![[dr. bob]](/dr-bob-sm.gif)
Dr. Bob is Robert Hsiung, MD,
bob@dr-bob.orgShown: posts 6 to 30 of 55. Go back in thread:
Posted by alexandra_k on August 16, 2005, at 18:11:26
In reply to Re: robot brains, posted by alexandra_k on August 16, 2005, at 17:26:52
what on earth is meaning?
what does 'water' mean?
one part of meaning is reference.
what does 'water' mean? well... it means the set of all objects that the term is correctly applied to. all the past samples of water, all the present samples of water, and all the future samples of water as well.On the actual world it turns out that the stuff that we were causally acquainted with, the stuff that we dubbed 'water' just is one and the same thing (roughly) as H2O.
So in one sense, water means H2O. We start with a term that is associated with a sample of stuff by ostensive definition. Ostensive definition: 'that (gesture) is water'. That is a baptism or naming ceremony. Then other speakers use the term with the intention to refer to the same sort of stuff as the person they heard the term off. In that way there is a causal chain that links the term to the stuff.
The scientists study that stuff... And what they discover is its essential nature: turns out that that stuff gets to be the same kind of stuff in virtue of having the same chemical constitution: H2O. So now we can say that H2O means water.
Now... Lets do some space travelling...
(Credit to Hillary Putnam) We discover a planet (over the other side of the sun) that turns out to be EXACTLY qualitatively identical to this world. Everything looks EXACTLY the same. You even have a counter-part on twin earth. Someone that looks and thinks just like you. Has all the experiences you have had etc etc.On this world the scientists have made an interesting discovery. The essential nature of the stuff that the twin earthians have dubbed 'water' actually has chemical composition xyz. Now it turns out that thats not just another way of saying H2O. Rather, the stuff they dubbed water, the stuff that falls from the sky and fills the lakes, the drinkable, potable stuff has a radically different chemical composition to earthian water. Qualitatively is appears exactly the same, but scientifically its essental nature is radically different.
Now... Some questions...
The twin earthians call xyz 'water'. Does the twin earth expression 'water' have the same or different extension (set of samples in the world) that the earthian expression 'water' has?
Do the twin earthian and earthian expressions 'water' mean the same thing?Consensus (fairly much - one shouldn't say that really...) is that the terms have different extensions. They refer to different samples of stuff with different essential natures.
The terms have the same meaning, however. Qualitatively there is no difference between the concepts that the earthians and twin earthians have. Our concepts are the same: they pick out the sample by its superficial properties of 'watery stuff' the clear liquid that fills the lakes etc...
And what this is supposed to show us...
The essential nature of things is to be determined by science (and is thus a-posteriori, it is an empirical matter).
We use terms without knowing the essential nature, but when it comes to learning about the essential nature we defer to the experts...Given that water turned out to be H2O on earth the earthian expression 'water' necessarily refers to H2O.
It could have been true that the earthian expression 'water' referred to xyz only in the sense that given the state of our knowledge a couple hundred years ago it seemed from our point of view to be possible...
But actually, it is not possible that the earthian expression 'water' refers to xyz at all. GIVEN the essential nature of water being what it is it is necessary that the essential nature of water is what it is.
And this is how Kripke shows us that there is such a thing as a-posteriori, empirical, to be determined by science necessity. It isn't just that analytic statements are necessary.
'Water = H2O' is a-posteriori...
But it is necessary as well...
Which is just to say that...
Water = H2O in all possible worlds.And that it is possible...
That there be another world (lets say behind the sun as well) where H2O is black and tarry. Its this black and tarry stuff that paves the roads. On this second twin earth they call this stuff 'tar'. But it turns out that 'tar' (in twin earthian) is coextensive (picks out the same stuff) as 'water' in earthian. And the correct thing to say in earthian english is 'golly gee, you pave your roads with water over here!'
Crazy philosophers, eh???
Posted by Damos on August 16, 2005, at 18:52:50
In reply to Re: the meaning of meaning, posted by alexandra_k on August 16, 2005, at 18:11:26
Hmmmmm, big questions. I don't think the essence of something is simply explained by its chemical composition e.g H20, but I'm not sure how to explain it. I'm sure the meaning of 'water' would vary between say a scientist (chemist), marine biologist, surfer, aboriginal, and farmer.
I find it really interesting that in ideogrammatic languages the one character can have many, many meanings. Damn it girl, you've got me thinking again and it's before 10am and I've only had 1 coffee. AAAARRRRGGGHHHH I need a panadol or ten.
