![[dr. bob]](/dr-bob-sm.gif)
Dr. Bob is Robert Hsiung, MD,
bob@dr-bob.orgShown: posts 26 to 50 of 55. Go back in thread:
Posted by zeugma on August 28, 2005, at 15:01:09
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain... » Phillipa, posted by alexandra_k on August 24, 2005, at 1:37:02
Okay so... Just in case Zeugma or someone hits the boards... I have many confusions around meaning... Philosophy of language is really very hard (IMO).>
hi alexandra, you know I can't resist this topic!
>
>
>
> Two dimensional modal semantics / logic in particular…>The variant developed by David Kaplan which is indeed a modal semantics (he calls it ‘two sorted’, my perception is kinda fuzzy right now so looking at it I can’t tell if it’s two dimensional or not…
>
> The two dimensions aren't 'dennotation and connotation'. My mistake - the two dimensions are extension / reference and intension (standard meaning).
>Denotation and connotation is a variant terminology for extension/intension.
>
>
>
>>
>
>
> You can do all kinds of funny stuff with indexicals by evaluating their truth / falsity in modal contexts (across other possible worlds):
>
> 'I am here now'.
>
> This statement is necessarily true.
But is it true that I am here now, barely dressed and in front of my computer, is a necessary truth?
The utterance-type 'I am here now' is one that gets assigned value 'T' every time it's used. The two dimensions of demonstrative logic (which I believe you're talking about) are content and character. The character of 'I am here now' is such that it cannot be used falsely. But its content is just everyday contingent truth. I could be somewhere else on a Sunday afternoon (though highly unlikely, of course).
Both content and character are aspects of sense or intension. Content is the part that ties in with possible worlds, and hence propositions (if you consider that a proposition is either the possible world that makes the utterance true, or the ordered triple of persons, places, and times that make up what I mean when I say 'I am here now.')Character is the route by which we proceed to the proposition. I use the utterance-type, 'I am here now,' to convey the content that I am here now, and you do not know what it means until (getting to the reference part of the equation) you know the referents of each of those terms I just used, including the indexicals 'I', 'here', and 'now' (such bewildering little words). This is kind of neat because utterances have two varieties of sense (content and character) and words have extension (reference), and the doctrine that words acquire meaning only in the context of a sentence is borne out.
So, it is not the referents that vary across possible worlds... it is the senses. I wish, of course, that I (designatum here) could vary at will from world to world, but I can't. I'm stuck here for now. But this world has Alexandra in it :-)
>
>
>
>
> It is true that I am here now.
> But it is also possible that I be somewhere else now.Very possible :-)
-z
Posted by alexandra_k on August 28, 2005, at 18:03:35
In reply to mystery of the missing indexical.. » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on August 28, 2005, at 15:01:09
> hi alexandra, you know I can't resist this topic!
lol! indeed. you like the hard stuff (imo)... language and metaphysics. i'm more fond of mental representation...
> The variant developed by David Kaplan which is indeed a modal semantics (he calls it ‘two sorted’, my perception is kinda fuzzy right now so looking at it I can’t tell if it’s two dimensional or not…ah. i remember kaplan (a little) from a couple years back... what gets hard is that people use the same term with a different meaning / reference (aargh! this gets hard to talk about). what i mean is that for some philosophers meaning just is reference. whereas for others there is a distinction between varieties of meaning. it can be hard to figure out how much is verbal dispute with people using terms differently in philosophy of language...
> > The two dimensions aren't 'dennotation and connotation'. My mistake - the two dimensions are extension / reference and intension (standard meaning).
> Denotation and connotation is a variant terminology for extension/intension.:-) so i was right after all! i think i have heard of a distinction between intension and connotation somewhere. where intension was part of standard meaning and connotation was more to do with idiosyncratic variations between speakers. so the intension of 'water' might be 'watery stuff', but the connotation of 'water' might be 'sacred substance' for some individual or smaller group of individuals. but then i've also heard of connotation being used synonomously with intension. so it is hard...
> > 'I am here now'.
> > This statement is necessarily true.> But is it true that I am here now, barely dressed and in front of my computer, is a necessary truth?
> The utterance-type 'I am here now' is one that gets assigned value 'T' every time it's used. The two dimensions of demonstrative logic (which I believe you're talking about) are content and character.hmm. bells are ringing...
i shall have to have a go with kripke, because i am more familiar with his terminology (though i'll try and get the hang of kaplan's usage as i go...)
a rigid designator designates the same individual across all possible worlds...
'alexandra_k' is a rigid designator because it dennotes alexandra_k in all worlds in which it dennotes anything at all.
'the new zealander who posts about philosophy on psycho-babble' is a flaccid designator. in this world (the actual world) the description is enough to pick out one and only one individual (alexandra_k). but there is a possible world in which alexandra_k never posted to babble. my officemate might have posted to babble instead and he may have even posted philosophy stuff. in that world the description 'the new zealander who posts about philosophy on psycho-babble' would pick out a different referent. thus it is a contingent truth that that description picks out me. there are other possible worlds in which that same description picks out other individuals.
