Posted by alexandra_k on August 22, 2005, at 19:29:07
In reply to Re: The Problem of Inaction, posted by alexandra_k on August 22, 2005, at 19:21:56
For any model that is able to solve the problem of inaction, there is a related problem that arises. Namely, how to account for the relatively few cases where subjects actually do act on their delusions. In an often cited case of this one man became convinced that his step-father was a robot and he decapitated him in order to look for the batteries and microfilm in his head. This seems a very strange thing to do if one is merely attempting to report on ones anomalous experience.
Rather than considering there to be a significant problem with all of the accounts offered thus far I would like to consider whether different models might be better placed to account for the different kinds of cases. It would seem that making a delusional utterance yet not behaving as though one literally believed the world was that way would be best explained by subjects attempting to report on their experiences. Where subjects do act on their delusions, however, then I think that a modified version of Davies et al’s two factor account where we have an anomalous experience rather than a perceptual experience explains the phenomenon quite well.
I would also like to suggest that subjects come to act on their delusions after progressing from reporting on their experiences to mistaking their experiences to be veridical. What this buys us is the notion that the sense of conviction has become similarly misplaced.
poster:alexandra_k
thread:543149
URL: http://www.dr-bob.org/babble/write/20050807/msgs/545320.html