![[dr. bob]](/dr-bob-sm.gif)
Dr. Bob is Robert Hsiung, MD,
bob@dr-bob.orgShown: posts 31 to 55 of 55. Go back in thread:
Posted by alexandra_k on August 30, 2005, at 5:56:40
In reply to zero-place predicates, posted by zeugma on August 29, 2005, at 23:00:46
Can't think right now.
Want to think on what you have said a bit more.
just wanted to say that that last bit reminds me of Quine:
'to be is to be the value of a vairable'.
Posted by alexandra_k on August 30, 2005, at 17:46:54
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on August 29, 2005, at 22:40:14
Okay... Now I am confused again...
Time for a little definitional agreement...CHARACTER - a function that maps contexts onto contents.
CONTENT - a function that maps possible worlds onto extensions.
REFERENCE - the external object that is picked out.
Lets have a go with 'alexandra_k':
CHARACTER - I was the individual that was present at the association between word and referent (context -> content).
CONTENT - When considering the worlds where the term 'alexandra_k' is correctly applied we are considering the worlds in which there is an individual with my essential properties (possible world -> extension).
REFERENCE - alexandra_k (extension).Lets have a go with 'the kiwi babbler who goes on about philosophy'.
CHARACTER - In the context of utterance alexandra_k is the only individual who meets that description (context -> content)
CONTENT - It is possible that I never came to babble and that other kiwi philosophers did (etc etc) so the individual picked out across different possible worlds varies...(possible worlds -> extension)
REFERENCE - varies across other possible worlds.Lets have a go at 'I'
CHARACTER - In the context of utterance 'I' picks out alexandra_k (context -> content)
CONTENT - given the character... across all possible worlds 'I' picks out alexandra_k. (possible worlds -> extensions)
REFERENCE - alexandra_k
> 'I', 'here', 'now' are not flaccid designators. They are rigid. Rigidity applies to content, not character.I do believe I'm getting you now :-)
>(So content is intensional. And we are externalists about content. :-))
Hmm. I never thought of it like that. Intensional externalism... I like the sound of that :-)
> Now 'now', here' and so on are also rigid. But of course only with respect to their content; their characters (which are also part of the senses of these terms) are not constant.
Yeah, I get you.
> Characters are neither rigid nor flaccid; they are constant or inconstant.
Okay...
No, sorry... How do they get to be inconstant?
(Does that happen when the context of utterance changes???)
Posted by alexandra_k on August 30, 2005, at 18:03:37
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on August 30, 2005, at 17:46:54
all this angst over the relation between word and world...
Posted by zeugma on August 31, 2005, at 7:33:22
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on August 30, 2005, at 17:46:54
Characters are neither rigid nor flaccid; they are constant or inconstant.
Okay...
No, sorry... How do they get to be inconstant?
(Does that happen when the context of utterance changes???)>>Most characters are constant. For example, 'the car' refers to the (contextually salient) automobile I don't drive any more (thankfully), at least it does in my dialect of English. Questions of contextual salience are presumably pragmatic, because obviously many definite descriptions have an uncertain reference strictly speaking, but are nonetheless used widely with few problems.
Context, insofar as it affects character, is the ordered set of elements (time, place, speaker, world) that determines the content of the utterance. So I say 'I woke up two hours ago.' The function that is the character of 'I' includes as part of its determining elements 'speaker', and that speaker (and hence contentual element) is 'zeugma.' The time is 8 am Wednesday, and so 'two hours ago' designates the contentual element '6 am.'
But if you had uttered the identical string of words, I would have to know that the character of 'I', while identical to the character that 'I' means when I use it, yields the content 'alexandra_k', and likewise with the other elements of the utterance. So the equation character=standard meaning is basically right.I shouldn't have said, then, that characters are 'constant' or 'inconstant.' If these words didn't have a constant meaning, we would be speaking different dialects, and getting confused in the process. I think what I 'meant' was that for most non-indexical terms, they yield the same SORT of content as definite descriptions, and hence the pathway from character to content, and then to extension, can be collapsed into a single process that can be designated as 'intension.' So empty singular terms like 'the present King of France' can be regarded as having an intension though yielding an extension that is the empty set. In fact that was what intensions were mostly useful for, apart from problems that arise where one object can be designated by more than one singular term (e.g. 'the Morning Star' and 'the Evening Star').
and yeah, indexical terms are fixed relative to their contents (I am the only one to use 'I' to designate [Z], though others may share my name and many of my attributes) in virtue of their contextual elements- I am naturally going to figure in every ordered quadruple that represents the context of each of my utterances, and one must use this context to arrive at me. So the character as function (meaning) is constant (i.e. ordered quadruple) but the elements of the set are context-dependent, and without a grasp of the context, the right output can't be gotten. That is what differentiates the indexicals from the everyday terms like 'car' and 'computer'- the time, place and speaker aren't important as long as the language is shared between interlocutors. So those factors can generally be ignored when dealing with such terms.