'i am here now' is a flaccid designator. the 'i' picks out different individuals in different possible worlds.
the 'here' picks out different places in different possible worlds.
the 'now' picks out different times in different possible worlds (because possible worlds are just supposed to be ways this world might be including ways it was / will be in the past / future.the sentance 'i am here now' is necessarily true whenever it is uttered, wherever it is uttered, by whomever it is uttered.
but the person place and time that are referred to change as a function of the context of utterance.
i can know 'i am here now' is necessarily true without knowing who i am, where i am, or when i am.
>The character of 'I am here now' is such that it cannot be used falsely.
so... character is what i might be tempted to call... standard meaning / intension.
>But its content is just everyday contingent truth. I could be somewhere else on a Sunday afternoon (though highly unlikely, of course).
and the content is externalist, which is just to say that the content is the reference / dennotation.
> Both content and character are aspects of sense or intension. Content is the part that ties in with possible worlds, and hence propositions (if you consider that a proposition is either the possible world that makes the utterance true, or the ordered triple of persons, places, and times that make up what I mean when I say 'I am here now.')are you sure that content is part of intension? maybe this is wrong... is content a function that maps character on to contexts in order to deliver a reference?
> Character is the route by which we proceed to the proposition. I use the utterance-type, 'I am here now,' to convey the content that I am here now,
to flaccidly designate who, when, and where you are
>and you do not know what it means until (getting to the reference part of the equation) you know the referents of each of those terms I just used, including the indexicals 'I', 'here', and 'now' (such bewildering little words).
or is it that i do not know what you are referring to until i am able to map the character (standard meaning) onto the context (your environment) thereby getting to the reference?
>This is kind of neat because utterances have two varieties of sense (content and character) and words have extension (reference), and the doctrine that words acquire meaning only in the context of a sentence is borne out.
ah. this really is ringing bells...
> So, it is not the referents that vary across possible worlds... it is the senses.???
I thought the character is standard (standard meaning). so the character of 'i' is that it refers (flaccidly) to the speaker.
The content varies depending on circumstances. if I say 'I' the context is such that i refer to alexandra_k.
and the content... just is the reference (because we are being content externalists).and the content is flaccidly designated because we are getting to it via an intension (description) where the reference of the description varies across all possible worlds. whereas if i refer to myself as alexandra_k then that refers to alexandra_k across all possible worlds.
so...
1. 'i am here now'
2. 'alexandra_k is babbling at 10.49 on monday the 25th of august'.
in the actual world both utterances dennote / refer to the same thing.
but when we go modal...
1. is necessarily true (true in all possible worlds) but the dennotation changes as the 'i' pick out different individuals, the 'here' picks out different places, and the 'now' changes.
2. is a contingent truth. while it is not possible that 'i am here now' is false, 'where' i am, who 'i' am, 'when' i am varies...so while it is true that i must be indentical with myself (at one point in time) in order to count as the same thing...
any description of me is only contingently true (in that the description may not obtain to me) across different possible worlds.
except for essential properties which an individual must retain in order to retain its identity as that individual.
kripke reckoned that what was crucial for being the 'same person' was 'descended from that (gesture) sperm and egg combination'. i don't like that. i like to think it is possible that i could have had different biological parents :-( still... i guess he's talking bodily criterion (same human being) rather than psychological criterion.
>But this world has Alexandra in it :-)
:-)
Ah... But you might prefer one or the other of my counter-parts :-)
Posted by alexandra_k on August 28, 2005, at 18:08:00
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on August 28, 2005, at 18:03:35
oh.
i might be getting it...
lets have a go...
please correct me if i f*ck it up...two varieties of sense:
character
contentreference
so you take an utterance (lets go with 'I am babbling).
The character is something along the lines of 'the speaker of the utterance is babbling'
The content is determined by the character + the actual world environment. So the character + facts about the actual world determine that...
The referent is 'babbling alexandra_k'
and the referent is designated flacidly because if the context was different the referent would be different.
so...
does that mean that sense is not a ladder that can be disgarded once you have used it to get to the referent????
make sense???
Posted by zeugma on August 29, 2005, at 22:40:14
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.., posted by alexandra_k on August 28, 2005, at 18:08:00
am in something of an addled way right now, wrote a detailed commentary and then my connection failed- i'm an idiot for not working offline- but anyways- it's late here- 11:19 pm Monday night and have an early day coming up- so- detailed exegesis will wait, a few comments i can't refrain from and are salient enough to me (hopefully to you)-
'I', 'here', 'now' are not flaccid designators. They are rigid. Rigidity applies to content, not character. Character is a function that maps contexts onto contents. Content is a function that maps possible worlds onto extensions. (So content is intensional. And we are externalists about content. :-))Now I remain [Z] (zero-place predicate denoting 'exists in that world') regardless of the flaccid designators that denote me and that vary from world to world (say the one in which I am female, the one in which I am not a basket case, the one in which my previous post to you wasn't lost (aggg!); I am me, just as Richard Nixon would still be Nixon even if not named 'Nixon' in many of the possible worlds in which the zero-place predicate [Nixon] has an extension denoting a member of those worlds.
