Posted by zeugma on September 13, 2005, at 5:23:42
In reply to Re: now a one-place predicate at least » zeugma, posted by Damos on September 12, 2005, at 1:33:04
thanks to you both for being there :-)
Ritalin has a very bad name in a lot of the world. I read an abstract which said that the main advantage of newer ADHD drugs is that they are not called Ritalin (i.e., Strattera, Adderall, etc.). ADHD is a real, debilitating phenomenon, but as with most diagnoses in psychiatry, diagnosis is lax (sort of like saying someone has a headache, but not getting into the etiology of the disorder).
Depersonalization is eerie, when younger this caused a continual state of panic, but the panic attacks are not frequent anymore because the feeling of being isolated from my own body is one I am habituated to by now. It's a physical disconnection, not an emotional one. Philosophically, this makes it very hard for me to cope with philosophers who put a great deal of stress on phenomenology, such as Daniel Dennett or (in a Continental vein) Husserl. I find that Dennett's work makes my head spin because he is always talking about phenomenology, and I can't follow any of it. The same with theories of mental representation. Depersonalization has been correlated with a defect in the ability to generate imagery. It is easier for me to think of properties that two predicates might have in common (for example, that red and blue both share a property with green, but not with cold) than to think of 'how it feels' to see green as opposed to red. That's why I find problems such as Dennett's 'zombies' who are the same as us but lack consciousness difficult to assess. If their behavior is identical, including, presdumably,verbal behavior, then how do the zombies differ from us? They would say there is nothing it' feels' like to be them. But would they nonetheless be able to use predicates such as 'aware of', as in, they are aware that the patch is green? Maybe I am drastically off here, but I am inclined to take a behaviorist line in these matters. (typing in great haste so just throwing out ideas.)(suppose I'm trying to say that ability to use mentalistic predicates is a property of a limited calss of organisms, and that whether there is real 'mind' behind it is revealed by the pattern of use.)
yes Alexandra I tend to be depressed, not dysthymic. Things are fairly level now though. :-)
-z
poster:zeugma
thread:541758
URL: http://www.dr-bob.org/babble/write/20050910/msgs/554541.html