sense of completeness is lost, a place where all you have is all these pieces that no longer seem to bear any real relationship to one another. I don't care about how you divide it, categorise it and analyse it. I care about what it means.
Meaning is so important to me because it's like........like glue I guess, a kind of binding agent if you will. And I don't see meaning as being fixed either, it flows. It needs to flow. Without meaning I am lost and that's why I'm so hopelessly floundering around right now. I can't find a way to see how who I am and what I do (workwise and whole of life wise) has any meaning, purpose or value.
Sorry, I've rambled, distorted, misrepresented and very probably plagiarised and only ended up with a thousand kinds of cr*p. I'm sorry.
Posted by zeugma on October 15, 2005, at 14:13:26
In reply to I tried......and failed miserably - as usual :-( » alexandra_k, posted by Damos on October 13, 2005, at 22:41:41
Damos,
meaning is a binding agent. In my case it is very precarious holding together a few shreds of consciousness.
about spirituality: last night i had terrible hypnagogic hallucinations, when they occur i always think of how in medieval times they were considered nocturnal attacks by demons, and more recently so-called UFO abductions have been attributed to them.
they are extremely unpleasant. i haven't said anything about spirituality. i suppose these hypnagogic hallucinations would have made a me a most spiritual person had i grown up (and i use the phrase loosely) in a different environment.
i break down over the course of a week. i become less responsive, coordinated, and focused. i actually feel ok, simply inert, like mere brain substrate with minimal consciousness.the meaning generator sputters and one sees that it is a machine that makes extraordinary demands on our selves, one can perceive its substrates when the glaze of sensation wears away and what remains is dull enough to stare at, as one can stare at Venus but not the sun.
and if you've ever stared at Venus after sunrise, there are moments when you can see it, then it flickers away, then there, and then... it melts away from the center of the sky.
there is meaning as i perceive it.
-z
Posted by zeugma on October 15, 2005, at 15:30:54
In reply to Re: Reality 1 and Reality 2 » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on October 11, 2005, at 19:22:13
> > > i want to say there is no meaning apart from mind / language.
>
> and i've just thought of something to support this notion... have you read any grice? do you remember how grice distinguishes between natural and non-natural meaning?
grice and NM vs. NNM... a cloud means it's going to rain, natural meaning. 'red' means red, NNM. doesn't science become a series of searches into natural meaning then?
>
> by 'meaning' i mean non-natural meaning. and non-natural meaning REQUIRES a speaker intending something by what they think / say. and thinkings / sayings are the only candidates for non-natural meanings (though I should also include sign language and writing of course).
>
yes, but NNM becomes convoluted. I interrupt a speaker with 'it's a fine day.' Conventional meaning: the sun is shining. my intention: get this annoying character to shut up. NNM of utterance of 'it's a fine day': shut up, annoying character. because that's my intention. Grice is right to zero in on sudden changes of subject as instances where conventional meaning and intention diverge. Grice is good, but intention has to do an awful lot of work.> > hmmm. 'sortal' denotes that we sort items by neans of such terms... natural kind terms are surely a special kind of 'sortal'?
>
> yes indeed. in order to grasp the referent (and make determinations on 'same' or 'different' referent across possible worlds) we need to grasp something of the referents accidental as opposed to essential properties.
>
> 'water'. you can gesture as much as you like, that doesn't distinguish between the accidental and essential properties of the referent. the world (in itself) does not contain a distinction between its accidental and essential properties. this is a distinction that we make, that we draw, for our various purposes. and of course you need to draw the distinction between which properties count as essential and which properties count as accidental in order to grasp the notion of 'same stuff'. in order to make judgements of similarity and difference you need to preface that with 'same or different in what respects?' and so this is where people come into it. what interests us. what distinctions we care to draw. what distinctions are important to us.
ok. we are interested in the molecular structure of water, and make it the basis for putting substances on the lists of things that are water. now suppose it was observable properties that caught our eye instead (so to speak). nothing wrong with that. but i have certain sympathies with quine's holism, and can't let this go by too blithely. suppose it turned out that chemists were wrong about water. it's like jade (i think that jade is the substance that has several chemical instantiations while looking alike to the naked eye). or, let's say gold and pyrite. now gold is on the periodic table near silver. but we're wrong about gold, it turns out to be like pyrite, a composite of some kind. no big deal, EXCEPT an awful lot of work is now invalidated regarding the nature of gold, and which ripples through the whole web of our beliefs. now i don't take gold's elemental status on faith, so to speak. i take our understanding of gold as interwoven with our understanding of everything else on the periodic table.so if gold is not silver's neighbor on the chart, then what about hydrogen? or carbon? is it merely a set of observations that produced the conclusion that gold was distinct from pyrite, or is it those observations PLUS the fact that the observations cleared a path to putting gold in its slot in the vicinity of silver? And isn't that path the one we follow? and what other paths are there?