Apologies for highly prolix reply.
I'm glad you like intensional externalism. :-)
-z
Posted by zeugma on August 31, 2005, at 7:38:11
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.., posted by zeugma on August 31, 2005, at 7:33:22
sorry, when I said 'contentual element' when speaking of contexts, i should have said 'contextual elements.' Content cannot figure as input to character, only as output.
-z
Posted by alexandra_k on August 31, 2005, at 17:11:40
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.., posted by zeugma on August 31, 2005, at 7:33:22
:-)
Philosophy of language is hard...
(imo)Are you interested in teleological semantics at all???? Frogs and bacteria and cats on a dark night and cat v dog and stuff like that?????
Millikan is a hard read...
But I've done a bit of reading on proper functions...
Posted by alexandra_k on August 31, 2005, at 18:00:25
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on August 31, 2005, at 17:11:40
Utterances and thoughts are distinctive in that they (can be) ABOUT states of affairs / events / facts / situations in the external world (the world outside the head / mind / brain).
They can represent accurately or inaccurately. They can be true (if accurate) and false (if inaccurate).
If we go a long way back into the evolutionary history of this world then we can go back to before life emerged... At that point in time there isn't any intentionality / aboutness / representation.
These phenomena emerged via the process of natural selection and thus there must be a naturalistic account of the emergence of the phenomena.
There might be lessons for the present...
Lets have a look at some rudimentary aboutness...
Frogs snap their tongues at moving dark spots.
A mental representation is what occurs between the stimulus and the response.
Presumably the stimulus gets represented in the frogs brain and that representation produces the tongue snapping response.In order for something to count as a representation misrepresentation must be possible...
Now, if an experimentor throws a bee bee pellet in front of the frog the frog will snap its tongue at it.
So the million dollar question is 'is this a case of mis-representation?'
There are a number of candidates for the content of the frogs representation:
1) fly
2) moving dark spot
3) fly or bee beeIf the content of the frogs representation is FLY then snapping at a bee bee pellet is a case of misrepresentation.
If the content of the frogs representation is MOVING DARK SPOT then snapping at a bee bee pellet is not a case of misrepresentation (because a bee bee pellet just is a moving dark spot
If the content of the frogs representation is FLY OR BEE BEE then snapping at a bee bee pellet is not a case of misrepresentation (because it is correctly applied to anything that is either a fly or a bee bee. In case you are worried about disjunctive concepts there isn't really a problem here. People talk of 'greenstone' and it just turns out that greenstone is appropriately applied to either jadite or nephrite).So... How does actual selection history help fix the content of the frogs representation?
In the actual selection history of the frog bee bees in the environment would have been rare (or non-existant). Thus if the frog has the concept FLY OR BEE BEE then this will confer the same selectional advantage as possession of the concept FLY.
In the actual selection history of the frog if enough of the moving dark spots were flies or other nutritious (or digestible or whatever) substances then MOVING DARK SPOT would confer the same selectional advantage as possession of the concept FLY.
So... About now the thought is that we need to go modal to fix the content of the frogs representation.
There is a possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by FLY OR BEE BEE.
Some of them are going to die out (inadequate nutrition).
There is another possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by BEE BEE.
All of them are going to die out (inadequate nutrition).
There is another possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by FLIES.
More of them will survive.
In virtue of this... Some people have argued that the content of the representation is best captured by 'fly'. Though there has been some haggling over 'nutritious substance' and alternatives like that as well...
But what I don't understand...
Is that...
Possible worlds are irrelevant with respect to ACTUAL selection pressures...
And ACTUAL selection pressures must be what determine the content of ACTUAL representations.
If we wanted to delineate the content of frogs representations in other possible worlds then we would need to look at their selection pressures.
The trouble is that 'other ways this world might have gone' don't help us with respect to ways this world is...And so... I would say that the content of the representation is still indeterminate.
Actual selection history is insufficient to fix content.
And going modal... Only helps with respect to fixing the content of frogs representations on other possible worlds.
It doesn't help us fix the content of the actual world frogs representations.