Posted by alexandra_k on August 16, 2005, at 19:30:33
In reply to Re: the meaning of meaning » alexandra_k, posted by Damos on August 16, 2005, at 18:52:50
Philosophers typically distinguish between two meanings of meaning.
Meaning1 is the easiest. Meaning1 is reference where the reference of the term is the class / set of objects in the world that the term is correctly applied to. This is also known as the extension of the term, and the objects in the world are what the term dennotes.
Meaning2 is a bit harder... Meaning2 is aka meaning, or sense, or intension. Meaning2 is more along the lines of a concept that people have.
Typically the two go together... But sometimes we can tease them apart...
As when there are perfectly meaningful terms / expressions that lack reference (e.g., pegasus, the present king of france)
Our concept of gold is (roughly) that of an expensive yellow metal. Fools gold is also a yellow metal, however, and some people may be fooled into paying a lot of money for it ;-) Most of us would probably be tempted to call samples of both 'gold'. But it turns out that the essential nature of gold (to be determined by science) is different from the essential nature of fools gold. We defer to the scientists to correct our application of terms to sets of stuff.
So the reference is supposed to be fixed by the nature of the substance. When we are worried about the nature of water that is a chemical matter so we defer to the chemists. When we are worried about the nature of a biological entity then that is a biological matter so we defer to the biologists.
>I'm sure the meaning of 'water' would vary between say a scientist (chemist), marine biologist, surfer, aboriginal, and farmer.
Here I would say that it is the connotation that varies, and not the dennotation or meaning.
Dennotation: reference. Essential nature to be determined by science.
Meaning: Standard meanings. Concepts that people have. Maybe cluster concepts / lists of superficial properties that tend to covary with the essential properties.
Connotation: Idiosyncratic variations on standard meanings. If there is a group for whom water has taken on a particular religious significance then these speakers might have idiosyncratic connotations associated with the term that aren't part of its dennotation or standard meaning.If the standard meaning vaires between people then it would follow that they wouldn't know what other people using the term are talking about.
If the dennotation varies between people then it would follow that they would be talking about different things.
There are complications though... Mostly with respect to how much the impurities in water actually are important to us. When we ask for a glass of water we most probably do not mean to ask for a glass of H2O and we'd probably be appalled at the taste if we actually got what we asked for!
We might think of gold as a yellow metal but under some conditions gold is not a yellow metal. If it was essential to gold to be a yellow metal then it would follow that if it was not a yellow metal it could not be gold.Golds being a yellow metal is part of our concept or meaning of gold. Maybe it is even more idiosyncratic than that... Maybe it is more a connotation (gold is an expensive yellow metal). None of that is essential to the nature of the substance. If those facts about gold changed gold would still be gold.
Knock a proton off, however, and we'd have changed it into something else ;-)
Posted by alexandra_k on August 16, 2005, at 19:48:05
In reply to Re: the meaning of meaning, posted by alexandra_k on August 16, 2005, at 19:30:33
Braddon Mitchell & Jackson "Philosophy of mind and cognition" talk about the possibility of finding that water is all black and tarry on some other possible world.
If this this truely possible then there would seem to arise a tension between the following premises:
- Science is supposed to determine the essential properties of the objects / substances that we originally picked out by ostension (pointing and naming it).
- It is possible for qualitative properties to vary independently from essential properties (that are to be determined by science).
The qualitative properties (those that are observable to us) are surely what interests us. We were initially interested in that watery stuff that fell from the sky and quenched our thirst etc etc. The qualitative properties were what interested us in the stuff.
Science is supposed to be about discovering the essential properties of the stuff / objects...
To say that it is possible for qualitative properties to vary independently from essential properties undermines the role of science and the role of essential properties with respect to being interesting to us. If essential properties vary independently from qualitative properties then what relevance are essential properties with respect to helping us understand or fix the nature of the qualitative world. The world that we experience?
If qualitative properties vary independently from essential properties then how on earth can we find out about them? Scientists just OBSERVE. Manipulate variables and then OBSERVE the results. Observations are necessarily constrained to the qualitative level. There cannot be a radical difference between the observational and essential levels of analysis as the only way we find out about essential properties is systematic observation. Do they really mean to say that xyz behaves exactly the same as h20 in a variety of experimental conditions? If so then what grounds for saying xyz does not = h20? If it does behave differently then isn't this a difference on the qualitative level.
If qualitative properties vary independently from essential properties then this undermines the scientific enterprise if the scientific enterprise is construed as the discovery of the essential nature of the world that we experience.
