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Dr. Bob is Robert Hsiung, MD,
bob@dr-bob.orgShown: posts 1 to 11 of 11. This is the beginning of the thread.
Posted by alexandra_k on July 21, 2005, at 18:48:10
In the spirit of avoiding present work I have been amusing myself with past work... I still quite like this one even though my thinking has changed quite a lot in the last few years...
A Realist Aspect to the Interpretation of Selves
The phenomenon that was until recently known as Multiple Personality Disorder has generated differing theoretical accounts of the metaphysical status of the alternative ‘personalities’ or ‘identities’ that are exhibited by subjects with the disorder. Some theorists have held that the phenomenon shows that we need to reconsider the status and nature of selves in general as it seems that it is possible for subjects to support, or give rise to more than one self. This has led some theorists to conclude that selves are fictions, whether in the ‘multiple’ individual or in those with a more conventional psychology e.g., Humphrey & Dennett (1998); Gillett, (1997); Hacking, (1991); Kolak, (1993). An alternative to this is to deny that alters are selves, and a popular strategy amongst clinician’s advocating treatment of the disorder is to consider them to be ‘aspects’, ‘segments’, or ‘parts’ of a self. On this view, alters are to be seen as fragments that may be blended or fused together to add up to a single self of the sort exhibited by individuals without the disorder (Putnam, 1995). The other major alternative is to deny that alters are selves, and maintain that there is only one self even in the case of subjects who present with the disorder e.g., Brown, (2001) and Clark, (1990). There has been a general tendency for theorists to reduce the metaphysical status of selves to fictions if one holds that alters are selves; or alternatively, to reduce the status of alters to something less than selves if one wants to attempt to keep the self as a respectable notion. The question as to the metaphysical status of alters is thus related to the question as to the metaphysical status of selves.
Posted by alexandra_k on July 21, 2005, at 18:55:16
In reply to A Realist Aspect to the Interpretation of Selves, posted by alexandra_k on July 21, 2005, at 18:48:10
The Reaction to Realism
The notion of a Cartesian Realist self as an entity to be found located within the subject has largely been discredited for two main reasons. The first problem arises with Descartes’ notion of the non-physical soul-stuff that is said to comprise the self. It is problematic because it is postulated as an entity that is forever beyond the reach of objective scientific investigation in principle. It is considered to be a non-physical object that cannot be studied by science, yet it is also held to be influenced by and to effect changes to the physical realm. It thus violates the scientific assumption that the physical world is causally closed (that only matter can cause changes to matter). This belief is foundational to science because the methods for testing hypotheses involve manipulating independent variables to measure resulting changes in dependent variables [I think I got that the right way around...] to either falsify the hypothesis or to lend it support. If the physical world is not causally closed then it seems that there are variables and ‘outside influences’ that would interfere with and confound experimental testing. Given the track record of scientific progress over the past few centuries, we may say that this lends support for the assumption that the physical world is causally closed. Dualism thus seems to be contra-indicated. Dennett, (1991) claims that accepting a dualistic conception of the mind (self) is therefore ‘giving up’. It is giving up on the notion of a scientific understanding of our world. Most theorists now claim to work within a broadly naturalistic or materialistic framework, and so the notion of a Cartesian immaterial self is now held in disrepute. Dualism does not offer us an alternative explanation; rather it seems to preclude any possible scientific explanation.
The second reason for the reaction to Cartesian Realism (or Cartesian Materialism) is that the notion of the self as a concretely existing, unified, and simple entity to be found localised within the subject’s brain does not seem to correspond to reality. The self, mind, or ‘place where it all comes together’ has eluded the best efforts of neuroscientists to pinpoint the area of localisation. Feinberg, (2001) writes that there is no place in the brain in which ‘all the brain’s activity converges on ‘one pontifical cell’. He goes on to propose a nested hierarchy theory of self where diverse areas of the brain contribute to the consciousness and selfhood that are seen as emergent properties of the normally functioning human brain. He shows us through a series of case studies that the self is not an all or none affair. It can break down or malfunction to differing degrees, and it cannot be the sole product of any one localised region. It seems that the homunculus that is the self is not to be found in a localised region of the brain at all. No neuron, mental module, or pattern of activation seems to constitute a self. These varieties of realism are thus held in disrepute.