And going modal... Is insufficient to fix the content of the frogs representations on other possible worlds because... Selection history (which is what is supposed to be relevant to fix content) underdetermines representational content.But once again I'm probably missing something...
But there is also the point...
There is also the point that...
Natural selection isn't so much about 'survival of the fittest' as it is about 'elimination of the least successful'. As such... Why should we expect selected mechanisms (or selected representational contents for that matter) to be optimal? They just need to be 'good enough' to get buy...Natural selection is a kludge. A hack. (Dennett)
Short sighted.
Not with a view to other possible worlds ;-)
Posted by zeugma on September 1, 2005, at 6:32:08
In reply to Re: teleological semantics? » alexandra_k, posted by alexandra_k on August 31, 2005, at 18:00:25
> Utterances and thoughts are distinctive in that they (can be) ABOUT states of affairs / events / facts / situations in the external world (the world outside the head / mind / brain).
>
> They can represent accurately or inaccurately. They can be true (if accurate) and false (if inaccurate).Now we are on to the hard stuff :-)
>
> If we go a long way back into the evolutionary history of this world then we can go back to before life emerged... At that point in time there isn't any intentionality / aboutness / representation.
>IMO, if we get into knots trying to explicate the word-world relation via such constructs as 'intensionality,' going the route to 'intentionality' and tangles involving mental representation make logic-splitting into child's-play... IMO.
> These phenomena emerged via the process of natural selection and thus there must be a naturalistic account of the emergence of the phenomena.
>
> There might be lessons for the present...
>
> Lets have a look at some rudimentary aboutness...
>
> Frogs snap their tongues at moving dark spots.
> A mental representation is what occurs between the stimulus and the response.
> Presumably the stimulus gets represented in the frogs brain and that representation produces the tongue snapping response.a neural circuit directs the snapping process.. is it a 'representation'... i don't know.
>
> In order for something to count as a representation misrepresentation must be possible...
>
right, because the 'representation' relation is a weak one. it is dependent upon one's capacity for representation, a sort of map which depicts the terrain but necessarily loses detail...> Now, if an experimentor throws a bee bee pellet in front of the frog the frog will snap its tongue at it.
>
> So the million dollar question is 'is this a case of mis-representation?'
well, the frog's picture of the stimulus (to anthropomorphize) doesn't have sufficient resolution to discriminate between pellets and flies.
>
> There are a number of candidates for the content of the frogs representation:
> 1) fly
> 2) moving dark spot
> 3) fly or bee bee
>
> If the content of the frogs representation is FLY then snapping at a bee bee pellet is a case of misrepresentation.
> If the content of the frogs representation is MOVING DARK SPOT then snapping at a bee bee pellet is not a case of misrepresentation (because a bee bee pellet just is a moving dark spot
> If the content of the frogs representation is FLY OR BEE BEE then snapping at a bee bee pellet is not a case of misrepresentation (because it is correctly applied to anything that is either a fly or a bee bee. In case you are worried about disjunctive concepts there isn't really a problem here. People talk of 'greenstone' and it just turns out that greenstone is appropriately applied to either jadite or nephrite).
>
> So... How does actual selection history help fix the content of the frogs representation?
>ah... content... it seems to me that content and representation are a little orthogonal. i suppose i would appeal to a process of informational decay to explain why the frog's representation of the fly is so prone to error. representation is a very weak relation. a puppet can represent Julius Caesar, and what is more the puppet can then be identified as Julius caesar on repeated ocassions, despite the fact that the puppet could represent Caesar lacks any surface plausibilty. In particular nothing naturalistic could explain the representation, other than as an exercise of a representational capacity that humans have evolved that can make any x represent y (language is largely arbitrary yet has tremendous capacity to represent). But moving from the stark concept of 'representation' to the notion that there is a capacity for representation (recognizing that the relation itself is arbitrary) mignt chage the equation, though i don't know...
> In the actual selection history of the frog bee bees in the environment would have been rare (or non-existant). Thus if the frog has the concept FLY OR BEE BEE then this will confer the same selectional advantage as possession of the concept FLY.