Do they really want to do that????
They want to say that they can't vary independently in the actual world. But once a correlation is discovered in the actual world (between qualitative and essential properties) then when we go counter-factual (to investigate other possible worlds) it is possible for them to come apart and reference follows essential properties.
Hmm
HmmAnd it is from this kind of stuff that two-dimensional (that means connotation and dennotation) modal (possible world) semantics (meanings of terms / espressions as opposed to dennotations of terms / expressions) was born...
yukko.
Posted by alexandra_k on August 16, 2005, at 19:50:24
In reply to on the absurdity of paving the roads with water, posted by alexandra_k on August 16, 2005, at 19:48:05
stupid link... "Philosophy of mind and cognition"
Posted by damos on August 16, 2005, at 22:24:28
In reply to Re: on the absurdity of paving the roads with water, posted by alexandra_k on August 16, 2005, at 19:50:24
I'd like it denoted that I connoted be processing all this good stuff as quickly as I would like and still pretend to be doing some work.
Still pondering denotation and connotation, but I see what you mean. It's really interesting. What I wouldn't give to have all day to ponder and post about this stuff. The idea of logical and objective meaning is interesting in itself. My solitary functioning braincell is running at warp speed with this stuff. I really enjoy it when you make me think about this kinda stuff.
Thanks you :-)
Posted by alexandra_k on August 17, 2005, at 2:47:37
In reply to on the absurdity of paving the roads with water, posted by alexandra_k on August 16, 2005, at 19:48:05
Though I'm fairly dodgey on this stuff really...
I'm missing something.
By observable, qualitative, superficial etc properties they mean at a casual glance. H2O and XYZ might appear similar in the way that H2O and gin can appear similar. Jackson didn't want to commit himself to qualitatively *identical* under scientific observations.
Though he said that scientists think that while this world is made of matter, it is possible that there be a world qualitatively identical to ours that is made of anti-matter. Where the particles circle the nucleas in the opposite direction or something...
If that is possible then you would have two qualitatively identical worlds that differed with respect to essential properties: one is made of matter and the other is made of anti-matter.
Maybe qualitative similarities are multiply realised at a lower level of analysis.
I think it might be that that they are attempting to capture.
And that we defer to a lower level of analysis.
But... Thats not all that interests us. For a while meaning2 fell in disrepute. Philosophers turned from the messy and tricky study of meanings to the less messy and tricky study of extensions / referents. They went so far as to dub extensions / referents meanings.
Content externalism is the view that mental content (ideas, thoughts, the reference / meaning of words) is outside the head. It is in the object / set of objects that the speaker has come into causal contact with.
Hillary Putnam considered whether the proposition 'I am a brain in a vat' is meaningful...
He considers that if I am a brain in a vat of nutrients being stimulated in certain ways by mad scientists (and have been all my life) then I cannot think about vats because I have not come into causal contact with vats. In fact I have not come into causal contact with brains either, so I am unable to think about brains and vats.
In English the word 'vat' refers to vats in the world. In vat English, however, the word 'vat' would refer to something along the lines of 'neural stimulation x'. The referents are different in english and vat english and thus the terms do not refer to / mean the same thing.
Thus it follows like this...
(P1) If I was a brain in a vat then I would not be able to think the thought 'I am a brain in a vat'.
(P2) But clearly I can think the thought 'I am a brain in a vat'.
_________________________________________________
(C) Therefore I know that I am not a brain in a vat.HA!
Howz that for an attempted defeat of radical sceptisism (which is the view that you cannot know whether you are or are not a brain in a vat).
Basically it falls down insofar as we don't know whether we can think 'I am a brain in a vat' because we don't know whether we have come into causal contact with brains and vats or not.
(P2) and (C) have the same truth values. The trouble is that we can't assume the truth of one to prove the truth of the other.
This argument is called a transcendental argument. I'm starting to wonder whether that means that when you accept the argument that is because you have seen how to transcend the problem. The trouble with the formal structure of transcendental arguments is that they are circular. They assume something that they need to prove. (P2) is reason to believe (C) but then (C) is the reason to believe (P2).
The ontological argument for the existence of god functions like this (IMO)
These are both facts that go beyond how things qualitatively seem to be to us. Qualitatively there is no difference between thinking english and thinking vat english thoughts.
Instead of alleviating scepticism about knowledge of the external world
Scepticism infects knowledge of the contents of ones mind...We cannot determine the content of our thoughts / words from how they seem to us.
Appearances can be misleading...
Is the moral of content externalism.