The materialistic intuition that there must be a physiological basis to the self is not disputed, all agree that the self is (somehow or other) a product of the brain. No one wants to deny that physiological changes are the physical causes of behaviour. Non-realists just want to deny that the self will turn out to be identified with those physiological changes. Accounts of how the behaviours that constitute the disorder arise have thus been offered in terms of competing mental modules (physical structures within the brain), or patterns of activation with respect to neurotransmitter levels. While there is little empirical evidence at this stage attempts have been made to show both that there is a physical basis that gives rise to the presence of the behaviours that constitute the disorder (which none but a dualist would deny), and to show what that physical basis is. Non-realists just part ways with realists in denying that the self will turn out to be a particular part of the brain; a view that seems to be supported by science. Non-realists tend to emphasize the social and cultural aspects of the process of self-construction. These notions form the basis of their subsequent accounts. Non-realism about the self has thus emerged as the dominant position within psychology and indeed philosophy today.
The current emphasis on non-realism with respect to the self may be seen as a reaction to these discredited varieties of realism outlined above. Because the everyday term ‘self’ is taken by most theorists to refer to one of these realist selves, and seeing as it turns out that these realist selves do not exist, some theorists have concluded that this shows us that selves do not exist at all. Most go on to construct a theory of what the self ‘really’ is, though regard themselves to be non-realists in that (a) they want to divorce themselves from the above varieties of realism, and (b) they believe that the self that they go on to talk about is contrary to our commonsense way of using the term. We may instead take the line that the everyday term ‘self’ does not refer to a thing to be found within the brain (or even an immaterial thing not to be found within the brain). This seems the most plausible line to account for the everyday term ‘self’ because the brain must be irrelevant to what we mean by ‘self’ as most of us do not have the opportunity to look inside the individual’s brains that we attribute self-hood to. Yet we can and do consider individuals to have selves. What we do have access to, and what therefore seems the most plausible to consider with respect to self-hood is the behaviour (especially the verbal behaviour) of subjects. This is not to say that the self just is a collection of behaviours, but it is to say that behaviour must surely be more significant to our everyday usage of the term than the inner workings of the brain, or even the presence of an (invisible) soul. At this stage it is enough to note that one can allow an aspect of realism with respect to the self - and not just the funny kind of ‘realism’ claimed by those who maintain that it is okay to go on talking about selves even though they don’t really exist . The behaviour is real, and so realism may be able to get a toehold if it is plausible that behaviour is a necessary part of self-hood, and with respect to the everyday usage of the term ‘self’ I think that it must be.
Here what is of interest is given that subjects with typical psychology have one self (in that we typically attribute one self to them); is it then the case that individual’s with MPD (or as it is now called Dissociative Identity Disorder) have more than one self? Or alternatively, do they not even exhibit one until they are fused? Or, is there but one all along? Even if it turns out that different alters are correlated with different transmitter levels, or different mental modules that gain control of the motor cortex or language production areas, this does not show us that alters are selves for the same reasons that data on brain activity cannot show us the one self in the brain. The data will not help us with that ‘decision’, it can only provide a physiological account of how the phenomenon occurs; it may be able to tell us the neurophysiological cause of the behaviours that constitute the disorder. But it cannot show us the neurophysiological self or selves in the brain; and thus it cannot tell us what the phenomenon amounts to.
Whether the phenomenon amounts to an individual’s having more that one self or not is not going to just emerge from the physical facts. We have the physical facts that show us that the phenomenon occurs, the physical facts that even the most ardent sceptics about the disorder do not deny - and now a decision needs to be made on theoretical grounds as to what the phenomenon amounts to; it is this that has been the main subject of dispute, and this is what I will be concerned with here. The phenomenon usually seems to be interpreted as not implying that the subject has more than one self (usually because of some assumption that necessitates a one-one correlation between selves and brains / bodies), or as showing the fictional side to selves because there turns out to be more than one. I will go on to argue that whether there are one or many selves is largely a matter of interpretation, though in order to maximize rationality it may be more charitable to view these subjects as having more than one self - and to see alters as selves with equivalent metaphysical status. Just because it is indeterminate how many selves there ‘really’ are, this does not imply that selves / alters are purely fictional; there is a realist aspect to them that needs to be emphasized in this current climate where non-realism prevails.