Now 'now', here' and so on are also rigid. But of course only with respect to their content; their characters (which are also part of the senses of these terms) are not constant. By content Kaplan means more or less what everyone means when they talk about 'propositions' (it always comes down to those, right? Well, all that matters is that we are good content-externalists!)Characters are neither rigid nor flaccid; they are constant or inconstant. 'I' is not constant. But I can only use it to point to [Z], your friend from the tail end of the alphabet, no matter what world I am in or what flaccid designators pick me out.
Addendum largely unrelated: Counterpart theory is strangely satisfying. When I am at my lowest, I can always think of how my counterparts are having a great time, and rather than making me jealous of them, I feel oddly consoled. It's like, they're part of the team, and even though I'm slacking off, they're getting the job done. Strange, huh?
Posted by zeugma on August 29, 2005, at 23:00:46
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on August 29, 2005, at 22:40:14
this is one of those terms that i obsess over late at night. I am terrible at grammar but am obsessed with it. Presumably a zero-place predicate is one that has no hole to fill. If [Z] exists in a world, then the function that [Z] represents is available for entry into statements made about [Z]. [Z] is just there. Intransitivive verb: one-place predicate: x breathes. Transitive verb: x loves y. The letters represent holes that must be filled before a statement can be made, or a sentence uttered. I suppose that 'zero-place predicates' (of which 'exists' is the only one of which I can think offhand) are a way of saying what Kant said: 'existence is not a predicate.' (I'm quoting secondhand.) Existence just means you can put it on the left-hand side of a copula (itself a term that does not really mean) so you can make a meaningful statement when a real predicate is appended.
-z
Posted by alexandra_k on August 30, 2005, at 5:56:40
In reply to zero-place predicates, posted by zeugma on August 29, 2005, at 23:00:46
Can't think right now.
Want to think on what you have said a bit more.
just wanted to say that that last bit reminds me of Quine:
'to be is to be the value of a vairable'.
Posted by alexandra_k on August 30, 2005, at 17:46:54
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on August 29, 2005, at 22:40:14
Okay... Now I am confused again...
Time for a little definitional agreement...CHARACTER - a function that maps contexts onto contents.
CONTENT - a function that maps possible worlds onto extensions.
REFERENCE - the external object that is picked out.
Lets have a go with 'alexandra_k':
CHARACTER - I was the individual that was present at the association between word and referent (context -> content).
CONTENT - When considering the worlds where the term 'alexandra_k' is correctly applied we are considering the worlds in which there is an individual with my essential properties (possible world -> extension).
REFERENCE - alexandra_k (extension).Lets have a go with 'the kiwi babbler who goes on about philosophy'.
CHARACTER - In the context of utterance alexandra_k is the only individual who meets that description (context -> content)
CONTENT - It is possible that I never came to babble and that other kiwi philosophers did (etc etc) so the individual picked out across different possible worlds varies...(possible worlds -> extension)
REFERENCE - varies across other possible worlds.Lets have a go at 'I'
CHARACTER - In the context of utterance 'I' picks out alexandra_k (context -> content)
CONTENT - given the character... across all possible worlds 'I' picks out alexandra_k. (possible worlds -> extensions)
REFERENCE - alexandra_k
> 'I', 'here', 'now' are not flaccid designators. They are rigid. Rigidity applies to content, not character.I do believe I'm getting you now :-)
>(So content is intensional. And we are externalists about content. :-))
Hmm. I never thought of it like that. Intensional externalism... I like the sound of that :-)
> Now 'now', here' and so on are also rigid. But of course only with respect to their content; their characters (which are also part of the senses of these terms) are not constant.
Yeah, I get you.
> Characters are neither rigid nor flaccid; they are constant or inconstant.
Okay...
No, sorry... How do they get to be inconstant?
(Does that happen when the context of utterance changes???)
Posted by alexandra_k on August 30, 2005, at 18:03:37
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on August 30, 2005, at 17:46:54
all this angst over the relation between word and world...
Posted by zeugma on August 31, 2005, at 7:33:22
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on August 30, 2005, at 17:46:54
Characters are neither rigid nor flaccid; they are constant or inconstant.
Okay...
No, sorry... How do they get to be inconstant?
(Does that happen when the context of utterance changes???)>>Most characters are constant. For example, 'the car' refers to the (contextually salient) automobile I don't drive any more (thankfully), at least it does in my dialect of English. Questions of contextual salience are presumably pragmatic, because obviously many definite descriptions have an uncertain reference strictly speaking, but are nonetheless used widely with few problems.
Context, insofar as it affects character, is the ordered set of elements (time, place, speaker, world) that determines the content of the utterance. So I say 'I woke up two hours ago.' The function that is the character of 'I' includes as part of its determining elements 'speaker', and that speaker (and hence contentual element) is 'zeugma.' The time is 8 am Wednesday, and so 'two hours ago' designates the contentual element '6 am.'