(What this does is carve the nasty, messy topic of meaning up. Reference gets to pick up one hell of a lot. If meaning = reference then we don't know what we mean much of the time...)
'Radical translation begins at home'
Quine
Posted by alexandra_k on August 17, 2005, at 17:25:19
In reply to Re: the meaning of meaning, posted by alexandra_k on August 16, 2005, at 18:11:26
Okay so... Just in case Zeugma or someone hits the boards... I have many confusions around meaning... Philosophy of language is really very hard (IMO).
That is just by way of saying... That I don't really know what I'm talking about so if it is hard to understand that may well be because it is ununderstandable, incoherant, or just plain wrong...
Two dimensional modal semantics / logic in particular...
The two dimensions aren't 'dennotation and connotation'. My mistake - the two dimensions are extension / reference and intension (standard meaning).
So for example...
Take a sentance 'There is water on twin earth'.
Lets specify twin earth (there are a variety of thought experiments that specify a variety of conditions on twin earth).On my version of twin earth there is no H2O. There is watery stuff that fills the lakes etc, but that stuff is xyz and let us grant that H2O does not = xyz.
Now lets evaluate the utterance 'there is water on twin earth' by going modal (considering another possible world):
With respect to extension the utterance is false: there is no h2O on twin earth.
With respect to intension the utterance is true: there is watery stuff that fills the lakes etc.You can do all kinds of funny stuff with indexicals by evaluating their truth / falsity in modal contexts (across other possible worlds):
'I am here now'.
This statement is necessarily true. It is true in all possible worlds. For anyone who speaks the utterance the utterance cannot be false.
What is curious about the expression is that while we want to say that it has a standard meaning it is also true that there is no standard dennotation.
'I' is indexical because what the term dennotes changes as a function of context of utterance. If I say 'I' I dennote a_k, if you say 'I' you dennote Damos etc.
'Here' is indexical because where the term dennotes changes as a function of context of utterance. If I say 'here' it refers to where I am right now.
And 'Now' is the same...
Indexicals have a standard meaning 'I' refers to whoever is speaking now etc... But the referent changes as a function from intension to context.
'I am here now' is necessarily true. It is true for all speakers at all times at all places across all possible worlds.
But the referents (extensions) vary across different possible worlds.
It is necessarily true because it doesn't say anything in particular about the world at all.
It is true that I am here now.
But it is also possible that I be somewhere else now.Argh.
I'm all confused already...
I'm just talking really...
;-)
Posted by alexandra_k on August 17, 2005, at 17:41:51
In reply to Re: the meaning of meaning, posted by alexandra_k on August 17, 2005, at 17:25:19
I am getting there... I am getting there...
So... The thought is that initially we picked out samples of water by its qualitative properties. We knew to dub something water when it appeared to be 'that watery stuff'. The clear liquid that falls from the sky, fills the lakes, is drinkable, potable etc etc. Thats how we identify whether something is correctly called 'water' or not.
But then on with the march of science... And the scientists tell us 'that watery stuff that falls from the sky etc has a common essential nature and that essential nature is that it is H2O.
And so the scientists fix the reference of the term. The thought is that now we know the essential nature of the stuff that we initially refered to via its qualitative properties. If the qualitative properties come apart from the essential properties (as they do most clearly on twin earth) then the essential properties take priority with respect to reference.
So: Initially we go via qualitative properties. Scientists discover a correlation between qualitative properties and essential properties. An identity claim is made (Water = H2O) and from thereon the essential properties fix the reference.
Kripke maintains that identity claims are necessary. Once we discover a correlation on the actual world and make an identity claim then that identity claim is true on all possible worlds.
Now what is interesting...Initially we identify mental states like pains, tickles, emotions etc by their qualitative properties. Then on with the march of science and scientists discover (or more properly WILL discover) correlations between certain neural patterns and qualitative states. The scientists want to make an identity claim 'mental state x = brain state y'. Now if the identity claim is right then this identity claim is necessary. What that means is that mental state x would = brain state y across all possible worlds. And when the qualitative properties come apart from the essential properties then the dennotation follows the essential properties.
And this is a problem quite a few people struggle with...
Kripke says that clearly it is false that mental states are identicle to brain states across all possible worlds. Clearly it is possible for beings without brains to have mental states. Thus he maintains that the identity claim between mental states and brain states is necessarily false.
Hmm. Hrm...
The trouble is... Knowing whether we have an identity claim or not to start with. If we DO have an identity then it is true in all possible worlds... If we DO NOT have an identity then it is false in all possible worlds... I think you are also allowed contingent identity (true on some worlds and false on others) - but I'm not sure whether that counts as identity...
