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Dr. Bob is Robert Hsiung, MD,
bob@dr-bob.orgShown: posts 1 to 10 of 10. This is the beginning of the thread.
Posted by alexandra_k on July 5, 2005, at 5:05:11
Descartes was an interactionist substance dualist. His main claims on the nature and relationship between mind and matter can be summarised as follows:
1) Mind is made of immaterial substance.
2) Matter (including body and brain) is made of material substance.
3) Mind interacts with matter and matter interacts with mind via the pineal body.So he believes that there are two distinct things or entities: mind, and matter.
He believes they are different kinds of stuff, or substance (immaterial and material respectively).
He believes that matter can cause changes to mind (as when you hit your thumb and feel pain).
He believes that mind can cause changes to matter (as when you decide to raise your arm and it raises into the air).
He was most probably wrong about the pineal body... But best not throw the baby out with the bath water just yet.Descartes arguments for dualism.
Leibniz law states that if we have x and y (at any one moment in time) and x has a property that y lacks then x and y cannot be the same thing.
So. Science tells us that water is one and the same thing as H2O (roughly...)
And now it seems that science tells us that mind is one and the same thing as brain (roughly...)
But if we can find one property that x (mind) has that y (body) lacks or vice versa then the scientific claim is necessarily false.
Descartes round one:
Mind has the property of indubitibility
Matter has the property of dubitibility
________________________________________
Mind has a property that matter lacks
________________________________________
By Leibniz law mind cannot be one and the same thing as matter.Interesting...
Here is a paralell argument (of the same structure)
Louis Lane wants to marry Superman
Louis Lane does not want to marry Clarke Kent
____________________________________________
Superman has a property that Clarke Kent lacks
____________________________________________
By Leibniz law Superman cannot be the same person as Clarke Kent.There are other problems with this example (to do with personal identity and identity of alternative states etc etc) but the relevant problem that this example is supposed to draw out is the kind of property that it is and is not appropriate to use in Leibniz law.
Leibniz law only works if we are making reference to genuine properties of the objects (x and y). It doesn't work for psychological properties. Basically, whether Louis Lane wants to marry Clarke Kent or not is a fact about Louis - not a fact about Superman or Clarke Kent (the x and y). Whether something is dubitable or indubitable (whether I am able to doubt something or not) is likewise a fact about me - not really a fact about mind and brain.
Descartes round two:
Mind is not extended in space
Matter is extended in space
______________________________
Mind and matter have different properties
_____________________________
By Leibniz law mind and matter cannot be the same thing.This one is trickier...
The materialist has to say that despite seeming counter-intuitive mind must be extended in space after all (because if the mind just is the brain then it turns out that the mind is located wherever the brain is located). Hmm.Being charitable to Descartes...
My pain is in my foot
My brain state is in my head
______________________________
My pain has a different location to my brain state
______________________________________________
By Leibniz law my pain cannot be my brain stateThe materialist has to say that despite it sounding rather counter-intuitive, your pain isn't in your foot after all. Your pain is in your brain. It is just that the brain state 'tells' you or 'tags' or 'projects' the location of the pain for you. Like how you don't see 2d images on the back of your retina - your brain projects 3d objects in the world
It does seem a little odd to deny those premises - but this is what the materialist needs to do. If mental states just are states of ones brain then the materialist cannot admit that the mental state has a property that the brain state lacks without contradiction.
How about this:
The morning star appears in the sky in the morning
The evening star appears in the sky in the evening
_________________________________________________
The morning star has a property that the evening star lacks
________________________________________________
By Leibniz law the morning star cannot be the evening star.(FYI the morning star and the evening star are typically thought to refer to venus. Philosophers like this one.)
Turns out we were mistaken with the premises - we were making a false claim about what we observe. It can be hard to find genuine properties of objects...
What about this?