But if you had uttered the identical string of words, I would have to know that the character of 'I', while identical to the character that 'I' means when I use it, yields the content 'alexandra_k', and likewise with the other elements of the utterance. So the equation character=standard meaning is basically right.I shouldn't have said, then, that characters are 'constant' or 'inconstant.' If these words didn't have a constant meaning, we would be speaking different dialects, and getting confused in the process. I think what I 'meant' was that for most non-indexical terms, they yield the same SORT of content as definite descriptions, and hence the pathway from character to content, and then to extension, can be collapsed into a single process that can be designated as 'intension.' So empty singular terms like 'the present King of France' can be regarded as having an intension though yielding an extension that is the empty set. In fact that was what intensions were mostly useful for, apart from problems that arise where one object can be designated by more than one singular term (e.g. 'the Morning Star' and 'the Evening Star').
and yeah, indexical terms are fixed relative to their contents (I am the only one to use 'I' to designate [Z], though others may share my name and many of my attributes) in virtue of their contextual elements- I am naturally going to figure in every ordered quadruple that represents the context of each of my utterances, and one must use this context to arrive at me. So the character as function (meaning) is constant (i.e. ordered quadruple) but the elements of the set are context-dependent, and without a grasp of the context, the right output can't be gotten. That is what differentiates the indexicals from the everyday terms like 'car' and 'computer'- the time, place and speaker aren't important as long as the language is shared between interlocutors. So those factors can generally be ignored when dealing with such terms.
Apologies for highly prolix reply.
I'm glad you like intensional externalism. :-)
-z
Posted by zeugma on August 31, 2005, at 7:38:11
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.., posted by zeugma on August 31, 2005, at 7:33:22
sorry, when I said 'contentual element' when speaking of contexts, i should have said 'contextual elements.' Content cannot figure as input to character, only as output.
-z
Posted by alexandra_k on August 31, 2005, at 17:11:40
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.., posted by zeugma on August 31, 2005, at 7:33:22
:-)
Philosophy of language is hard...
(imo)Are you interested in teleological semantics at all???? Frogs and bacteria and cats on a dark night and cat v dog and stuff like that?????
Millikan is a hard read...
But I've done a bit of reading on proper functions...
Posted by alexandra_k on August 31, 2005, at 18:00:25
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on August 31, 2005, at 17:11:40
Utterances and thoughts are distinctive in that they (can be) ABOUT states of affairs / events / facts / situations in the external world (the world outside the head / mind / brain).
They can represent accurately or inaccurately. They can be true (if accurate) and false (if inaccurate).
If we go a long way back into the evolutionary history of this world then we can go back to before life emerged... At that point in time there isn't any intentionality / aboutness / representation.
These phenomena emerged via the process of natural selection and thus there must be a naturalistic account of the emergence of the phenomena.
There might be lessons for the present...
Lets have a look at some rudimentary aboutness...
Frogs snap their tongues at moving dark spots.
A mental representation is what occurs between the stimulus and the response.
Presumably the stimulus gets represented in the frogs brain and that representation produces the tongue snapping response.In order for something to count as a representation misrepresentation must be possible...
Now, if an experimentor throws a bee bee pellet in front of the frog the frog will snap its tongue at it.
So the million dollar question is 'is this a case of mis-representation?'
There are a number of candidates for the content of the frogs representation:
1) fly
2) moving dark spot
3) fly or bee beeIf the content of the frogs representation is FLY then snapping at a bee bee pellet is a case of misrepresentation.
If the content of the frogs representation is MOVING DARK SPOT then snapping at a bee bee pellet is not a case of misrepresentation (because a bee bee pellet just is a moving dark spot
If the content of the frogs representation is FLY OR BEE BEE then snapping at a bee bee pellet is not a case of misrepresentation (because it is correctly applied to anything that is either a fly or a bee bee. In case you are worried about disjunctive concepts there isn't really a problem here. People talk of 'greenstone' and it just turns out that greenstone is appropriately applied to either jadite or nephrite).So... How does actual selection history help fix the content of the frogs representation?
In the actual selection history of the frog bee bees in the environment would have been rare (or non-existant). Thus if the frog has the concept FLY OR BEE BEE then this will confer the same selectional advantage as possession of the concept FLY.
In the actual selection history of the frog if enough of the moving dark spots were flies or other nutritious (or digestible or whatever) substances then MOVING DARK SPOT would confer the same selectional advantage as possession of the concept FLY.
So... About now the thought is that we need to go modal to fix the content of the frogs representation.
There is a possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by FLY OR BEE BEE.
Some of them are going to die out (inadequate nutrition).
There is another possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by BEE BEE.
All of them are going to die out (inadequate nutrition).
There is another possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by FLIES.
More of them will survive.
In virtue of this... Some people have argued that the content of the representation is best captured by 'fly'. Though there has been some haggling over 'nutritious substance' and alternatives like that as well...