Any way... Going counterfactual (considering other possible worlds) isn't like observing these possible worlds through a telescope and seeing what is there (credit to Kripke). It is an intuition pump. To get us thinking about what is and is not possible. And the trouble is that it is perfectly possible for rational people to disagree. So the thought experiments aren't terribly rationally persuasive much of the time (nobody is going to change their mind based on them). It is very controversial what if any use 2 d modal logic is...
I think... That sometimes... Actually most times... The qualitative properties are what interests us. We are interested in essential properties only insofar as there is some kind of lawful connection between essential properties and qualitative properties.
The business of science is to explain and predict things on the qualitative level. To explain our experience of the world.
But thats just my opinion.
And I don't really know what I'm talking about...
Posted by Damos on August 17, 2005, at 20:49:50
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain..., posted by alexandra_k on August 17, 2005, at 17:41:51
Sorry kiddo, but I'm gonna have to print all this out and work my way through it. Hate how work keeps getting in the way of important stuff :-)
Gosh I just wish I had read something, anything that would help me contribute to this in some meaningful way. I love watching you think stuff through and examine what you've thought and said and then expand, clarify, or even retrace your steps and then move forward again. Whether you realise it or not, I learn a lot from what you post and really appreciate it.
Posted by alexandra_k on August 17, 2005, at 21:28:02
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain... » alexandra_k, posted by Damos on August 17, 2005, at 20:49:50
> I'm gonna have to print all this out and work my way through it.
You don't have to. Really. Its just me talking really. A lot of it doesn't make very much sense. Not sure whether reflecting on it will help it make any more sense.
Posted by Damos on August 17, 2005, at 21:58:46
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain... » Damos, posted by alexandra_k on August 17, 2005, at 21:28:02
Whether it's just you talking and whether it makes sense or not isn't what matters. It's written by someone I care a whole bunch about and it's interesting - that's what matters. Anyway, hadn't you already guessed that I like listening when you 'just talk' :-)
Posted by Phillipa on August 17, 2005, at 22:16:48
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain... » alexandra_k, posted by Damos on August 17, 2005, at 21:58:46
Ahhhh Alexandra Remember my post about Babbleland? That's where i want to live. And the Magic pill? Caused quite a stir on PBabble. Fondly, Phillipa
Posted by alexandra_k on August 18, 2005, at 18:33:03
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain..., posted by Phillipa on August 17, 2005, at 22:16:48
> Ahhhh Alexandra Remember my post about Babbleland? That's where i want to live.
:-)
Yeah, thats right.
Posted by alexandra_k on August 18, 2005, at 18:33:54
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain... » alexandra_k, posted by Damos on August 17, 2005, at 21:58:46
> Anyway, hadn't you already guessed that I like listening when you 'just talk' :-)
Okay :-)
Just don't stress trying to make sense of something that probably doesn't make a lot of sense
Posted by alexandra_k on August 18, 2005, at 18:34:19
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain..., posted by alexandra_k on August 18, 2005, at 18:33:54
Posted by Damos on August 23, 2005, at 23:48:22
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain..., posted by alexandra_k on August 18, 2005, at 18:33:54
I was just reading that "new cells are only generated in two areas of the brain, the olfactory bulb, that governs the sense of smell, and the hippocamus, an area important to learning." Apparently all the others are as old as we are. Also "the adult brain contains stem cells, meaning it may be possible to stimulate the brain to grow new tissue after injury." Never knew about the first bit - that's really rather interesting.
Was also reading that depending on your beliefs you could belive in anywhere from 3 to 9 levels of consciousness. Those who believe in 7 see each chakra as corresponding to a different level (can't remember them offhand - bugger).
I'm still not convinced that the 'essence' of a person can be explained by there essential nature i.e. biological/chemical make-up.
Posted by Phillipa on August 23, 2005, at 23:57:14
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain... » alexandra_k, posted by Damos on August 23, 2005, at 23:48:22
Damos, That's exactly what they told me at Taste and Smell clinic that stem cells can rejuvenate the olfactory cells which control smell. hence restore smell and that controls taste. Thanks Fondly, Phillipa
Posted by alexandra_k on August 24, 2005, at 1:34:52
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain... » alexandra_k, posted by Damos on August 23, 2005, at 23:48:22
> I was just reading that "new cells are only generated in two areas of the brain, the olfactory bulb, that governs the sense of smell, and the hippocamus, an area important to learning." Apparently all the others are as old as we are.
