Posted by alexandra_k on January 17, 2005, at 16:59:13
We use mental states to predict and explain behaviour. Both in our own case and in the case of other people. If we see someone running and ask 'why is that person running' then an acceptable explanation is that
(1) She believed that she needed to run to catch the bus
(2) She wanted to catch the bus
(3) She was 'rational' enough to put these together. To realise that she should therefore run so as to catch the bus.It is a foundational part of folk psychology that a person will act in such a way as to satisfy their desires were their beliefs true. Of course we can have many many desires, but it is thought that the 'strongest' desire is the one that comes into play with respect to the causation of behaviour.
-Belief is a state designed to fit (represent) the world.
-Desire is a state that seeks to alter the world to fit with it.
-Fantasy does neither...A belief is a mental state that plays a certain functional role in the state of the organism (person). This is according to the best current philosophical theorising...
Beliefs are typically caused by certain things (the thing that the belief is about).
They typically interact with other beliefs in certain ways (so that a person will also come to believe what deductively follows when the deduction is pointed out to them).
They also interact with ones desires so as to produce the relevant action.This is a tripartite theory of the nature of belief.
There is an input clause (what the typical causes are)
an internal role clause (governing relations between that belief and other beliefs) and
an output clause (the behavious that results from the belief interacting with ones desires).According to this theory a belief is a belief in virtue of the mental states fulfilling that functional role in the organism.
It is thought that the above theory is simply a 'systematisation' of what the average person implicitly believes about the nature of belief. Does it seem barely worth the trouble of stating or does it seem wrong? It is hard to assess it. I am already enmeshed in it as a plausible account of mental states.
The thought is that 'desire' can be given its own functional specification. To give a functional specification of something we treat what is to be explained as a 'black box' and we specify the causal relations. We can do that with 'belief'. Then we can do that with 'desire'. While we mention one of those in the functional specification of the other it is the entire system of causal interrelations that defines the nature of the mental state. This prevents circularity (just in case any Skinnerians are worried).
In the case of delusions we seem to have a 'belief' that is divorced from its typical functional role.
- The belief does not arise understandably from experince. (What is the experience that would lead you to come to the belief that 'my wife has been replaced by an impostor?')
-It does not seem to interact with the subjects other beliefs in expected ways. (Why don't they search for the original. Why aren't they worried about them? Why don't they worry what happened to them?)
-It does not seem to interact with desires in such a way as to produce the relevant action. (In SOME cases - people don't act on their belief).If we have a mental state that does not fulfill the functional specification of belief than either:
Functional specification is inadequate to capture the nature of belief (so best current theory is wrong or badly inadequate).
OR
Delusions, while being mental states, are not beliefs.Then there is the worry about content. Some people maintain that the meaning or content of the mental state can be specified by spelling out the way in which the state interacts with other states. If this is so then it would seem that based on the causal role that the state plays in delusional subjects we may be left having to conclude that delusions are not contentful utterances. That is the line Campbell takes...
Others say that belief should be given a functional specification but not the content of the belief. In this case you could have a fixed content that has come apart from its functional role. There could be a 'limited' breakdown in rationality at either the input, internal role, or output points. You may even be able to tell a story about how all three of these have broken down and yet the content is fixed by prior learning / the use of the words in other contexts...
poster:alexandra_k
thread:443284
URL: http://www.dr-bob.org/babble/write/20041210/msgs/443284.html