Alexander the Great knew there was water in front of him
Alexander the Great did not know there was H2O in front of him (hadn't been discovered yet)...Same saga: properties of alexander and not of water / H2O.
lets be kind to Descartes round three:
I am imagining a yellow cow
My mental state has the property of being yellow
My brain state does not have the property of being yellow
_______________________________________
My mental state has a property my brain state lacks
_______________________________________
By Leibniz law my mental state cannot be my brain state.Hmm.
What would / could / should the materialist say about now??????
Methinks... They need to do some fast talking...
They have to deny either the first or the second premise.
I'd suggest the second. My brain state has to have the property of being yellow after all... But if you cut off the top of my head my brain won't look yellow to you...
Posted by alexandra_k on July 5, 2005, at 7:06:55
In reply to Mind and Brain or just Brain?, posted by alexandra_k on July 5, 2005, at 5:05:11
my thesis topic has just had the rug pulled out from under it.
its not even on the agenda anymore :-(
call that the 'specific theory' and then talk about a 'generic theory' claim allegance to the 'generic theory' and my topic is gone.The first factor isn't anomalous experience anymore.
Its neurophysiological deficit.The second factor isn't cognitive deficit (problem with rationality) anymore. Its something that happens between the nerophysiological deficit and the retaining of the delusion 'despite incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary'.
Crappy crap crap.
Well whats the difference between the first and second factor then? Aren't they both neurophysiological deficits? Why don't you just leave the personal level out of it completely and go study brain science.
Oh. Thats right. You did.
and the neurophysiological anomaly is idiosyncratic across different individuals.
it doesn't make any sense.
they are right about that.
delusions aren't natural kinds either, peoples.
schizophrenia isn't.
Delusions aren't.
Delusions with the same content aren't.
You can have different deficits and slightly different behaviours with the same content.
I don't think it makes sense at any level of analysis.Crap.
I wanna study something else :-(
Posted by alexandra_k on July 5, 2005, at 7:26:19
In reply to Re: the sideways dance, posted by alexandra_k on July 5, 2005, at 7:06:55
what is the difference between neurological deficit -> second factor -> delusion and neurological deficit -> delusion?
The second factor is supposed to be a neurological deficit as well...
The problem is meant to be that even the revised version of the first factor isn't necessary (according to the generic theory). Its not necessary or sufficient.
So the second factor does most of the work.
But the second factor is defined as just a way station, a place holder between the neuro anomaly (which was supposed to produce the delusional hypothesis yet not be necessary for the production of a delusional hypothesis at the same time) and the retaining of the belief.
Hmm.
Maybe I have stuff to say after all.
In fact... I should be pleased. The good news is just how many words do I think I can get out of a mind numbingly boring picky talk through of their paper?????Stoked.
Posted by alexandra_k on July 5, 2005, at 7:30:25
In reply to Re: the sideways dance, posted by alexandra_k on July 5, 2005, at 7:26:19
and the discovery is:
people with monothematic and circumscribed delusions resulting from head trauma have head trauma (ahem - neurophysiological deficit).
And there it is.
i don't know whether to cry or to laugh sometimes.
still... at least i don't have to get a real job.
Posted by Damos on July 5, 2005, at 17:18:42
In reply to Re: the sideways dance, posted by alexandra_k on July 5, 2005, at 7:30:25
Okay, so I admit it, I got lost completely after the first post. But the outcome, it seemed to be okay, right?
Do what I do - do both at the same time!
Might not understand a lot of it, but always enjoy reading when you argue stuff out.
Posted by alexandra_k on July 6, 2005, at 5:34:11
In reply to Re: the sideways dance » alexandra_k, posted by Damos on July 5, 2005, at 17:18:42
> Okay, so I admit it, I got lost completely after the first post.
AFTER the first post??? You mean you made it that far??? :-)
>But the outcome, it seemed to be okay, right?
Hard to tell...
Just venting really.
I don't know why it upsets me so.
But I guess that means I care.
> Might not understand a lot of it, but always enjoy reading when you argue stuff out.
Thanks.
(Shh - dont tell anyone but I dont really understand what I'm on about half the time either...)