Hmm. Okay then...
So thats to do with the identity of neurons. So (roughly) neurons don't replace. (They sort of do - but it isn't true that we have completely new ones in 7 years). So the same neuron persists through time... And thats the biological level of analysis (the level of analysis where the ontology / things that exist are biological entities such as neurons).I guess we need to drop a little lower... Maybe chemistry, lets see whats there... Different transmitter substances, different chemicals. Now... Are the chemical componants of a single neuron numerically identicle over the lifetime of the neuron? And the answer to that is 'no'. The molecules that make up a single neuron replace over time... Now I'm just pulling numbers from the sky but it might be a reasonable guess to say that every molecule in a single neuron might be different oh, every 7 years ;-)
(I have no idea really...)
And then lets worry about what the molecules are made of. Say you have a molecule of oxygen. Do the atoms that make up that molecule replace over time? What about the sub-atomic particles that make up the atom?
I think... (Though my understanding of sub-atomic particles is very dodgey indeed) that at the level of sub-atomic particles you don't even have a notion of an object moving through space anymore. Rather... Its like your tv or computer screen. Lots of little charges-at-a-place. Its not that a dog runs across your tv screen. Its that a value of charge-at-a-place changes.
> Was also reading that depending on your beliefs you could belive in anywhere from 3 to 9 levels of consciousness. Those who believe in 7 see each chakra as corresponding to a different level (can't remember them offhand - bugger).
:-)
I guess it would depend on how you define / operationalise / measure what constitutes a 'different level of consciousness'.
> I'm still not convinced that the 'essence' of a person can be explained by there essential nature i.e. biological/chemical make-up.... What do you mean by 'essence of a person'?
Posted by alexandra_k on August 24, 2005, at 1:37:02
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain... » Damos, posted by Phillipa on August 23, 2005, at 23:57:14
Yeah. Also... Old parts of the brain can take over the function of parts that may have been destroyed. Not all functions though...
Posted by zeugma on August 28, 2005, at 15:01:09
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain... » Phillipa, posted by alexandra_k on August 24, 2005, at 1:37:02
Okay so... Just in case Zeugma or someone hits the boards... I have many confusions around meaning... Philosophy of language is really very hard (IMO).>
hi alexandra, you know I can't resist this topic!
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> Two dimensional modal semantics / logic in particular…>The variant developed by David Kaplan which is indeed a modal semantics (he calls it ‘two sorted’, my perception is kinda fuzzy right now so looking at it I can’t tell if it’s two dimensional or not…
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> The two dimensions aren't 'dennotation and connotation'. My mistake - the two dimensions are extension / reference and intension (standard meaning).
>Denotation and connotation is a variant terminology for extension/intension.
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> You can do all kinds of funny stuff with indexicals by evaluating their truth / falsity in modal contexts (across other possible worlds):
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> 'I am here now'.
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> This statement is necessarily true.
But is it true that I am here now, barely dressed and in front of my computer, is a necessary truth?
The utterance-type 'I am here now' is one that gets assigned value 'T' every time it's used. The two dimensions of demonstrative logic (which I believe you're talking about) are content and character. The character of 'I am here now' is such that it cannot be used falsely. But its content is just everyday contingent truth. I could be somewhere else on a Sunday afternoon (though highly unlikely, of course).
Both content and character are aspects of sense or intension. Content is the part that ties in with possible worlds, and hence propositions (if you consider that a proposition is either the possible world that makes the utterance true, or the ordered triple of persons, places, and times that make up what I mean when I say 'I am here now.')Character is the route by which we proceed to the proposition. I use the utterance-type, 'I am here now,' to convey the content that I am here now, and you do not know what it means until (getting to the reference part of the equation) you know the referents of each of those terms I just used, including the indexicals 'I', 'here', and 'now' (such bewildering little words). This is kind of neat because utterances have two varieties of sense (content and character) and words have extension (reference), and the doctrine that words acquire meaning only in the context of a sentence is borne out.
So, it is not the referents that vary across possible worlds... it is the senses. I wish, of course, that I (designatum here) could vary at will from world to world, but I can't. I'm stuck here for now. But this world has Alexandra in it :-)
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> It is true that I am here now.
> But it is also possible that I be somewhere else now.Very possible :-)
-z
Posted by alexandra_k on August 28, 2005, at 18:03:35
In reply to mystery of the missing indexical.. » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on August 28, 2005, at 15:01:09
> hi alexandra, you know I can't resist this topic!
lol! indeed. you like the hard stuff (imo)... language and metaphysics. i'm more fond of mental representation...