>i don't want to say the frog has concepts at all, but an ability to identify, and snatch flies with its tongue. A bee bee pellet triggers the process despite the fact that the pellet is not edible. i prefer saying it has an 'ability' to locate and snatch flies than to say that it can conceptualize flies. the ability can confer a selectional advantage for the frog, without requiring the ability to generate concepts which are of dubious survival value even for humans who are much better at concept-forming.
concepts might also be useful in generating counterfactuals. for instance i might think 'if i stand here then i have a better chance of not getting eaten by this tiger.' but this could have evolved as an ability present in frogs on a non-conceptual level (i.e. it becomes motionless when a predator comes by, because of some random mutation that promotes such behavior, then the frogs who become motionless survive to reprodice at higher rates, so the behavior becomes prevalent. But is representation or concepts necessary at all? )
> In the actual selection history of the frog if enough of the moving dark spots were flies or other nutritious (or digestible or whatever) substances then MOVING DARK SPOT would confer the same selectional advantage as possession of the concept FLY.
>
> So... About now the thought is that we need to go modal to fix the content of the frogs representation.
>
> There is a possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by FLY OR BEE BEE.
>
> Some of them are going to die out (inadequate nutrition).
>
> There is another possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by BEE BEE.
>
> All of them are going to die out (inadequate nutrition).
>
> There is another possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by FLIES.
>
> More of them will survive.
>
> In virtue of this... Some people have argued that the content of the representation is best captured by 'fly'. Though there has been some haggling over 'nutritious substance' and alternatives like that as well...
>
> But what I don't understand...
> Is that...
> Possible worlds are irrelevant with respect to ACTUAL selection pressures...
> And ACTUAL selection pressures must be what determine the content of ACTUAL representations.
> If we wanted to delineate the content of frogs representations in other possible worlds then we would need to look at their selection pressures.
> The trouble is that 'other ways this world might have gone' don't help us with respect to ways this world is...
>
> And so... I would say that the content of the representation is still indeterminate.
i don't think there is content, just an ability to perform a certain action that in some environments confers selectional advantage for the frog. if one wants to offer a naturalistic account then the environmental input, since it constantly varies, supplies little need for concepts or content. Since humans have a greater capacity to stabilize their environments (still limited though) concepts might have more of a rationale to evolve. For instance concepts are useful when designing artifacts.
>
> Actual selection history is insufficient to fix content.
> And going modal... Only helps with respect to fixing the content of frogs representations on other possible worlds.
> It doesn't help us fix the content of the actual world frogs representations.
> And going modal... Is insufficient to fix the content of the frogs representations on other possible worlds because... Selection history (which is what is supposed to be relevant to fix content) underdetermines representational content.
>
> But once again I'm probably missing something...
>
> But there is also the point...
> There is also the point that...
> Natural selection isn't so much about 'survival of the fittest' as it is about 'elimination of the least successful'. As such... Why should we expect selected mechanisms (or selected representational contents for that matter) to be optimal? They just need to be 'good enough' to get buy...
>
> Natural selection is a kludge. A hack. (Dennett)
> Short sighted.
> Not with a view to other possible worlds ;-)
>
>this stuff is difficult :-)
-z
>
Posted by alexandra_k on September 1, 2005, at 16:10:56
In reply to Re: teleological semantics? » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on September 1, 2005, at 6:32:08
> Now we are on to the hard stuff :-)
I wondered if you were kidding...
IMO Kaplan is the hard stuff :-)
> > Lets have a look at some rudimentary aboutness...Okay. So what we want is to start with the small stuff and then build up to the sorts of concepts that people have. Just need 'rudimentary aboutness' in the same way that whatever prevents a lobster eating itself may be considered to be 'rudimentary self-hood'.
> > Frogs snap their tongues at moving dark spots.
> > A mental representation is what occurs between the stimulus and the response.
> > Presumably the stimulus gets represented in the frogs brain and that representation produces the tongue snapping response.
> a neural circuit directs the snapping process.. is it a 'representation'... i don't know.I think it is supposed to be a 'rudimentary representation'. But in order for something to count as a representation misrepresentation must be possible. I think that latter point has something to do with the content of the representation being able to be delineated with respect to truth values across possible worlds. There has to be something that counts as true (accurate representation) and false (misrepresentation) in order for it to count as a (contentful) representation.
(But then tautologies and contradictions might pose a problem... I'd rather not go there).
> well, the frog's picture of the stimulus (to anthropomorphize) doesn't have sufficient resolution to discriminate between pellets and flies.Hmm. Are you sure? Maybe some behaviourist could find out whether frogs can discriminate the two... If thats right then the content is starting to look like FLY OR BEE BEE or MOVING DARK SPOT or something like that... (Fly would be ruled out if it can't discriminate between flies and non-flies).
> In particular nothing naturalistic could explain the representation, other than as an exercise of a representational capacity that humans have evolved that can make any x represent y (language is largely arbitrary yet has tremendous capacity to represent).