Posted by Damos on July 6, 2005, at 17:18:11
In reply to Re: the sideways dance » Damos, posted by alexandra_k on July 6, 2005, at 5:34:11
> AFTER the first post??? You mean you made it that far??? :-)
Oh yeah, read 'em all, but by the end of the last one my brain was threatening me with imminent expolsion
> Hard to tell...
> Just venting really.
> I don't know why it upsets me so.
> But I guess that means I care.Yeah guess it does, and that's gotta be good.
> (Shh - dont tell anyone but I dont really understand what I'm on about half the time either...)ROTFLMFAO =0)
Posted by cockeyed on July 7, 2005, at 12:52:50
In reply to Mind and Brain or just Brain?, posted by alexandra_k on July 5, 2005, at 5:05:11
hi, haven't had any sleep. Nor syllogisms since 1962. Sounds like hotel california. Descartes was French, hence always right.[I'm married to a Parisian] But there was tis guy named, I think, William Ockham, the inventor of Ockham's razor. Anyway, I think my point...hell I have no point.Just a meat cleaver. spirit is smart meat, hence material. Coded brain pudding. The only spirit is booze. All the rest is wishful thinking. I think, therefor I wish? Or should I just go fish? yeah, that sounds right. Or something or other. Oh, I remember, the spiritual is just mistaken identity of the product of meat or brain. More like Ockham's axe I'm afraid. But It's 2 in the afternoon maybe if I say my prayers before I crash I'll get a flash from the realm of spirit, except I can't drink. Very cockeyed.
Posted by alexandra_k on July 9, 2005, at 3:32:44
In reply to Re: Mind and Brain or just Brain? » alexandra_k, posted by cockeyed on July 7, 2005, at 12:52:50
ROFL!
Hotel California is one of my favourite songs.
Yeah, Occham's razor.Once upon a time it was thought that there was a radical difference in kind between living (animate) and non-living (inanimate) things. It was thought that living things possessed vital spirit and that left when you died. Only living things possessed vital spirit.
On with the march of science... And now the difference between living and non-living things is explained in terms of biochemical processes.
Did we go 'how nice, we now have two explanations?' No - we did not. It was thought that the postulated vital spirit was basically redundant once we had the outline of a scientific explanation. Positing vital spirit doesn't buy us anything with respect to explanation. Occhams razor is basically the thought that you shouldn't multiply entities beyond necessity. Vital spirit is an extra kind of stuff (hence a more complex theory) and vital spirit doesn't explain things any better than bio-chemical processes and so vital spirit has indeed been axed from our ontology (catalogue of things that exist).
Same with phlogiston.
The thought is that when we don't know very much we tend to think there is a 'thing'. Later on as we learn more we realise that we don't need to posit a 'thing' after all.
It is thought...
It is thought...
That the mind / soul / spirit should go the same way.But: Occham's razor can only be used when we have two theories that are explanatorily equivalent. So. Does Dualism buy us anything that the identity theory cannot?
Though really... There aren't any substance dualists around anyways. The dualists who remain are property dualists (mental states are immaterial properties of the physical brain). It is unclear whether Occham's razor could / should apply to the positing of classes (or kinds) of properties rather than substances.
Did you used to study?
Posted by alexandra_k on July 9, 2005, at 3:41:44
In reply to Re: Mind and Brain or just Brain? » cockeyed, posted by alexandra_k on July 9, 2005, at 3:32:44
> Though really... There aren't any substance dualists around anyways*.
*In academic philosophy circles. Except... Possibly... David Chalmers. But then he thinks that consciousness needs to be brute. The physicists need to add consciousness to the list of brute things they accept into their ontology. He tries to work on the psycho-physical laws that govern the interaction between these basic entities. It sounds interesting... But I bet there is an awful lot of math :-( Also... The critisisms he offers of why we shouldn't accept other views (most notably functionalism - the current front runner) apply to him as well. It is just that he takes consciousness seriously in a way that most others don't. It is just too hard...
This is the end of the thread.
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