Posted by alexandra_k on December 21, 2004, at 20:11:28
In reply to Re: 1.3, posted by smokeymadison on December 21, 2004, at 19:39:06
Okay. So they say 'I am dead'. Then the question becomes, what is it that they actually believe (assuming delusions are beliefs), or what is it that they mean by their utterance? Now we need to engage in radical translation (this is a philosophical term with a history, but just think of it as specifying what meaning they are attempting to convey with their utterance).
Translation one: I am biologically dead.
Translation two: I am emotionally dead.
Now if they intend one then their utterance is false. They are not biologically dead. If they intend two then their utterance is true. They are emotionally dead (we speak of this in other contexts so it isn't that odd really). On translation one evidence that their heart is beating is evidence that their belief is false. On translation two evidence that their heart is beating is not even relevant to what they are saying. If they are expressing the nature of their experience then their claims are true in the way that expressions of experience are incorrigable. What seems to be the case is the case. If they are making a claim about the way the world is (as in one), however, then their utterances can be false and in this case they are. The very act of making the utterance entails that you are alive (on translation one).
> i would like some feedback on the notion that in order to have a delusion, there has to be a fragmentation of the conscious mind. i am speaking from my own experience only, really, and haven't done any research on the subject myself. but it makes sense to me.Okay. Maybe your case would be a bit different from the standard becasue maybe you never really lost 'insight' into the falsity of the belief. Maybe you wouldn't have been classified as delusional on those grounds. The notion is that some people do not have insight into the falsity of their beliefs however. Thats why the DSM says that they are held with a 'firm conviction'. But then it becomes an empirical matter as to whether there are in fact any delusions if we take the DSM to be authorative on the definition.
What if all 'delusions' (that are not acted on) are simply expressions of first person experience? What if their anomalous experience is so compelling that they are just continually giving expression to it?
What if the anomalous experience that was relevant to your case was an intense feeling that you were in danger; that someone wished you harm? Then your delusion would be understandable in light of that anomalous experience. We could distinguish between the specific and general form of the delusion. The general form could be given by the anomalous experience, and the specific form (that it was your boyfriend) could be a rationalisation for your experience. That would mean that you could waver with respect to the specific form - but there could be a conviction with respect to the general. I want to say that medication assists by removing or muting the anomalous experience. Get rid of the experience, and there we go.
> Basically, extreme emotionBut once again, the Cotard subject doesn't have extreme emotion. That is precisely the problem for the Cotard subject, that they don't feel anything at all. To maintain that delusions arise in response to extreme emotions would indeed require a second factor. It would also not be able to explain all of the delusions on the list (Cotard, for example).
>fragments the mind and different parts rationalize reality to different ends. a delusion is born when reality is p but the part of the mind that believes q is in control and does the talking, producing the utterances you are talking about.Yeah, someone is working on that currently in Australia. I don't know much about what he is up to. Except that the notion is that he is going to attempt to come up with a model of this that can be run as a computer simulation. I think this is a promising area, but it is one I have bypassed because I don't know enough about programming or coming up with models that are capable of being programmed.
poster:alexandra_k
thread:432064
URL: http://www.dr-bob.org/babble/write/20041210/msgs/432636.html