How about representation in thought? Is the connection there arbitrary? There are causal / informational theories of representation. Dretske in particular goes on about x represents cat so long as x tends to be caused by cats. But then there is a problem as to how misrepresentation is possible. And how we can think x in the absence of cats.
> i don't want to say the frog has concepts at all, but an ability to identify, and snatch flies with its tongue. A bee bee pellet triggers the process despite the fact that the pellet is not edible.Hmm. So was the frog mistaken when it snapped at the bee bee? I think you are saying that it is supposed to snatch at flies and it shouldn't really be snapping at bee bees. But... Why not? Why not say the frog has an ability to snatch at MOVING DARK SPOTS or at FLIES OR BEE BEES. Why flies?
>i prefer saying it has an 'ability' to locate and snatch flies than to say that it can conceptualize flies. the ability can confer a selectional advantage for the frog, without requiring the ability to generate concepts which are of dubious survival value even for humans who are much better at concept-forming.
You behaviourist you!!!!!
An ability to snap at FLIES
An ability to snap at FLIES OR BEE BEES
An ability to snap at MOVING DARK SPOTS
Would confer the same selectional advantage in a world where those three things are correlated more often than not.
And I just have to say this again:You behaviourist you!!!!!
Yes, the frog has an ability.
But the million dollar question resurfaces when you want to cash out what that ability consists in a little more. How on earth does the frog have that abillity? There is a mechanism that represents things in the world and connects to an appropriate response. At this stage in the day we are dealing with a pretty simple (rudimentary) concept. So we have Stimuli -> Representation -> Response. Things get much more interesting when representations get decoupled from particular responses.... They start interacting with other representations / goals etc in various ways...> concepts might also be useful in generating counterfactuals. for instance i might think 'if i stand here then i have a better chance of not getting eaten by this tiger.' but this could have evolved as an ability present in frogs on a non-conceptual level (i.e. it becomes motionless when a predator comes by, because of some random mutation that promotes such behavior, then the frogs who become motionless survive to reprodice at higher rates, so the behavior becomes prevalent. But is representation or concepts necessary at all? )
At this point... Probably not. I think it would be pointless (and inaccurate) to attribute 'if I stand here I'll be less likely to be eaten by a tiger' because this is attributing too much. An understanding of probability, etc. With the frog... Saying it has a mental representation isn't necessarily to commit oneself to the view that the frog is aware of the representation.
Maybe it is dodgey whether the frog has a representation at all. But if we can't even figure out the content or, if you like, the function of the mechanism, what the behavioural ability amounts to then what hope of explaining human concepts and behaviour?????
> i don't think there is content, just an ability to perform a certain action that in some environments confers selectional advantage for the frog.>if one wants to offer a naturalistic account then the environmental input, since it constantly varies, supplies little need for concepts or content. Since humans have a greater capacity to stabilize their environments (still limited though) concepts might have more of a rationale to evolve. For instance concepts are useful when designing artifacts.
Posted by alexandra_k on September 1, 2005, at 16:17:36
In reply to Re: teleological semantics? » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on September 1, 2005, at 16:10:56
The heart does a number of things. To list just a couple
1) It pumps blood
2) It takes up space in the chest cavity
3) It goes 'thumpety thump'So of these three things that the heart does, which (if any) is the proper function of the heart? What is it SUPPOSED to do?
So people go back and consider how hearts evolved. They consider that 1) is the proper function because those organisms that had hearts that pumped blood did better than those organisms whose hearts did not.
Somebody might have a heart that made a 'thumpety thump' noise, but this wouldn't help them terribly unless it also pumped blood etc.
So people look to selection history to fix proper function here too.
But...
Same saga.
You need to bring counter-factuals into it...
And I don't see how they are supposed to help fix ACTUAL content or ACTUAL proper function..Oh well.
Posted by Damos on September 5, 2005, at 18:54:32
In reply to Re: teleofunction, posted by alexandra_k on September 1, 2005, at 16:17:36
Just wanted to say a quick but sincere thank you for your dialogue. A lot of it was so far over my head I'll need to get on the next Shuttle mission to reach it, but it was still really interesting. So 'Thank You'.
The love and respect you have for each other and the sunject really shines through.
Thank you both for being so intelligent, thoughtful and here.
Posted by zeugma on September 5, 2005, at 19:27:17
In reply to Alexandra, Zeugma - Thank you, posted by Damos on September 5, 2005, at 18:54:32
thank you Damos for your kind words.