But what I don't understand...
Is that...
Possible worlds are irrelevant with respect to ACTUAL selection pressures...
And ACTUAL selection pressures must be what determine the content of ACTUAL representations.
If we wanted to delineate the content of frogs representations in other possible worlds then we would need to look at their selection pressures.
The trouble is that 'other ways this world might have gone' don't help us with respect to ways this world is...And so... I would say that the content of the representation is still indeterminate.
Actual selection history is insufficient to fix content.
And going modal... Only helps with respect to fixing the content of frogs representations on other possible worlds.
It doesn't help us fix the content of the actual world frogs representations.
And going modal... Is insufficient to fix the content of the frogs representations on other possible worlds because... Selection history (which is what is supposed to be relevant to fix content) underdetermines representational content.But once again I'm probably missing something...
But there is also the point...
There is also the point that...
Natural selection isn't so much about 'survival of the fittest' as it is about 'elimination of the least successful'. As such... Why should we expect selected mechanisms (or selected representational contents for that matter) to be optimal? They just need to be 'good enough' to get buy...Natural selection is a kludge. A hack. (Dennett)
Short sighted.
Not with a view to other possible worlds ;-)
Posted by zeugma on September 1, 2005, at 6:32:08
In reply to Re: teleological semantics? » alexandra_k, posted by alexandra_k on August 31, 2005, at 18:00:25
> Utterances and thoughts are distinctive in that they (can be) ABOUT states of affairs / events / facts / situations in the external world (the world outside the head / mind / brain).
>
> They can represent accurately or inaccurately. They can be true (if accurate) and false (if inaccurate).Now we are on to the hard stuff :-)
>
> If we go a long way back into the evolutionary history of this world then we can go back to before life emerged... At that point in time there isn't any intentionality / aboutness / representation.
>IMO, if we get into knots trying to explicate the word-world relation via such constructs as 'intensionality,' going the route to 'intentionality' and tangles involving mental representation make logic-splitting into child's-play... IMO.
> These phenomena emerged via the process of natural selection and thus there must be a naturalistic account of the emergence of the phenomena.
>
> There might be lessons for the present...
>
> Lets have a look at some rudimentary aboutness...
>
> Frogs snap their tongues at moving dark spots.
> A mental representation is what occurs between the stimulus and the response.
> Presumably the stimulus gets represented in the frogs brain and that representation produces the tongue snapping response.a neural circuit directs the snapping process.. is it a 'representation'... i don't know.
>
> In order for something to count as a representation misrepresentation must be possible...
>
right, because the 'representation' relation is a weak one. it is dependent upon one's capacity for representation, a sort of map which depicts the terrain but necessarily loses detail...> Now, if an experimentor throws a bee bee pellet in front of the frog the frog will snap its tongue at it.
>
> So the million dollar question is 'is this a case of mis-representation?'
well, the frog's picture of the stimulus (to anthropomorphize) doesn't have sufficient resolution to discriminate between pellets and flies.
>
> There are a number of candidates for the content of the frogs representation:
> 1) fly
> 2) moving dark spot
> 3) fly or bee bee
>
> If the content of the frogs representation is FLY then snapping at a bee bee pellet is a case of misrepresentation.
> If the content of the frogs representation is MOVING DARK SPOT then snapping at a bee bee pellet is not a case of misrepresentation (because a bee bee pellet just is a moving dark spot
> If the content of the frogs representation is FLY OR BEE BEE then snapping at a bee bee pellet is not a case of misrepresentation (because it is correctly applied to anything that is either a fly or a bee bee. In case you are worried about disjunctive concepts there isn't really a problem here. People talk of 'greenstone' and it just turns out that greenstone is appropriately applied to either jadite or nephrite).
>
> So... How does actual selection history help fix the content of the frogs representation?
>ah... content... it seems to me that content and representation are a little orthogonal. i suppose i would appeal to a process of informational decay to explain why the frog's representation of the fly is so prone to error. representation is a very weak relation. a puppet can represent Julius Caesar, and what is more the puppet can then be identified as Julius caesar on repeated ocassions, despite the fact that the puppet could represent Caesar lacks any surface plausibilty. In particular nothing naturalistic could explain the representation, other than as an exercise of a representational capacity that humans have evolved that can make any x represent y (language is largely arbitrary yet has tremendous capacity to represent). But moving from the stark concept of 'representation' to the notion that there is a capacity for representation (recognizing that the relation itself is arbitrary) mignt chage the equation, though i don't know...
> In the actual selection history of the frog bee bees in the environment would have been rare (or non-existant). Thus if the frog has the concept FLY OR BEE BEE then this will confer the same selectional advantage as possession of the concept FLY.
