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Dr. Bob is Robert Hsiung, MD,
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Posted by alexandra_k on March 28, 2005, at 0:48:42
Intentional systems theory is primarily a theory as to when we are entitled to say that a system is a true believer. Our attributions of specific intentional states are held to be true in virtue of their predictive success. Dennett, (1998) considers that the intentional stance gives us ‘predictive leverage that we can get by no other method’. While this is controversial we may consider that the prediction that Sally will go to a shop because she wants to buy a puppy cannot be translated into a prediction from the level of physics. Firstly, we may consider that there is nothing on the physical level that corresponds to ‘a shop’ either in the subject’s brain or in the external world . We may thus consider that kinds of behaviours that are crucial to intentional explanations (e.g., going to a shop) are multiply realisable both in the brain and in the external world, and thus they are irreducible to the physical level. The same could be said for the notion of a ‘puppy’ as an object , and (arguably) for the notion of ‘belief’ itself. While some (notably the Churchlands) consider that intentional states are irreducible and thus illegitimate and should be abolished, the fact is that the intentional stance is legitimated and sustained by its utility.
If we were to opt out of intentional psychology we would not be able to function in our everyday lives, and it would be us that would become extinct and not the theory of intentional psychology. We cannot refrain from interpreting the behaviour of others from the intentional stance, and we cannot refrain from interpreting our own behaviour from the intentional stance. Inability to use the intentional stance adequately would appear to be a feature of pathology, such as when someone is unable to attribute appropriate emotional states to themselves (or to label them), or is unable to form adaptive beliefs regarding themselves or others that serve to facilitate their needs being met.
We may thus consider that the intentional stance is predictive in virtue of capturing real patterns or kinds of behaviour that are not visible from a lower level (physical) stance. It is in virtue of this predictive success that we are entitled to use the intentional stance to explain and describe behaviour as well. While Dennett, (1987) considers that a variety of objects behaviour can be predicted by the intentional stance e.g. oil refineries and thermometers it would seem that adopting the intentional stance towards these objects does not buy us ‘predictive leverage we can get from no other method’. We could equally well predict their behaviour from the design stance (where they behave as they are designed to behave other things being equal) and thus I consider that viewing these objects as intentional systems is to attribute a greater mental capacity than is needed to explain the phenomenon. These systems thus do not count as ‘true believers’.
While intentional systems theory focuses on attributions of particular mental states I think that it can be extended so as to provide a similarly rough picture-view account of our attributions of self-hood. While intentional stance theorists typically consider beliefs and desires that would be attributed fairly uniformly to any intentional system (e.g., that a system believes relevant things about the environment and has fairly standard desires for biological needs etc) sometimes the attributions that interest us the most are those that are fairly idiosyncratic to particular people or personalities. We can consider that when different people are in the same circumstances they often behave in different ways and when we know something of the particular people involved we can often predict how they will behave compared to one another.
To consider the notion of a self or personality we need to look not only at the patterns that emerge from a snap-shot view when we view the subject as an intentional system; we also need to consider patterns that emerge as frequencies of these emergent kinds of behaviours when we view them over time. So the picture we have is as follows:
(i) When we consider an object as an intentional system ‘real patterns’ emerge that legitimate our attributions of specific beliefs and specific desires so as to predict and explain the systems behaviour.(ii) When we view the patterns in the behaviour of an intentional system over time further patterns emerge in the frequency of kinds of behaviours that an intentional system exhibits. These patterns have to do with attributions of preferences and consistent character, or personality traits etc, and they serve to legitimate our attributions of selfhood.
For example, some intentional systems frequently respond to certain kinds of events by feeling stressed. Some intentional systems frequently deal with stress by exhibiting avoidance behaviours, and others work pro-actively to alleviate the stress. We often use these patterns (that emerge as frequencies) to predict how that system will behave in the future. We attribute personality traits such as ‘avoidant’ or ‘pro-active’ on the basis of many specific attributions that are made from the intentional stance. It thus seems reasonable to consider that the concept that we have of a unique individual, personality, character, or self is a more general attribution or inference that is built out of the specific intentional states that we attribute. It is a result of considering frequencies in our attributions, or the patterns that emerge in the behaviours that prompt our attributions when we consider either the behaviour of the system, or the frequency of our attributions to it over time .
While intentional systems theory considers that beliefs and desires ought to ‘evolve in right and proper ways’ it seems that by this they are primarily concerned with beliefs evolving in light of changes in the immediate environment and desires growing until they are satisfied (Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, 1996 p. 148). When we consider the notion of an intentional system as a self, we may consider not only immediate or fairly immediate desires for biological needs, but also further reaching goals or plans, memories and preferences. We expect that an intentional system, or a self is largely consistent or continuous through time as the beliefs and desires evolve in right and proper ways, and do not alter abruptly for seemingly no good reason. Sometimes people do experience neurological damage which results in behavioural changes that has others conclude that they are not the same ‘person’ any more. We may consider that here the self has altered so abruptly, or has degenerated to the point that it is hard to see how the beliefs and desires could have rationally evolved from the earlier intentional system .
This is the end of the thread.
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