Posted by cockeyed on July 22, 2005, at 1:17:56
In reply to Re: The Reaction to Realism, posted by alexandra_k on July 21, 2005, at 18:55:16
it's about two Am and I'm a bit like the proverbial "three peckered goat"
I've little to interprete since I'm in a boat with a bunch of M*f*kers and when I wake up I know that thee is one thing that keeps me sane.
And that's "will I get caught" Yes, I know I will, so that dampens my thought about doing this or doing that. Or to put it succicnt'ly can I get away with this or that. Or would it be too much work. There's something to be said for that. When one grows older there's somthing to be said for that. Now, can I get away with , shall we say, grabbing some plunder...in this simple case, some perrenial flowers or some
landscape enhancements...hmmmm, I wonder.
But, it don't mean a thing, I'm reasonable, know I'll get caught. 'Cause when I was younger, it happened. And I bought a whole lot of misery. And I suspect justice, should incorpoate misery, instead of...well, here I'm at a loss cause I used to be liberal. Now I'm not what I'd prefer to be, distinctly uncivil.cockeyed[ Realism is cruelty, wisdom is the same, but with hesitation? or, rather, celerity]
Posted by smokeymadison on July 24, 2005, at 11:28:48
In reply to A Realist Aspect to the Interpretation of Selves, posted by alexandra_k on July 21, 2005, at 18:48:10
hey alexandra k,
i too am putting off work. but since it is Sunday i figure it isn't so bad. anyway, about self-hood.
i have to go with the notion that there is no self. we are constantly changing, integrating new memories via our senses and upon them devising methods of interacting with the world.
it is this collection of memories distributed throughout the brain (if i remember my biopsychology course right) and the methods we use to deal with the world that we misinterpret as our self. as conscious creatures, we put a lot of energy into trying to feel as if we are an individual with a self, a core. layers and layers of experiences seem like a solid entity, but if you peel them away, there is nothing at the middle.
in the case of MPD, i think that it is an illustration of the fact that there is no self. each alter has its own collection of memories (sometimes overlaping) and its own way of dealing with the world. when you look at a person with MPD, it appears as if the self has been split b/c what we consider to be the self exists within the person as multiples. but actually each alter is the same as the one collection of memories and learned behaviors that exists in each of us.
now, not all behavior can be the result of stimuli from the environment. take for example speech. a child will start to speak if given even the minute amount of social interaction. speech is a resilent property of human behavior. it is overwhelmingly the result of some genetic influence.
our genetic inheritance does not provide us with a self. it is the structure that will provide us with senses and the material necessary to assume memories so that we can function efficiently as conscious creatures. consciousness itself is like a loop. it is an awareness of what we feel to be a core of ourselves constantly interacting with the world. this core is nothing more than the feeling that there is a boundary btw us and the world (actually there is simply a sharp increase in order) and the memories and methods we have integrated into a framework that has no permanence, is constantly changing.
Posted by alexandra_k on July 25, 2005, at 16:43:11
In reply to Re: A Realist Aspect to the Interpretation of Selv » alexandra_k, posted by smokeymadison on July 24, 2005, at 11:28:48
Sorry... I'm not ignoring you but I really want to take the time to think about what you have said and respond properly. Working to a deadline at the mo... I'll reply on Sat / Sun. I'll also try and think of something to say to the thread you started :-)
Posted by smokeymadison on July 25, 2005, at 17:20:20
In reply to Re: A Realist Aspect to the Interpretation of Selv » smokeymadison, posted by alexandra_k on July 25, 2005, at 16:43:11
Posted by smokeymadison on July 29, 2005, at 12:54:02
In reply to A Realist Aspect to the Interpretation of Selves, posted by alexandra_k on July 21, 2005, at 18:48:10
The Brain--is wider than the sky--
For--put them side by side--
The one the other will contain
With ease--and You--beside--The Brain is deeper than the sea--
For--hold them--Blue to Blue--
The one the other will absorb--
As Sponges--Buckets--doThe Brain is just the weight of God--
For--Heft them--Pound for Pound--
And they will differ--if they do--
As Syllable from Sound--Emily Dickinson
alexandra k,
is it fair to assume that what we consider the mind to be contains our "self," real or imagined? if so, and if the mind has no bounds, as implied in this poem, then how can our "selves" have bounds, or even exist as closed systems within the mind?-are we are capable of what our mind is capable?