I'm still trying to write a suitable reply to Alexandra's posts on teleological semantics. It's something I have trouble getting my head around.
And these past few days have been a little difficult for me, so thank you again :-)
-z
Posted by alexandra_k on September 5, 2005, at 22:53:04
In reply to Re: Alexandra, Zeugma - Thank you » Damos, posted by zeugma on September 5, 2005, at 19:27:17
> thank you Damos for your kind words.
Yeah. Thanks :-)Zeugma, if you would like to change the subject then that is okay by me. Covering familiar terrain from a different perspective can be useful too.
Basically... If its hard work then don't worry about it. I had to think a great deal about content / character and I appreciate that time / effort is a limited capacity resource.
> And these past few days have been a little difficult for me, so thank you again :-)
Hope things start looking up for you :-)
Posted by damos on September 5, 2005, at 23:08:19
In reply to Re: Alexandra, Zeugma - Thank you » Damos, posted by zeugma on September 5, 2005, at 19:27:17
Zeugma, sorry the past few days have been difficult for you. Sending you lots of wishes for better days to come.
Posted by alexandra_k on September 5, 2005, at 23:19:17
In reply to Re: Alexandra, Zeugma - Thank you » zeugma, posted by damos on September 5, 2005, at 23:08:19
And how are you doing?
Fragile
And a funny feeling...
I've been told its supposed to be "emptiness"
"Boredom"
I don't know...Sorry... Thats me.
How are you doing?
Posted by zeugma on September 7, 2005, at 17:24:27
In reply to Re: Damos, posted by alexandra_k on September 5, 2005, at 23:19:17
Posted by Damos on September 7, 2005, at 23:00:09
In reply to feel like a zero-place predicate right now (nm), posted by zeugma on September 7, 2005, at 17:24:27
Hey ~Z,
Sorry you're not feeling so good (also sorry that that's probably an understatement), want to talk about it? My entire pygmy sized intellect is at your disposal, or I can just listen good. If you don't feel like posting you can babblemail me if you want to.
You take good care of you - okay.
(((((Zeugma)))))
Posted by zeugma on September 9, 2005, at 18:36:27
In reply to Re: feel like a zero-place predicate right now » zeugma, posted by Damos on September 7, 2005, at 23:00:09
thanks to a kind Babblemail from Damos :-)
and the effects of lots and lots of caffeine, in liquid and pill form.
I am very depersonalized, I don't really feel 'there' unless large quantities of some stimulating substance have been ingested, Provigil or Ritalin or caffeine (or combination thereof), which gets me off the floor where I experience absolute nothingness.
It was the verb 'to be' that got me into philosophy. (That and Descartes' Dream Argument- but that argument has a slightly different spin when you're narcoleptic...) Heidegger explains what 'Dasein' means, but I wish he would explain his explanation- he does, endlessly, but not in a form I can understand. Quine is a little more prosaic- "to be is to be the value of a variable." Well, I can understand that, sort of. And for someone who hardly feels 'there' it's a pressing question.
I do feel a little 'here' now. Philosophy is a very personal matter for me.
-z
Posted by alexandra_k on September 11, 2005, at 16:28:34
In reply to now a one-place predicate at least » Damos, posted by zeugma on September 9, 2005, at 18:36:27
> I am very depersonalized, I don't really feel 'there' unless large quantities of some stimulating substance have been ingested, Provigil or Ritalin or caffeine (or combination thereof), which gets me off the floor where I experience absolute nothingness.
Hmm. Are you depressed or dysthymic?
> It was the verb 'to be' that got me into philosophy. (That and Descartes' Dream Argument- but that argument has a slightly different spin when you're narcoleptic...)
:-)
Descartes' dream argument got me hooked too. That and a mini-lecture on personal identity that I went to when I was still in school...If Tracey's body is in England...
And we chop off her arms and send them to France...
Then where is Tracey?
If Tracey's body (including her arms) is in England and her brain is in France then where is Tracey?
If Tracey's left hemisphere is in England and her right hemisphere is in France and the rest of her body is in Germany then where is Tracey?:-)
>Heidegger explains what 'Dasein' means, but I wish he would explain his explanation- he does, endlessly, but not in a form I can understand.
Ah. Welcome to continental philosophy...
;-)> Quine is a little more prosaic- "to be is to be the value of a variable." Well, I can understand that, sort of. And for someone who hardly feels 'there' it's a pressing question.
Ah. I see...
Existence.
'To be'I guess I find something similar...
What worries me is why it is like anything at all to be me.
It is surely possible that there be a physical duplicate of this world but where none of the beings on that world are conscious.
