Posted by zeugma on September 1, 2005, at 6:32:08
In reply to Re: teleological semantics? » alexandra_k, posted by alexandra_k on August 31, 2005, at 18:00:25
> Utterances and thoughts are distinctive in that they (can be) ABOUT states of affairs / events / facts / situations in the external world (the world outside the head / mind / brain).
>
> They can represent accurately or inaccurately. They can be true (if accurate) and false (if inaccurate).Now we are on to the hard stuff :-)
>
> If we go a long way back into the evolutionary history of this world then we can go back to before life emerged... At that point in time there isn't any intentionality / aboutness / representation.
>IMO, if we get into knots trying to explicate the word-world relation via such constructs as 'intensionality,' going the route to 'intentionality' and tangles involving mental representation make logic-splitting into child's-play... IMO.
> These phenomena emerged via the process of natural selection and thus there must be a naturalistic account of the emergence of the phenomena.
>
> There might be lessons for the present...
>
> Lets have a look at some rudimentary aboutness...
>
> Frogs snap their tongues at moving dark spots.
> A mental representation is what occurs between the stimulus and the response.
> Presumably the stimulus gets represented in the frogs brain and that representation produces the tongue snapping response.a neural circuit directs the snapping process.. is it a 'representation'... i don't know.
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> In order for something to count as a representation misrepresentation must be possible...
>
right, because the 'representation' relation is a weak one. it is dependent upon one's capacity for representation, a sort of map which depicts the terrain but necessarily loses detail...> Now, if an experimentor throws a bee bee pellet in front of the frog the frog will snap its tongue at it.
>
> So the million dollar question is 'is this a case of mis-representation?'
well, the frog's picture of the stimulus (to anthropomorphize) doesn't have sufficient resolution to discriminate between pellets and flies.
>
> There are a number of candidates for the content of the frogs representation:
> 1) fly
> 2) moving dark spot
> 3) fly or bee bee
>
> If the content of the frogs representation is FLY then snapping at a bee bee pellet is a case of misrepresentation.
> If the content of the frogs representation is MOVING DARK SPOT then snapping at a bee bee pellet is not a case of misrepresentation (because a bee bee pellet just is a moving dark spot
> If the content of the frogs representation is FLY OR BEE BEE then snapping at a bee bee pellet is not a case of misrepresentation (because it is correctly applied to anything that is either a fly or a bee bee. In case you are worried about disjunctive concepts there isn't really a problem here. People talk of 'greenstone' and it just turns out that greenstone is appropriately applied to either jadite or nephrite).
>
> So... How does actual selection history help fix the content of the frogs representation?
>ah... content... it seems to me that content and representation are a little orthogonal. i suppose i would appeal to a process of informational decay to explain why the frog's representation of the fly is so prone to error. representation is a very weak relation. a puppet can represent Julius Caesar, and what is more the puppet can then be identified as Julius caesar on repeated ocassions, despite the fact that the puppet could represent Caesar lacks any surface plausibilty. In particular nothing naturalistic could explain the representation, other than as an exercise of a representational capacity that humans have evolved that can make any x represent y (language is largely arbitrary yet has tremendous capacity to represent). But moving from the stark concept of 'representation' to the notion that there is a capacity for representation (recognizing that the relation itself is arbitrary) mignt chage the equation, though i don't know...
> In the actual selection history of the frog bee bees in the environment would have been rare (or non-existant). Thus if the frog has the concept FLY OR BEE BEE then this will confer the same selectional advantage as possession of the concept FLY.
>i don't want to say the frog has concepts at all, but an ability to identify, and snatch flies with its tongue. A bee bee pellet triggers the process despite the fact that the pellet is not edible. i prefer saying it has an 'ability' to locate and snatch flies than to say that it can conceptualize flies. the ability can confer a selectional advantage for the frog, without requiring the ability to generate concepts which are of dubious survival value even for humans who are much better at concept-forming.
concepts might also be useful in generating counterfactuals. for instance i might think 'if i stand here then i have a better chance of not getting eaten by this tiger.' but this could have evolved as an ability present in frogs on a non-conceptual level (i.e. it becomes motionless when a predator comes by, because of some random mutation that promotes such behavior, then the frogs who become motionless survive to reprodice at higher rates, so the behavior becomes prevalent. But is representation or concepts necessary at all? )
> In the actual selection history of the frog if enough of the moving dark spots were flies or other nutritious (or digestible or whatever) substances then MOVING DARK SPOT would confer the same selectional advantage as possession of the concept FLY.
>
> So... About now the thought is that we need to go modal to fix the content of the frogs representation.
>
> There is a possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by FLY OR BEE BEE.
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> Some of them are going to die out (inadequate nutrition).
>
> There is another possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by BEE BEE.
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> All of them are going to die out (inadequate nutrition).
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> There is another possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by FLIES.
>
> More of them will survive.
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> In virtue of this... Some people have argued that the content of the representation is best captured by 'fly'. Though there has been some haggling over 'nutritious substance' and alternatives like that as well...
>
> But what I don't understand...
> Is that...
> Possible worlds are irrelevant with respect to ACTUAL selection pressures...
> And ACTUAL selection pressures must be what determine the content of ACTUAL representations.
> If we wanted to delineate the content of frogs representations in other possible worlds then we would need to look at their selection pressures.
> The trouble is that 'other ways this world might have gone' don't help us with respect to ways this world is...
>
> And so... I would say that the content of the representation is still indeterminate.
i don't think there is content, just an ability to perform a certain action that in some environments confers selectional advantage for the frog. if one wants to offer a naturalistic account then the environmental input, since it constantly varies, supplies little need for concepts or content. Since humans have a greater capacity to stabilize their environments (still limited though) concepts might have more of a rationale to evolve. For instance concepts are useful when designing artifacts.
>
> Actual selection history is insufficient to fix content.
> And going modal... Only helps with respect to fixing the content of frogs representations on other possible worlds.
> It doesn't help us fix the content of the actual world frogs representations.
> And going modal... Is insufficient to fix the content of the frogs representations on other possible worlds because... Selection history (which is what is supposed to be relevant to fix content) underdetermines representational content.
>
> But once again I'm probably missing something...
>
> But there is also the point...
> There is also the point that...
> Natural selection isn't so much about 'survival of the fittest' as it is about 'elimination of the least successful'. As such... Why should we expect selected mechanisms (or selected representational contents for that matter) to be optimal? They just need to be 'good enough' to get buy...
>
> Natural selection is a kludge. A hack. (Dennett)
> Short sighted.
> Not with a view to other possible worlds ;-)
>
>this stuff is difficult :-)
-z
>
poster:zeugma
thread:541758
URL: http://www.dr-bob.org/babble/write/20050807/msgs/549586.html