>i don't want to say the frog has concepts at all, but an ability to identify, and snatch flies with its tongue. A bee bee pellet triggers the process despite the fact that the pellet is not edible. i prefer saying it has an 'ability' to locate and snatch flies than to say that it can conceptualize flies. the ability can confer a selectional advantage for the frog, without requiring the ability to generate concepts which are of dubious survival value even for humans who are much better at concept-forming.
concepts might also be useful in generating counterfactuals. for instance i might think 'if i stand here then i have a better chance of not getting eaten by this tiger.' but this could have evolved as an ability present in frogs on a non-conceptual level (i.e. it becomes motionless when a predator comes by, because of some random mutation that promotes such behavior, then the frogs who become motionless survive to reprodice at higher rates, so the behavior becomes prevalent. But is representation or concepts necessary at all? )
> In the actual selection history of the frog if enough of the moving dark spots were flies or other nutritious (or digestible or whatever) substances then MOVING DARK SPOT would confer the same selectional advantage as possession of the concept FLY.
>
> So... About now the thought is that we need to go modal to fix the content of the frogs representation.
>
> There is a possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by FLY OR BEE BEE.
>
> Some of them are going to die out (inadequate nutrition).
>
> There is another possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by BEE BEE.
>
> All of them are going to die out (inadequate nutrition).
>
> There is another possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by FLIES.
>
> More of them will survive.
>
> In virtue of this... Some people have argued that the content of the representation is best captured by 'fly'. Though there has been some haggling over 'nutritious substance' and alternatives like that as well...
>
> But what I don't understand...
> Is that...
> Possible worlds are irrelevant with respect to ACTUAL selection pressures...
> And ACTUAL selection pressures must be what determine the content of ACTUAL representations.
> If we wanted to delineate the content of frogs representations in other possible worlds then we would need to look at their selection pressures.
> The trouble is that 'other ways this world might have gone' don't help us with respect to ways this world is...
>
> And so... I would say that the content of the representation is still indeterminate.
i don't think there is content, just an ability to perform a certain action that in some environments confers selectional advantage for the frog. if one wants to offer a naturalistic account then the environmental input, since it constantly varies, supplies little need for concepts or content. Since humans have a greater capacity to stabilize their environments (still limited though) concepts might have more of a rationale to evolve. For instance concepts are useful when designing artifacts.
>
> Actual selection history is insufficient to fix content.
> And going modal... Only helps with respect to fixing the content of frogs representations on other possible worlds.
> It doesn't help us fix the content of the actual world frogs representations.
> And going modal... Is insufficient to fix the content of the frogs representations on other possible worlds because... Selection history (which is what is supposed to be relevant to fix content) underdetermines representational content.
>
> But once again I'm probably missing something...
>
> But there is also the point...
> There is also the point that...
> Natural selection isn't so much about 'survival of the fittest' as it is about 'elimination of the least successful'. As such... Why should we expect selected mechanisms (or selected representational contents for that matter) to be optimal? They just need to be 'good enough' to get buy...
>
> Natural selection is a kludge. A hack. (Dennett)
> Short sighted.
> Not with a view to other possible worlds ;-)
>
>this stuff is difficult :-)
-z
>
Posted by alexandra_k on September 1, 2005, at 16:10:56
In reply to Re: teleological semantics? » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on September 1, 2005, at 6:32:08
> Now we are on to the hard stuff :-)
I wondered if you were kidding...
IMO Kaplan is the hard stuff :-)
> > Lets have a look at some rudimentary aboutness...Okay. So what we want is to start with the small stuff and then build up to the sorts of concepts that people have. Just need 'rudimentary aboutness' in the same way that whatever prevents a lobster eating itself may be considered to be 'rudimentary self-hood'.
> > Frogs snap their tongues at moving dark spots.
> > A mental representation is what occurs between the stimulus and the response.
> > Presumably the stimulus gets represented in the frogs brain and that representation produces the tongue snapping response.
> a neural circuit directs the snapping process.. is it a 'representation'... i don't know.I think it is supposed to be a 'rudimentary representation'. But in order for something to count as a representation misrepresentation must be possible. I think that latter point has something to do with the content of the representation being able to be delineated with respect to truth values across possible worlds. There has to be something that counts as true (accurate representation) and false (misrepresentation) in order for it to count as a (contentful) representation.
(But then tautologies and contradictions might pose a problem... I'd rather not go there).
> well, the frog's picture of the stimulus (to anthropomorphize) doesn't have sufficient resolution to discriminate between pellets and flies.Hmm. Are you sure? Maybe some behaviourist could find out whether frogs can discriminate the two... If thats right then the content is starting to look like FLY OR BEE BEE or MOVING DARK SPOT or something like that... (Fly would be ruled out if it can't discriminate between flies and non-flies).
> In particular nothing naturalistic could explain the representation, other than as an exercise of a representational capacity that humans have evolved that can make any x represent y (language is largely arbitrary yet has tremendous capacity to represent).
How about representation in thought? Is the connection there arbitrary? There are causal / informational theories of representation. Dretske in particular goes on about x represents cat so long as x tends to be caused by cats. But then there is a problem as to how misrepresentation is possible. And how we can think x in the absence of cats.