There is nothing at all that it is like to be them.
So why on earth is there something that it is like to be me?
And (presumably) you too?Mind
ConsciousnessI guess the same (or at least a similar) question...
> I do feel a little 'here' now. Philosophy is a very personal matter for me.:-)
Depersonalisation is an eerie feeling...
'The aim of philosophy is thoughts that are at peace'
w.
Posted by Damos on September 12, 2005, at 1:33:04
In reply to now a one-place predicate at least » Damos, posted by zeugma on September 9, 2005, at 18:36:27
Hey ~Z,
How are you doing today?
Sorry, I don't know too much about Provigil and Ritilin other than that the latter is pretty much handed out like candy to kids in Oz these days. Sadly it seems that it is easy to diagnose ADHD and prescribe a pill than to actually pracice medicine.
I can strongly identify with caffeine though. Or is that I can identify with strong caffeine? Hmm, the latter I think.
Glad you're at least one place better.
Damos
Posted by zeugma on September 13, 2005, at 5:23:42
In reply to Re: now a one-place predicate at least » zeugma, posted by Damos on September 12, 2005, at 1:33:04
thanks to you both for being there :-)
Ritalin has a very bad name in a lot of the world. I read an abstract which said that the main advantage of newer ADHD drugs is that they are not called Ritalin (i.e., Strattera, Adderall, etc.). ADHD is a real, debilitating phenomenon, but as with most diagnoses in psychiatry, diagnosis is lax (sort of like saying someone has a headache, but not getting into the etiology of the disorder).
Depersonalization is eerie, when younger this caused a continual state of panic, but the panic attacks are not frequent anymore because the feeling of being isolated from my own body is one I am habituated to by now. It's a physical disconnection, not an emotional one. Philosophically, this makes it very hard for me to cope with philosophers who put a great deal of stress on phenomenology, such as Daniel Dennett or (in a Continental vein) Husserl. I find that Dennett's work makes my head spin because he is always talking about phenomenology, and I can't follow any of it. The same with theories of mental representation. Depersonalization has been correlated with a defect in the ability to generate imagery. It is easier for me to think of properties that two predicates might have in common (for example, that red and blue both share a property with green, but not with cold) than to think of 'how it feels' to see green as opposed to red. That's why I find problems such as Dennett's 'zombies' who are the same as us but lack consciousness difficult to assess. If their behavior is identical, including, presdumably,verbal behavior, then how do the zombies differ from us? They would say there is nothing it' feels' like to be them. But would they nonetheless be able to use predicates such as 'aware of', as in, they are aware that the patch is green? Maybe I am drastically off here, but I am inclined to take a behaviorist line in these matters. (typing in great haste so just throwing out ideas.)(suppose I'm trying to say that ability to use mentalistic predicates is a property of a limited calss of organisms, and that whether there is real 'mind' behind it is revealed by the pattern of use.)
yes Alexandra I tend to be depressed, not dysthymic. Things are fairly level now though. :-)
-z
Posted by alexandra_k on September 13, 2005, at 18:48:38
In reply to Alexandra and Damos, posted by zeugma on September 13, 2005, at 5:23:42
> thanks to you both for being there :-)
And thanks to you :-)
>I read an abstract which said that the main advantage of newer ADHD drugs is that they are not called RitalinLOL!
> Depersonalization is eerie, when younger this caused a continual state of panic, but the panic attacks are not frequent anymore because the feeling of being isolated from my own body is one I am habituated to by now.Hmm. I get depersonalization too - but I think mine is a bit different. It feels like I am an observer of my own body. I can watch it moving around and having thoughts and perceptions and sometimes emotions and behaving in various ways. But none of it feels like it follows from me, from a conscious decision I have made. I am therefore interested in the notion of free will and especially the notion that we don't really have any. I quite like epiphenomenalism, the idea that we just experience our brains processes and we have no say whatsoever as to what brain processes will occur in us.
>Philosophically, this makes it very hard for me to cope with philosophers who put a great deal of stress on phenomenology, such as Daniel Dennett or (in a Continental vein) Husserl. I find that Dennett's work makes my head spin because he is always talking about phenomenology, and I can't follow any of it.
Ah. Have you tried "Consciousness Explained"? I'm wondering about Dennett... See, Dennett says he is going to take phenomenology seriously. He then proceeds to pay tribute to the richness of phenomenological experience (which sounds like the bit you are having trouble with). He then proceeds... To change the subject. To deny the phenomenology. I wonder... Whether in the end he may well get to a position that you could have sympathy for.
