Posted by alexandra_k on August 22, 2005, at 19:21:56
In reply to Re: Reports of Experience, posted by alexandra_k on August 22, 2005, at 19:19:51
It is often thought to be a fairly significant problem for models of delusions that consider delusions to be false beliefs about external reality that in most cases delusional subjects do not act in ways in which we would expect them to act were they to literally believe what they are saying. In the Capgras delusion, for instance the delusional subject comes to maintain that someone who is close to them has been replaced by an impostor. We might expect that the delusional subject would attempt to talk to the alleged impostor to see whether they have access to the memories of the original. We might expect them to show some concern as to where the original has got to or concern as to what might have happened to them. Subjects with the Capgras delusion do not attempt to locate the original. They do not contact the relevant authorities to inform them of the disappearance of the original. While we could attempt to attribute all sorts of other beliefs and desires to the delusional subject in order to make these behaviors rational given their delusion and their other beliefs and desires this is not a line that anybody seems to have pursued. Rather, these facts about delusional subjects most often not acting in ways we would expect has been taken to be evidence for their irrationality. It has also led some theorists to consider that delusions may not be appropriately classified as beliefs.
Gregory Currie takes the later line and he attempts to maintain that delusions are not really beliefs rather they are ‘imaginings misidentified as beliefs by the delusional subject’. I am not sure whether this line will help solve the problem of inaction, however, as Tim Bayne has queried ‘what is the difference between believing something to be the case and believing that one believes something to be the case?’ This does seem a little odd and perhaps Curries line is not really enough to solve the problem of inaction. I think that viewing delusions as reports of anomalous experience is able to solve the problem of inaction quite naturally. There wouldn’t seem to be any obvious behavioral consequences for reporting on ones experience.
poster:alexandra_k
thread:543149
URL: http://www.dr-bob.org/babble/write/20050807/msgs/545317.html