-how can we be studied with traditional scientific methods if we are not closed systems?just some thoughts...
i have said a lot about memory as a key factor in the structure of what we think of as our self. another idea--memory itself is not purely a personal construct. much of it depends on the environment to be formed and then to be retrieved. an event has to be significant enough (the environment provokes a response) to be "stored." in order to retrieve the memory, something in the environment has to trigger an association in order for us to remember. so even that which we tend to think of as "us," based upon our memories, depends greatly upon that which is beyond our physical brain.
not sure how logical this all sounds...
SM
Posted by alexandra_k on July 30, 2005, at 18:12:40
In reply to the brain (mind)--wider than the sky » alexandra_k, posted by smokeymadison on July 29, 2005, at 12:54:02
> is it fair to assume that what we consider the mind to be contains our "self," real or imagined?
You could think of the mind as a container and the self to be the contents of mind / consciousness... Or... You could think of the self as one and the same thing as the contents of mind / consciousness... Or... You could think of the self as the interrelationship between the contents of mind / consciousness. They would be three different theories... I like to think of the self as a mechanism that processes the contents of consciousness to produce behaviour. The mind / self just is whatever takes in the contents of consciousness and delivers behaviours. And ultimately... In people that function is performed by the brain.
And the self just is a certain kind of mind...
(One that is sufficiently complex like ours. Animals have rudimentary selves...)>if so, and if the mind has no bounds, as implied in this poem, then how can our "selves" have bounds, or even exist as closed systems within the mind?
Thats an interesting question :-)
You can draw a picture of a horse.
Your picture of the horse is itself 2 cm tall.
The horse your picture is of is 17 hands high.
The representation has different characteristics from what is represented.
We see objects in the world, not 2d images on the back of a little tiny retina...There are an indefinate number of gramatically correct sentances in any natural language (English, for example). Given a fixed number of words at any one point in time there is an indefinate number of meaningfully different sentances that are gramatical. Consider... I have one kumquats, I have two kumquats, I have three kumquats etc etc. Also: you can add 'and' fairly much as you like to add another clause onto a sentance.
So language itself is finite (finite number of words at any one point in time, finite number of rules for determining gramatically correct sentances).
Thought has this property as well. There are a fixed number of ideas or contents... There are finite rules on how ideas can be combined to result in meaningful thoughts.
Language and thought have recursive rules that allow us to get infinity (or at least an indefinite amount) from the finite stock of ideas / words that we started from.
So... Because of the kinds of rules that govern mental / brain processes... Our brains can generate novelty etc. It seems as though... It is tardis like... And in a sense it is - but I think you can explain that appearance.
> -are we are capable of what our mind is capable?
> -how can we be studied with traditional scientific methods if we are not closed systems?I think we are closed systems.
Environment + genes -> thoughts, perceptions, beliefs, desires, memories, goals etc etc -> behaviour.
Physical processes all the way...
But sometimes you have an abstract description of a physical process.What does all money have in common on the physical level? Not a lot... You have to specify what counts as money or not at a level of description where you specify its function rather than its intrinsic properties.
Action and mental states must be given similar treatment...
> i have said a lot about memory as a key factor in the structure of what we think of as our self. another idea--memory itself is not purely a personal construct. much of it depends on the environment to be formed and then to be retrieved. an event has to be significant enough (the environment provokes a response) to be "stored." in order to retrieve the memory, something in the environment has to trigger an association in order for us to remember. so even that which we tend to think of as "us," based upon our memories, depends greatly upon that which is beyond our physical brain.Yeah. I think this is Locke... The mind is a blank slate, a tabula rasa. Imprints are made on the blank slate, imprints which are dim copies of sense impressions. I guess remembering is supposed to be 'finding' or 'locating' the picture in memory.
Plato talked about the avairy metaphor. It is like a man goes into an avairy and wants to grab hold of a bird (memory imprint). How does he know what he is looking for? Why does he need the bird if he already knows what he is looking for? Paradoxes about memory arise from this...