> The variant developed by David Kaplan which is indeed a modal semantics (he calls it ‘two sorted’, my perception is kinda fuzzy right now so looking at it I can’t tell if it’s two dimensional or not…ah. i remember kaplan (a little) from a couple years back... what gets hard is that people use the same term with a different meaning / reference (aargh! this gets hard to talk about). what i mean is that for some philosophers meaning just is reference. whereas for others there is a distinction between varieties of meaning. it can be hard to figure out how much is verbal dispute with people using terms differently in philosophy of language...
> > The two dimensions aren't 'dennotation and connotation'. My mistake - the two dimensions are extension / reference and intension (standard meaning).
> Denotation and connotation is a variant terminology for extension/intension.:-) so i was right after all! i think i have heard of a distinction between intension and connotation somewhere. where intension was part of standard meaning and connotation was more to do with idiosyncratic variations between speakers. so the intension of 'water' might be 'watery stuff', but the connotation of 'water' might be 'sacred substance' for some individual or smaller group of individuals. but then i've also heard of connotation being used synonomously with intension. so it is hard...
> > 'I am here now'.
> > This statement is necessarily true.> But is it true that I am here now, barely dressed and in front of my computer, is a necessary truth?
> The utterance-type 'I am here now' is one that gets assigned value 'T' every time it's used. The two dimensions of demonstrative logic (which I believe you're talking about) are content and character.hmm. bells are ringing...
i shall have to have a go with kripke, because i am more familiar with his terminology (though i'll try and get the hang of kaplan's usage as i go...)
a rigid designator designates the same individual across all possible worlds...
'alexandra_k' is a rigid designator because it dennotes alexandra_k in all worlds in which it dennotes anything at all.
'the new zealander who posts about philosophy on psycho-babble' is a flaccid designator. in this world (the actual world) the description is enough to pick out one and only one individual (alexandra_k). but there is a possible world in which alexandra_k never posted to babble. my officemate might have posted to babble instead and he may have even posted philosophy stuff. in that world the description 'the new zealander who posts about philosophy on psycho-babble' would pick out a different referent. thus it is a contingent truth that that description picks out me. there are other possible worlds in which that same description picks out other individuals.
'i am here now' is a flaccid designator. the 'i' picks out different individuals in different possible worlds.
the 'here' picks out different places in different possible worlds.
the 'now' picks out different times in different possible worlds (because possible worlds are just supposed to be ways this world might be including ways it was / will be in the past / future.the sentance 'i am here now' is necessarily true whenever it is uttered, wherever it is uttered, by whomever it is uttered.
but the person place and time that are referred to change as a function of the context of utterance.
i can know 'i am here now' is necessarily true without knowing who i am, where i am, or when i am.
>The character of 'I am here now' is such that it cannot be used falsely.
so... character is what i might be tempted to call... standard meaning / intension.
>But its content is just everyday contingent truth. I could be somewhere else on a Sunday afternoon (though highly unlikely, of course).
and the content is externalist, which is just to say that the content is the reference / dennotation.
> Both content and character are aspects of sense or intension. Content is the part that ties in with possible worlds, and hence propositions (if you consider that a proposition is either the possible world that makes the utterance true, or the ordered triple of persons, places, and times that make up what I mean when I say 'I am here now.')are you sure that content is part of intension? maybe this is wrong... is content a function that maps character on to contexts in order to deliver a reference?
> Character is the route by which we proceed to the proposition. I use the utterance-type, 'I am here now,' to convey the content that I am here now,
to flaccidly designate who, when, and where you are
>and you do not know what it means until (getting to the reference part of the equation) you know the referents of each of those terms I just used, including the indexicals 'I', 'here', and 'now' (such bewildering little words).
or is it that i do not know what you are referring to until i am able to map the character (standard meaning) onto the context (your environment) thereby getting to the reference?
>This is kind of neat because utterances have two varieties of sense (content and character) and words have extension (reference), and the doctrine that words acquire meaning only in the context of a sentence is borne out.
ah. this really is ringing bells...
> So, it is not the referents that vary across possible worlds... it is the senses.???
I thought the character is standard (standard meaning). so the character of 'i' is that it refers (flaccidly) to the speaker.
The content varies depending on circumstances. if I say 'I' the context is such that i refer to alexandra_k.
and the content... just is the reference (because we are being content externalists).and the content is flaccidly designated because we are getting to it via an intension (description) where the reference of the description varies across all possible worlds. whereas if i refer to myself as alexandra_k then that refers to alexandra_k across all possible worlds.
so...