> i don't want to say the frog has concepts at all, but an ability to identify, and snatch flies with its tongue. A bee bee pellet triggers the process despite the fact that the pellet is not edible.Hmm. So was the frog mistaken when it snapped at the bee bee? I think you are saying that it is supposed to snatch at flies and it shouldn't really be snapping at bee bees. But... Why not? Why not say the frog has an ability to snatch at MOVING DARK SPOTS or at FLIES OR BEE BEES. Why flies?
>i prefer saying it has an 'ability' to locate and snatch flies than to say that it can conceptualize flies. the ability can confer a selectional advantage for the frog, without requiring the ability to generate concepts which are of dubious survival value even for humans who are much better at concept-forming.
You behaviourist you!!!!!
An ability to snap at FLIES
An ability to snap at FLIES OR BEE BEES
An ability to snap at MOVING DARK SPOTS
Would confer the same selectional advantage in a world where those three things are correlated more often than not.
And I just have to say this again:You behaviourist you!!!!!
Yes, the frog has an ability.
But the million dollar question resurfaces when you want to cash out what that ability consists in a little more. How on earth does the frog have that abillity? There is a mechanism that represents things in the world and connects to an appropriate response. At this stage in the day we are dealing with a pretty simple (rudimentary) concept. So we have Stimuli -> Representation -> Response. Things get much more interesting when representations get decoupled from particular responses.... They start interacting with other representations / goals etc in various ways...> concepts might also be useful in generating counterfactuals. for instance i might think 'if i stand here then i have a better chance of not getting eaten by this tiger.' but this could have evolved as an ability present in frogs on a non-conceptual level (i.e. it becomes motionless when a predator comes by, because of some random mutation that promotes such behavior, then the frogs who become motionless survive to reprodice at higher rates, so the behavior becomes prevalent. But is representation or concepts necessary at all? )
At this point... Probably not. I think it would be pointless (and inaccurate) to attribute 'if I stand here I'll be less likely to be eaten by a tiger' because this is attributing too much. An understanding of probability, etc. With the frog... Saying it has a mental representation isn't necessarily to commit oneself to the view that the frog is aware of the representation.
Maybe it is dodgey whether the frog has a representation at all. But if we can't even figure out the content or, if you like, the function of the mechanism, what the behavioural ability amounts to then what hope of explaining human concepts and behaviour?????
> i don't think there is content, just an ability to perform a certain action that in some environments confers selectional advantage for the frog.>if one wants to offer a naturalistic account then the environmental input, since it constantly varies, supplies little need for concepts or content. Since humans have a greater capacity to stabilize their environments (still limited though) concepts might have more of a rationale to evolve. For instance concepts are useful when designing artifacts.
Posted by alexandra_k on September 1, 2005, at 16:17:36
In reply to Re: teleological semantics? » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on September 1, 2005, at 16:10:56
The heart does a number of things. To list just a couple
1) It pumps blood
2) It takes up space in the chest cavity
3) It goes 'thumpety thump'So of these three things that the heart does, which (if any) is the proper function of the heart? What is it SUPPOSED to do?
So people go back and consider how hearts evolved. They consider that 1) is the proper function because those organisms that had hearts that pumped blood did better than those organisms whose hearts did not.
Somebody might have a heart that made a 'thumpety thump' noise, but this wouldn't help them terribly unless it also pumped blood etc.
So people look to selection history to fix proper function here too.
But...
Same saga.
You need to bring counter-factuals into it...
And I don't see how they are supposed to help fix ACTUAL content or ACTUAL proper function..Oh well.
Posted by Damos on September 5, 2005, at 18:54:32
In reply to Re: teleofunction, posted by alexandra_k on September 1, 2005, at 16:17:36
Just wanted to say a quick but sincere thank you for your dialogue. A lot of it was so far over my head I'll need to get on the next Shuttle mission to reach it, but it was still really interesting. So 'Thank You'.
The love and respect you have for each other and the sunject really shines through.
Thank you both for being so intelligent, thoughtful and here.
Posted by zeugma on September 5, 2005, at 19:27:17
In reply to Alexandra, Zeugma - Thank you, posted by Damos on September 5, 2005, at 18:54:32
thank you Damos for your kind words.
I'm still trying to write a suitable reply to Alexandra's posts on teleological semantics. It's something I have trouble getting my head around.
And these past few days have been a little difficult for me, so thank you again :-)
-z
Posted by alexandra_k on September 5, 2005, at 22:53:04
In reply to Re: Alexandra, Zeugma - Thank you » Damos, posted by zeugma on September 5, 2005, at 19:27:17
> thank you Damos for your kind words.
Yeah. Thanks :-)Zeugma, if you would like to change the subject then that is okay by me. Covering familiar terrain from a different perspective can be useful too.
Basically... If its hard work then don't worry about it. I had to think a great deal about content / character and I appreciate that time / effort is a limited capacity resource.
> And these past few days have been a little difficult for me, so thank you again :-)
Hope things start looking up for you :-)
Posted by damos on September 5, 2005, at 23:08:19
In reply to Re: Alexandra, Zeugma - Thank you » Damos, posted by zeugma on September 5, 2005, at 19:27:17
Zeugma, sorry the past few days have been difficult for you. Sending you lots of wishes for better days to come.