>
> so in the case of 'water'. we decide that what we are really interested in is its essential properties as are to be determined by science. it is because these scientific properties are considered to be the relevant essential properties with respect to the reference of the term 'water' that 'water' is being treated as a natural kind term here. natural kind terms just do have essential properties that are to be determined by science.
>this portrayal (sorry to be so critical, this is an important matter) makes science a freestanding instituition rather than part of the path we as cognitive creatures follow. Or am i misreading you?
> if you grant that 'water' is a natural kind term then you are saying something about which properties are to be considered accidental and which are to be considered essential to the identity of the referent.
>
> if you do not grant that 'water' is a natural kind term then you might think the superficial, observable properties are actually what interests us. if you do this instead then you mean a different thing by 'water' you are drawing a different distinction. the observable properties would be essential and the chemical composition properties would be accidental.
>
> and thus you are going to get a different result when you ask 'same or different stuff / thing' across different possible worlds.
>
> but the stuff in the world...
> in the world the observable properties (if you cash that out PROPERLY), the observable properties JUST ARE correlated with the scientific 'real nature' properties.
>this partitions observation and 'reality' too strictly. it can be that they JUST ARE, the results of observation have to be sent to the right destination (i.e. woven into the right place in the web of belief).
> there isn't a distinction in reality...
> but we make distinctions according to what interests us...>i disagree. science is driven by what interests us, but it must go down a path that makes sense. but then there is the question of why certain paths make more sense than others. and if we say that some make more sense because they interest us, then it seems like a vicious circle. or if we say they make sense because of mind-dependence, then we have a very strong version of anti-realism that seems to me to go too far).
>
> more on universals...
>
> i think our grasp of universals is innate...
> don't get me wrong... i don't believe that there would be any redness if there weren't any red things... but there are red things, and so if we see two red things then our minds are such that we judge them to be similar in respect to this notion we call 'redness'. so... i guess our grasp of universals is in abstracting away from our experiences. but this abstracting away... is something that our mind does... the abstraction is general whereas reality... is always particular... though this is senseless really because reality isn't even particular because to say that it is particular is to say that it contains its own conditions of identity (that there is an objective distinction as to essential and inessential properties). but there is no 'identity' in the mind independent world. the world doesn't ask itself 'is that the same (insert identity conditions here) x or not?' that is something that we do...>>surely there is a difference between essential and inessential properties. but i have no argument s available at the moment beyond what i've already said. maybe essential properties are those that are necessary for coherence with the bulk of our beliefs.
>
> > > with respect to sense data... they don't seem to me to be mind independent.
>
> > agreed. Russell's epsitemology was crap. Sense data are mind dependent and not the place to look for acquiantance (a word whose spelling still eludes me).
>
> :-)
> the spelling eludes me too...
> i liked his epistemology (we know because we have direct access)
> its just that it relied on a metaphysical system...
> and that metaphysical system is untenable (as you note)
> :-(
>
> > i guess i would say that those... are the meeting point of mind and world.
>
> > if all goes well with our senses, yes.
>
> and even if our senses are in error... that just means that our minds are contributing other than how they should be...
> > all the problems that we have trying to get face recognition etc up off the ground in AI would seem to crop up quite significantly if objects are to be viewed as merely conjunctions of sense data...
>
> > ah. now this is the point i am interested in. Objects as conjunctions of sense data is untenable metaphysics.
>
> yeah. and i think... that realisation was the end of logical positivism... :-( it was beautiful (acquaintance gives us certain knowledge) but unfortunately acquaintance cannot be of mind independent reality...
>
> > i don't think sense data gets us far at all.
>
> no, just a whole heap of trouble...
>
> > my self is rapidly slipping away as i write (damn these stimulants with their wretched half-lives). the place to look for a self is not through introspection. damn these stimulants....
>
> where do you think we should look for a self?
>
> bodily criterion?
> memory criterion?
> narrative?
> behaviour?
>
> ??
>
>
> ooh. on reality 1 reality 2 this is a distinction i made in my honours year. apparantly it is similar to a distinction that kant drew but unfortunately i haven't read my kant so i'll just say something briefly about my version...
>
> reality 1 is mind-independent reality.
> reality 2 is inter-subjective reality (mind-dependent but also the point that we need different people to converge on their observations)
>
> reality 1 is outside the grasp of our minds by definition. by the very meaning of reality 1. because it is outside the grasp of our minds it follows that we cannot have acquaintance with it. we cannot know anything about it. if reality 1 is what is of interest to us then radical scepticism follows and we are left with a very sorry state of affairs indeed. science cannot be about reality 1 because reality 1 is beyond our grasp as a matter of principle.
>
> (i think this is noumena? reality in itself or how things are in themselves)
>
> reality 2 just has to be what interests us...
> the meeting point of mind and world.
> what is crucial is the point that different observers report the same observation.
> but observations just have to play a crucial part on the world that we experience.
> and isn't that what really interests us anyways?