Remembering isn't so very much about accessing a veridical representation of the past that has been preserved like a photograph. The act of remembering is something that is done in the present. Remembering is an active process in much the same way that learning is an active process. Sure you can just 'soak up' the learning or recollect a memory inprint but this isn't typically what we do when we are learning or remembring.
To really learn stuff you need to be active. To play around with it and try to encode it via multilple pathways. To really remember stuff we are typically active as well.
There is a lot of stuff out there (incl experiments) to show that memory is essentially constructive. Stories we tell ourself in the present.
I don't want to emphasise the constructive nature of it tooooooooooooo much. I think there are reality constraints in the pic we do have. It is just that we might have a hard time figuring out what is veridical vs what is confabulated..
Posted by alexandra_k on July 30, 2005, at 20:33:22
In reply to Re: A Realist Aspect to the Interpretation of Selv » alexandra_k, posted by smokeymadison on July 24, 2005, at 11:28:48
I agree with you...
Except...
I think the self just is a function from beliefs, perceptions, experiences, etc to behaviour.I think that is what the self is...
Posted by alexandra_k on July 30, 2005, at 20:52:38
In reply to Re: A Realist Aspect to the Interpretation of Selv, posted by alexandra_k on July 30, 2005, at 20:33:22
social / physical environment + genetic inheritance -> beliefs, desires, memories, perceptions, goals etc -> behaviour.
I think that is a physical process.
A physical process of causation that is governed by physical laws.Perhaps the universe is deterministic...
If this is so then if we understood all the social and physical environment and the genetic inheritance then we would be able to predict the beliefs desires etc with 100% accuracy.
Likewise if we knew all the beliefs desires etc then we would be able to predict the behaviour with 100% accuracy.This is Laplace's vision. If we knew the state of the universe at any one moment in time we would be able to predict with 100% accuracy the state of the universe at the next moment in time. And from there the next moment. And from there the next moment. And so on indefinately into the future.
Now maybe Laplace was wrong... Maybe Newtonian deterministic physics has been replaced. Maybe there is a fundamental indeterminacy in causation. Maybe the best we can do is say that given the initial conditions of the universe there is a 98% chance that this will be the next state, and a 1% chance that the next thing will be the next state, and so forth.
That might be right.
But it doesn't change things significantly...
So where is there room for free will???
Well... It depends what you mean by free will. Either there isn't any such thing, or free will turns out to be a little different than we had supposed...
I think... That our conscious experience just is numerically one and the same thing as some processes that are occurring within our brains. And those states are caused (either deterministically or indeterministically) by environment + genetic inheritance.
Consciousness is an epiphenomenon. We just experience a whole bunch of processes that are outside our control in a very real sense.
Sometimes we have the experience of making a decision. That is an experience that results from a decision being made. But the decision is being made by our brain processes that in a very real sense are being determined by processes outside our control.
Some people find this view of the world to be rather scarey. I don't think it has to be. I think... It leads to greater empathy. If I experienced your brain processes then I'd have the feelings thoughts perceptions that you have. I'd do the same things that you do. So I do not judge you. Its not your fault you got your body. Its not my fault I got mine. My feelings aren't my fault - I didn't choose them. I just experience what is there and what is there is caused by factors outside my control.And when people do bad things... Rather than justice being about punishment and retribution it should be about prevention of reoffending and rehabilitation.
I honestly believe that.
And it is this world view that got me there :-)
Posted by alexandra_k on July 31, 2005, at 10:06:54
In reply to Re: the brain (mind)--wider than the sky » smokeymadison, posted by alexandra_k on July 30, 2005, at 18:12:40
>You could think of the mind as a container and the self to be the contents of mind / consciousness... Or... You could think of the self as one and the same thing as the contents of mind / consciousness... Or... You could think of the self as the interrelationship between the contents of mind / consciousness.
Sorry... That should have gone like this:
1) the self is a container in which the contents of consciousness resides.
2) the self could be just a collection or conjunction of the contents of consciousness (and nothing over and above them)
2) the self could be a function from the precise way in which the contents of consciousness combine (according to physical laws) to produce behaviour.Though of course there are unconscious mental states / brain states involved there too...
This is the end of the thread.
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