>The same with theories of mental representation.
Though... Representations don't have to be conscious. In fact... If you think of representations as (consciously experienced) Lockean ideas then that results in a number of problems... You can think of representations as a mechanism that underlies our behavioural abilities to respond differentially to different stimuli.
> Depersonalization has been correlated with a defect in the ability to generate imagery.
Oh dear :-(
Is that why I'm so useless at navigating in halo??>It is easier for me to think of properties that two predicates might have in common (for example, that red and blue both share a property with green, but not with cold) than to think of 'how it feels' to see green as opposed to red. That's why I find problems such as Dennett's 'zombies' who are the same as us but lack consciousness difficult to assess. If their behavior is identical, including, presdumably,verbal behavior, then how do the zombies differ from us?
ONLY with respect to phenomenology.
(Chalmers says this is an important difference... Dennett ultimately concludes that if phenomenology is the ONLY difference then there is no difference. You might have sympathy with his position).>They would say there is nothing it' feels' like to be them.
No. They are exact physical duplicates... So they say all the things you would say. They would say 'wow look at the redness in the sunset' even though they don't have conscious experiences.
>But would they nonetheless be able to use predicates such as 'aware of', as in, they are aware that the patch is green?
Absolutely. You have to imagine a world that is an exact physical duplicate of this world down to the last sub-atomic particle. On that world you have a counter-part. Your counterpart has had an exact duplicate life to you. Your counterpart exhibited exact duplicate behaviours. Including verbal behaviours. But... There is nothing it is like to be your counterpart. But in your case... The notion is that there is something it is like to be you except when you are in a dreamless sleep or knocked unconscious.
>Maybe I am drastically off here, but I am inclined to take a behaviorist line in these matters. (typing in great haste so just throwing out ideas.)(suppose I'm trying to say that ability to use mentalistic predicates is a property of a limited calss of organisms, and that whether there is real 'mind' behind it is revealed by the pattern of use.)
So if we could artificially construct a robot that could behave comperably to a person then not only would it have comperable mental states such as belief and desire but it would also have comperable conscious states?
Is there a fact of the matter (whether it is conscious or not) and is the truth maker different from mere behaviours?
> yes Alexandra I tend to be depressed, not dysthymic. Things are fairly level now though. :-)I hope you get to be a two place predicate soon :-)
Posted by Damos on September 14, 2005, at 1:45:48
In reply to Alexandra and Damos, posted by zeugma on September 13, 2005, at 5:23:42
> thanks to you both for being there :-)
No, thank you Zeugma and you too Alex for allowing me to tag along on your philosophical coat-tails and friendship and for your trust.I'm swimming way out of my depth here in the sea of knowledge, so I hope you'll forgive me if I catch the next wave back into the safety of the shores of Damos Isle of Ignorance. Please know that I care and that I am keeping an eye out from the safety of the beach. If you need me, just raise your hand and wave and I shall swim out to meet you.
Warmest wishes to you both.
DamosP.S: I too LOL about the new ADHD drugs.
Posted by zeugma on September 22, 2005, at 11:38:52
In reply to Re: Zeugma and Damos » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on September 13, 2005, at 18:48:38
alexandra,
thank you so much for having the patience to converse with me about these matters. I printed out your last post, and when I get the energy to get myself out of the apt., I will write my marginal notes on it in a coffeeshop while also attending to my workplace demands (this was the advice of my ADD coach: do something fun, then the work will get done. Commenting on your posts is fun...)
in any case you can see the process of adding places to my predicate is not a simple one.
and thank you Damos for your supportive comments, both to myself and to alexandra. she is very lucky to have a friend like you :-)
-z
Posted by alexandra_k on September 28, 2005, at 2:06:56
In reply to Re: Zeugma and Damos » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on September 22, 2005, at 11:38:52
> thank you so much for having the patience to converse with me about these matters.
:-)
Same back at ya.> I printed out your last post, and when I get the energy to get myself out of the apt.
Just if or when you feel like it. Really. I can ramble on at times... And I don't want to create more pressure. I enjoy our chats - but I am capable of chatting about other stuff too (really!)
> Commenting on your posts is fun...)
:-) Thanks. I enjoy yours too.
> in any case you can see the process of adding places to my predicate is not a simple one.Yeah. I understand.
> and thank you Damos for your supportive comments, both to myself and to alexandra. she is very lucky to have a friend like you :-)Yeah. We are both lucky :-)
Damos is a great friend
This is the end of the thread.
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