> the world that we experience?
> isn't that really what science is about?
> explaining the essential properties (to be determined by science) of the world that we experience?
>
> (phenomena...)
>
> so of course mind is going to play a pivotal role in just what we mean by reality...
>
> the distinction between mind and reality is ultimately untenable.
>
> though... we do talk about a distinction between 'mind' and 'reality'. in fact, we set them up as being contrasting terms *by definition*. and we need these terms to even describe 'reality' as being the meeting point of mind and world.
>i don't think 'mind' and 'reality' are contrastive. if they are contrastive that presupposes skepticism. the difficulty with 'reality' is that it is not amenable to adjectival modification. is mind as 'real' as 'reality' or is it less? how about paths converging on reality, but not quite there? in this regard contrast with 'truth.' we don't have unlimited access to truth, and there may be many truths that are in principle unknowable to us. but truths (and forgive my convoluted path) can be called part of the 'alpha' content of minds. 'beta' content is content that is not truth-conditional, for instance knowing how to follow a gricean maxim of informativeness is the product of perceptions that need not be put into propositional form, and indeed one may not know how to put the knowledge into propositional form. or take my knowledge that the matterhorn is a jagged mountain on the swiss-italian border. now that is 'alpha' content. i believe the proposition true because i have seen pictures and i know what it means to be a jagged mountain. someone who has seen the mountain, and only knows it as 'that mountain over there,' has 'beta' knowledge. that mountain is the matterhorn, but this lucky person doesn't know that- he just observes the spectacular peak. now suppose i am that lucky person, and i study a map, figure out that 'that mountain' is the matterhorn- now i have done something that is neither given in the map nor delivered by sensory process. I have brought two pictures of the world into systematic correlation. but saying that propositional content and experiential content are anything other than differemces in sense- i.e. differences in cognitive significance- makes no sense because the fact that one can locate one's position is to say that both the map and the sensory qualities are alike in reference.
sorry, can't do any better now....
-z
> sigh.
>
> i think i'm heading back towards the inexpressible...
>
> (ps i've never read evans...)
>
>
Posted by Damos on October 16, 2005, at 19:33:40
In reply to Re: I tried......and failed miserably - as usual :-( » Damos, posted by zeugma on October 15, 2005, at 14:13:26
Hi -Z,
I hope you know it means a lot to me that you come here to be with us. Yeah, I know what you mean about it being precarious. I also know that it's the fact that there are those precious few that mean so much to me that actually keeps me going.
Dreams, something else Efexor seems to have stolen from me. I think I know what you mean though, I've had a couple of sleep paralysis incidents where there was something else there and some other terrible hallucinations with snakes and spiders and other 'things' that have left me spooked for days (nights). They are no fun, no fun at all. When you come to and you're actually standing in the middle of the bed and the bed clothes, pillows etc are strewn around the room and you're completely terrified, or lying on the floor having physically thrown yourself out of bed trying to get away, you get the feeling things are more than a little odd. But fortunately or sadly depending on your point of view since coming off Efexor I don't seem to dream anymore. Seem to have had an almost complete creativity by-pass.
I was actually reading somewhere recently how in ancient times they used to try and put terrible dreams into the minds of their enemies to make them lose their heart for battle. Had you grown up in ancient times or simply a different culture I'm sure you would have made a fine seer indeed. Guess you'll just have to settle for being the sage you are in this one :-)
Usually with the Dysthymia it's just a long slow slide into the abyss for me with varying levels of disconnectedness. But sometimes, sometimes it's like someone sneaks in while I'm asleep and sucks all that is me out of my body and just leaves an empty shell. A thing that can't think, can't feel, but continues to apparently function in the world. It's those times that I grasp the threads of what others mean to me and hold on to them with all I'm worth. Hoping that just holding on will somehow pull me back to life.
I kind of get what you mean about Venus, and yeah I feel meaning and the sense of meaning slipping away at times but I try so hard to remember that just like Venus, just because I can't see it doesn't mean it isn't there. Even more sadly sometimes I don't see the meaning of things and people until it's too late and that makes me sad. People need to know they have meaning to others. Like the time and care you take in your responses to Alex has meaning to me. The fact that you come down to my level to talk with me means more than you know. And my friend, just like Venus, even when we can't see you, just knowing you are there means something to us, and we long for those moments when you appear above the horizon and choose to grace our skies on your journey.
Sometimes I worry that we are looking so hard for specific meaning, that we actually miss so much other meaning that is flowing around us. I worry about that.
Thank you for sharing with me -z, I really appreciate it.
Go forward in thread:
Psycho-Babble Writing | Extras | FAQ
Dr. Bob is Robert Hsiung, MD,
bob@dr-bob.org
Script revised: February 4, 2008
URL: http://www.dr-bob.org/cgi-bin/pb/mget.pl
Copyright 2006-17 Robert Hsiung.
Owned and operated by Dr. Bob LLC and not the University of Chicago.