Posted by alexandra_k on September 5, 2005, at 23:19:17
In reply to Re: Alexandra, Zeugma - Thank you » zeugma, posted by damos on September 5, 2005, at 23:08:19
And how are you doing?
Fragile
And a funny feeling...
I've been told its supposed to be "emptiness"
"Boredom"
I don't know...Sorry... Thats me.
How are you doing?
Posted by zeugma on September 7, 2005, at 17:24:27
In reply to Re: Damos, posted by alexandra_k on September 5, 2005, at 23:19:17
Posted by Damos on September 7, 2005, at 23:00:09
In reply to feel like a zero-place predicate right now (nm), posted by zeugma on September 7, 2005, at 17:24:27
Hey ~Z,
Sorry you're not feeling so good (also sorry that that's probably an understatement), want to talk about it? My entire pygmy sized intellect is at your disposal, or I can just listen good. If you don't feel like posting you can babblemail me if you want to.
You take good care of you - okay.
(((((Zeugma)))))
Posted by zeugma on September 9, 2005, at 18:36:27
In reply to Re: feel like a zero-place predicate right now » zeugma, posted by Damos on September 7, 2005, at 23:00:09
thanks to a kind Babblemail from Damos :-)
and the effects of lots and lots of caffeine, in liquid and pill form.
I am very depersonalized, I don't really feel 'there' unless large quantities of some stimulating substance have been ingested, Provigil or Ritalin or caffeine (or combination thereof), which gets me off the floor where I experience absolute nothingness.
It was the verb 'to be' that got me into philosophy. (That and Descartes' Dream Argument- but that argument has a slightly different spin when you're narcoleptic...) Heidegger explains what 'Dasein' means, but I wish he would explain his explanation- he does, endlessly, but not in a form I can understand. Quine is a little more prosaic- "to be is to be the value of a variable." Well, I can understand that, sort of. And for someone who hardly feels 'there' it's a pressing question.
I do feel a little 'here' now. Philosophy is a very personal matter for me.
-z
Posted by alexandra_k on September 11, 2005, at 16:28:34
In reply to now a one-place predicate at least » Damos, posted by zeugma on September 9, 2005, at 18:36:27
> I am very depersonalized, I don't really feel 'there' unless large quantities of some stimulating substance have been ingested, Provigil or Ritalin or caffeine (or combination thereof), which gets me off the floor where I experience absolute nothingness.
Hmm. Are you depressed or dysthymic?
> It was the verb 'to be' that got me into philosophy. (That and Descartes' Dream Argument- but that argument has a slightly different spin when you're narcoleptic...)
:-)
Descartes' dream argument got me hooked too. That and a mini-lecture on personal identity that I went to when I was still in school...If Tracey's body is in England...
And we chop off her arms and send them to France...
Then where is Tracey?
If Tracey's body (including her arms) is in England and her brain is in France then where is Tracey?
If Tracey's left hemisphere is in England and her right hemisphere is in France and the rest of her body is in Germany then where is Tracey?:-)
>Heidegger explains what 'Dasein' means, but I wish he would explain his explanation- he does, endlessly, but not in a form I can understand.
Ah. Welcome to continental philosophy...
;-)> Quine is a little more prosaic- "to be is to be the value of a variable." Well, I can understand that, sort of. And for someone who hardly feels 'there' it's a pressing question.
Ah. I see...
Existence.
'To be'I guess I find something similar...
What worries me is why it is like anything at all to be me.
It is surely possible that there be a physical duplicate of this world but where none of the beings on that world are conscious.
There is nothing at all that it is like to be them.
So why on earth is there something that it is like to be me?
And (presumably) you too?Mind
ConsciousnessI guess the same (or at least a similar) question...
> I do feel a little 'here' now. Philosophy is a very personal matter for me.:-)
Depersonalisation is an eerie feeling...
'The aim of philosophy is thoughts that are at peace'
w.
Posted by Damos on September 12, 2005, at 1:33:04
In reply to now a one-place predicate at least » Damos, posted by zeugma on September 9, 2005, at 18:36:27
Hey ~Z,
How are you doing today?
Sorry, I don't know too much about Provigil and Ritilin other than that the latter is pretty much handed out like candy to kids in Oz these days. Sadly it seems that it is easy to diagnose ADHD and prescribe a pill than to actually pracice medicine.
I can strongly identify with caffeine though. Or is that I can identify with strong caffeine? Hmm, the latter I think.
Glad you're at least one place better.
Damos
Go forward in thread:
Psycho-Babble Writing | Extras | FAQ
Dr. Bob is Robert Hsiung, MD,
bob@dr-bob.org
Script revised: February 4, 2008
URL: http://www.dr-bob.org/cgi-bin/pb/mget.pl
Copyright 2006-17 Robert Hsiung.
Owned and operated by Dr. Bob LLC and not the University of Chicago.