1. 'i am here now'
2. 'alexandra_k is babbling at 10.49 on monday the 25th of august'.
in the actual world both utterances dennote / refer to the same thing.
but when we go modal...
1. is necessarily true (true in all possible worlds) but the dennotation changes as the 'i' pick out different individuals, the 'here' picks out different places, and the 'now' changes.
2. is a contingent truth. while it is not possible that 'i am here now' is false, 'where' i am, who 'i' am, 'when' i am varies...so while it is true that i must be indentical with myself (at one point in time) in order to count as the same thing...
any description of me is only contingently true (in that the description may not obtain to me) across different possible worlds.
except for essential properties which an individual must retain in order to retain its identity as that individual.
kripke reckoned that what was crucial for being the 'same person' was 'descended from that (gesture) sperm and egg combination'. i don't like that. i like to think it is possible that i could have had different biological parents :-( still... i guess he's talking bodily criterion (same human being) rather than psychological criterion.
>But this world has Alexandra in it :-)
:-)
Ah... But you might prefer one or the other of my counter-parts :-)
Posted by alexandra_k on August 28, 2005, at 18:08:00
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on August 28, 2005, at 18:03:35
oh.
i might be getting it...
lets have a go...
please correct me if i f*ck it up...two varieties of sense:
character
contentreference
so you take an utterance (lets go with 'I am babbling).
The character is something along the lines of 'the speaker of the utterance is babbling'
The content is determined by the character + the actual world environment. So the character + facts about the actual world determine that...
The referent is 'babbling alexandra_k'
and the referent is designated flacidly because if the context was different the referent would be different.
so...
does that mean that sense is not a ladder that can be disgarded once you have used it to get to the referent????
make sense???
Posted by zeugma on August 29, 2005, at 22:40:14
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.., posted by alexandra_k on August 28, 2005, at 18:08:00
am in something of an addled way right now, wrote a detailed commentary and then my connection failed- i'm an idiot for not working offline- but anyways- it's late here- 11:19 pm Monday night and have an early day coming up- so- detailed exegesis will wait, a few comments i can't refrain from and are salient enough to me (hopefully to you)-
'I', 'here', 'now' are not flaccid designators. They are rigid. Rigidity applies to content, not character. Character is a function that maps contexts onto contents. Content is a function that maps possible worlds onto extensions. (So content is intensional. And we are externalists about content. :-))Now I remain [Z] (zero-place predicate denoting 'exists in that world') regardless of the flaccid designators that denote me and that vary from world to world (say the one in which I am female, the one in which I am not a basket case, the one in which my previous post to you wasn't lost (aggg!); I am me, just as Richard Nixon would still be Nixon even if not named 'Nixon' in many of the possible worlds in which the zero-place predicate [Nixon] has an extension denoting a member of those worlds.
Now 'now', here' and so on are also rigid. But of course only with respect to their content; their characters (which are also part of the senses of these terms) are not constant. By content Kaplan means more or less what everyone means when they talk about 'propositions' (it always comes down to those, right? Well, all that matters is that we are good content-externalists!)Characters are neither rigid nor flaccid; they are constant or inconstant. 'I' is not constant. But I can only use it to point to [Z], your friend from the tail end of the alphabet, no matter what world I am in or what flaccid designators pick me out.
Addendum largely unrelated: Counterpart theory is strangely satisfying. When I am at my lowest, I can always think of how my counterparts are having a great time, and rather than making me jealous of them, I feel oddly consoled. It's like, they're part of the team, and even though I'm slacking off, they're getting the job done. Strange, huh?
Posted by zeugma on August 29, 2005, at 23:00:46
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on August 29, 2005, at 22:40:14
this is one of those terms that i obsess over late at night. I am terrible at grammar but am obsessed with it. Presumably a zero-place predicate is one that has no hole to fill. If [Z] exists in a world, then the function that [Z] represents is available for entry into statements made about [Z]. [Z] is just there. Intransitivive verb: one-place predicate: x breathes. Transitive verb: x loves y. The letters represent holes that must be filled before a statement can be made, or a sentence uttered. I suppose that 'zero-place predicates' (of which 'exists' is the only one of which I can think offhand) are a way of saying what Kant said: 'existence is not a predicate.' (I'm quoting secondhand.) Existence just means you can put it on the left-hand side of a copula (itself a term that does not really mean) so you can make a meaningful statement when a real predicate is appended.
-z
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