Posted by smokeymadison on December 20, 2004, at 17:04:16
In reply to Re: 1.2 » smokeymadison, posted by alexandra_k on December 20, 2004, at 13:19:04
> What Maher and Davies et al disagree about, however, is whether an anomalous experience alone is enough to produce (and hence to explain) delusion. Maher thinks that an anomalous experience alone sufficient (thats why hes a one factor theorist) and so the delusional subject adopts a normal rationalising strategy for their experience and comes up with a delusion.
>
> Davies et al. consider that no matter what Maher thinks DELUSIONS ARE NOT NORMAL RESPONSES TO ANY KIND OF EXPERIENCE. They think that not only do delusional subjects have an anomalous experience, they also have a cognitive (reasoning) deficit or bias (hence two factor theorists).
I don't believe that delusions are the result of faulty reasoning. but i would agree and disagree with "two factor" theorists in that it takes an experience (and i don't think that it has to be unusual) as well as the ability to "think outside the box" in order to create a delusion. what i mean is, those who have the capacity to become delusional possess alternate, but not necessarily pathological, reasoning skills. they solve the puzzle (what is reality) in an entirely different fashion then most people. the end result is a delusion.> Most theorists consider that delusions are 'irrational' (so there is a second facotor - a faulty cognition).
Deludions, if created by a rational brain, cannot themselves be irrational. i am thinking of the old puzzle of how to connect the dots without raising the pen. the answer is to fold the paper so the pen connects all the dots writing over the folds. People who are delusional do not possess faulty "wiring" instead, they merely draw conclusions through extraordinary mental processes that are rare.
> I guess the 'trigger' would be the anomalous experience. The 'vulnerable individual' would be pre-existing cognitive deficit.
Again, i don't believe that what makes a person likely to become delusional is a pre-existing or perhaps just present cognitive DEFICIT. it is instead, a rare cognitive ABILITY.
>
> Cognitive therapy for delusions requires them to be based on faulty cognitions. But maybe this is as wrong as cognitive therapies insistance that faulty thinking causes extreme / intense emotional states. Maybe they have it backwards.yes, i think that they do in some, if not most cases.
Some people with delusions appreciate that their 'belief' will sound implausible to others. Some seem to express confusion (at times) about just what it is they 'believe'. I like what you are saying, actually. Someone I know is currently working on different mental modules becoming isolated so that one module can believe that p and another can believe that not p at the same time. The subject could kind of waver between them... Sometimes there is good motivation for just accepting cognitive dissonance (sorting it out could take up a heck of a lot of cognitive resources which are needed for alternative projects that have more to do with survival)...
>
> Thats why philosophers are interested in this. Delusions have much to show us about the nature of belief. It is thought that an adequate model of the belief formation processes of normal subjects should be able to explain delusions by the positing of a breakdown in this model (though I guess that presupposes that they are beliefs). And rationality / irrationality (and whether that might have a structure so that there could be a localised failure rather than a global breakdown) has long been of interest to philosophers too...
thanks for the mind benders! you are really making me think!SM
poster:smokeymadison
thread:431950
URL: http://www.dr-bob.org/babble/write/20041210/msgs/432140.html